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ARTICLES 
THE EMERGENT LOGIC OF HEALTH 
LAW 
M. GREGG BLOCHE∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The American health care system is on a glide path toward ruin. 
Health spending has become the fiscal equivalent of global warming, and 
the number of uninsured Americans is approaching fifty million. Can law 
help to divert our country from this path? There are reasons for deep 
skepticism. Law governs the provision and financing of medical care in 
fragmented and incoherent fashion. Commentators from diverse 
perspectives bemoan this chaos, casting it as an obstacle to change. I 
contend in this Article that pessimism about health law’s prospects is 
unjustified, but that a new understanding of health law’s disarray is 
urgently needed to guide reform. My core proposition is that the law of 
health care provision is best understood as an emergent system. Its 
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contradictions and dysfunctions cannot be repaired by some master design. 
No one actor has a grand overview—or the power to impose a unifying 
vision. Countless market players, public planners, and legal and regulatory 
decisionmakers interact in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with, reinforcing, and 
adjusting to each other. Out of these interactions, a larger scheme 
emerges—one that incorporates the health sphere’s competing interests 
and values. Change in this system, for worse and for better, arises from the 
interplay between its myriad actors. 
By quitting the quest for a single, master design, we can better focus 
our efforts on possibilities for legal and policy change. We can and should 
continuously survey the landscape of stakeholders and expectations with an 
eye toward potential launching points for evolutionary processes—
processes that leverage current institutions and incentives. What we cannot 
do is plan or predict these evolutionary pathways in precise detail; the 
complexity of interactions among market and government actors precludes 
fine-grained foresight of this sort. But we can determine the general 
direction of needed change, identify seemingly intractable obstacles, and 
envision ways to diminish or finesse them over time. Dysfunctional legal 
doctrines, interest group expectations, consumers’ anxieties, and embedded 
institutional and cultural barriers can all be dealt with in this way, in 
iterative fashion. This Article sets out a strategy for doing so. To illustrate 
this strategy, I suggest emergent approaches to the most urgent challenges 
in health care policy and law—the crises of access, value, and cost. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American health care system is on a glide path toward ruin. 
Medical spending is rising at an unsustainable rate: it is on track to reach 
30 percent of gross domestic product (“GDP”) a quarter century from now 
and half of GDP within seventy-five years.1 The number of Americans 
without health insurance is approaching fifty million,2 and surging 
unemployment could push this figure much higher.3 Most of the care that 
 
 1. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE 
SPENDING 12 (2007). These CBO projections presume excess cost growth rates (rates by which medical 
cost increases exceed GDP growth) for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health spending that are well 
below historical averages. Were medical costs to continue to rise at historical rates, health spending 
would soar to an unimaginable 100 percent of GDP within seventy-five years. Id. app. D. 
 2. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated the ranks of the uninsured to be forty-seven million in 
2006 (just before the onset of the current recession). CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. 
PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 18 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-
233.pdf. 
 3. A rough rule of thumb is that each 1 percent rise in the unemployment rate boosts the number 
of uninsured adults by 1.1 million (job loss is thought not to substantially increase the number of 
children without insurance since children who lose coverage are typically eligible for Medicaid or 
SCHIP). KARYN SCHWARTZ, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH 
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patients receive is of unproven value, and up to one hundred thousand 
Americans die prematurely each year from medical mistakes.4 So it is for 
good reason that health reform has returned to the top of the nation’s 
political agenda. A decade and a half after the collapse of President 
Clinton’s health reform plan, Americans are again pressing for relief from 
soaring costs and telling pollsters and politicians that they want medical 
care for all. The main difference, this time, is that the problems have grown 
much worse. 
Are law and lawyers part of the cure? The prevailing view among 
health care reformers today is that lawyers have little to offer. Sure, statutes 
need to be drafted, laws must be enforced, and clients need to be told how 
to comply, but many reformers see these as technical tasks, requiring little 
insight or imagination. Lawyers should follow the dots that policymakers 
draw.5 Within legal academia as well, there is much skepticism about 
health law: many do not view it as worthy of separate study. Such 
skepticism might seem anomalous, since America is awash in health law. 
Terabytes of legal text address the provision and financing of medical care, 
mandating and constraining all manner of activities. But does this vast 
 
COVERAGE IN A PERIOD OF RISING UNEMPLOYMENT 8 (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
uninsured/upload/7842.pdf. Thus, for example, were the unemployment rate to reach double digits (10 
percent)—five percentage points higher than the December 2007 unemployment rate—the number of 
uninsured adults would rise by 5.5 million. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Labor 
Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/ 
SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000 (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 4. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING 
A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (estimating, based on extrapolations 
from New York, Colorado, and Utah data, that between forty-four thousand and ninety-eight thousand 
Americans die prematurely from medical errors each year). 
 5. Christopher Jennings, President Clinton’s senior health policy advisor from 1994 through 
2000 (and chief health policy advisor to Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign) 
states that health care policy is the province of people with expertise in politics, economics, and 
medicine and public health, not law. Lawyers, he argues, should limit themselves to advising and 
advocating for their clients—and to implementing and enforcing policies formulated by others with 
relevant expertise. Interview with Christopher Jennings, President, Jennings Policy Strategies (Mar. 
2007). Lawyers played peripheral roles in developing President Clinton’s health reform plan, numerous 
participants in that process have told me, and President George W. Bush’s health reform proposals 
(emphasizing high-deductible health plans and medical savings accounts) were developed by economist 
Katherine Baicker (a member of the Council of Economic Advisors) and her staff. Interview with 
Katherine Baicker, Member, Council of Economic Advisors (July 2006). To be sure, lawyers drafted 
the legislation that Presidents Clinton and Bush submitted to Congress, but they had minimal roles in 
formulating the concepts behind it. Lawyers have been similarly peripheral, so far, in the development 
of President Obama’s nascent health care reform plans, though these plans present intricate questions of 
regulatory governance. Economists (with some input from political scientists and physicians) have thus 
far led the way: no legal scholar or practitioner participated in the presidential transition’s health policy 
team, and only a few served on or advised the transition’s Health & Human Services Department 
review team. 
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body of law have a distinctive purpose or mission, or is it merely the sum 
total of diverse doctrines that happen to apply in the health sphere? To 
borrow from Judge Frank Easterbrook, who chided “cyberlaw” on these 
grounds, does it make as little sense to study health care law as it does “the 
law of the horse?”6 Laws govern the sale, theft, and racing of horses, but 
they do not thereby constitute a field of inquiry,7 let alone reform-minded 
action. Scholars who devote much of their energy to health law8 are made 
uncomfortable by this question9—and by the status anxiety it invites.10 The 
 
 6. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 
207. 
 7. This is not to say that laws pertaining to horses do not matter, but it is to suggest that the law 
of the horse is not usefully analyzed as a discrete field. “Far better for most students—better, even, for 
those who plan to go into the horse trade—to take courses in property, torts, commercial transactions, 
and the like . . . . Only by putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about commercial 
endeavors could one really understand the law about horses.” Id. at 208. 
 8. The number of these is difficult to estimate, but a fair measure may be the one hundred or so 
attendees that are typical at the annual Health Law Professors Conference, sponsored by the American 
Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics. See 2008 Health Law Professors Conference—Description, 
https://www.aslme.org/aslmesecure/info/description.php?conf_id=70 (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Most 
of these attendees hold faculty positions at law schools; others teach in schools of medicine and public 
health. 
 9. The law-of-the-horse put-down has provoked a series of responses from leading health law 
scholars. See Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 365 (2006); Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 391 (2006); Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (2006). Earlier, George Annas wondered whether health law could be 
distinguished from “law and a banana,” George J. Annas, Health Law at the Turn of the Century: From 
White Dwarf to Red Giant, 21 CONN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1989), and Hall—along with Mary Anne 
Bobinski and David Orentlicher—fretted that health law’s topics were connected by “happenstance,” 
like “the law of green things or the law of Tuesdays,” MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID 
ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS, at xxxi (6th ed. 2003). 
 10. This anxiety is justified by the peculiarities of legal academia’s pecking order. As Henry 
Greely has pointed out, publications in elite medical and health policy venues like the New England 
Journal of Medicine and Health Affairs do not count for much when a candidate is being considered for 
a law faculty position or for tenure. And elite law reviews—those at schools near the top of the U.S. 
News & World Report rankings—rarely publish articles on health law topics. Since publication in these 
venues is the principal metric of scholarly accomplishment when hiring and tenure are at issue, would-
be health law scholars face a competitive disadvantage. Greely, supra note 9, at 400–02. A glimpse at 
legal academia’s skepticism about health law as a field was recently afforded by litigation (and 
discovery) that followed the University of Michigan Law School’s denial of tenure to Peter Hammer in 
2002. Hammer sued the school, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, obtained his tenure 
file, and posted its contents on a website. A law school committee voted to grant him tenure, but at least 
one panel member, James J. White, dissented. White won a sufficient percentage of “no” votes from the 
full faculty to turn down the committee’s recommendation (the faculty voted 18-12 to tenure Hammer; 
he thus fell two votes short of the two thirds majority that Michigan requires). Hammer v. University of 
Michigan, Peter Hammer’s Lawsuit Against the University of Michigan Law School, 
http://wayneoutlaws.org/hammer_v_umich/background (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). In a memo 
explaining his dissent, White acknowledged that Hammer “has been recognized by many in the health 
law field as one of the most prominent students of antitrust law’s application to the health care 
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question is, of course, rhetorical; the point meant by those who pose it is 
that the “best” legal thinking stays within bounds—bounds drawn by 
established doctrinal category (tort, contract, etc.) or disciplinary method 
(philosophy, history, or law and economics). 
The unspoken corollary is that the best scholars and practitioners, even 
on health law topics, are those who combine elite credentials of the classic 
sort with professional commitment to a legal category or analytic method. 
Thus, for example, medical malpractice law’s conundrums are best 
explored by scholars with a rich understanding of tort law theory, or by 
economists using sophisticated mathematical models and statistical 
methods. And the legal governance of competition between health care 
providers is best understood by antitrust lawyers with command of relevant 
market analysis, rule-of-reason doctrine, and the economics of collusion. In 
this view, a sophisticated grasp of health care systems and medical 
decisionmaking is of secondary import. Lawyers can do more for the 
regulatory governance of medicine, and for law’s coherence, by not 
treating health care as different from other endeavors that law governs. 
Health law scholars and practitioners have responded to the law-of-
the-horse challenge in two ways. Some have argued that medical care 
provision and financing is indeed different—so unique and complicated 
that it calls for an integrated regulatory governance strategy, cutting across 
doctrinal boundaries.11 Others, especially practitioners, have more or less 
accepted the law-of-the-horse problem as an endemic feature of the field. 
They have eschewed grand theory in favor of practical questions within one 
 
industry.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition at exhibit 7, 
Hammer v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., No. 04-241 (Mich. Ct. Cl. June 20, 2006) [hereinafter 
Plaintiff’s Brief], available at http://wayneoutlaws.org/hammer_v_umich/plaintiffs-opposition-to-
defendants-motion-for-reconsideration. But White said this merited “less weight” than the views of 
antitrust law scholars. Id. Criticizing Hammer—who is both a lawyer and an economist—for having 
“little contact with law and economic scholars outside of the health care field,” White concluded, “I do 
not believe that we can rely on the judgment of those in health care about the tenure standards that an 
elite law school should use.” Id. 
 11. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 22–28 (1995) (calling for 
reinterpretation of health care law’s diverse doctrines to support market competition among health 
plans); James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and 
State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459 (1994) (same). See also M. Gregg 
Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 299–300 (2003) (urging that the task of 
health law be reconceived as mediation among medical care’s competing therapeutic, caring, and other 
purposes); Elhauge, supra note 9, at 388–90 (urging harmonization of health law doctrines to support a 
reform strategy that incorporates market competition, universal coverage, the setting of spending limits 
via political means, and some deference to physician judgment); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s 
Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health 
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 630 n.131 (2003) (proposing that health care law be formulated based on 
“therapeutic jurisprudence” principles). 
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or another policy sphere.12 Health care law matters greatly (and merits 
respect as a field), they say, because the subjects it addresses are socially 
important, and close attention to health care’s complexities yields more 
pertinent insights than does preoccupation with doctrinal categories or 
disciplinary methods. 
There are thus, broadly speaking, three “takes” among lawyers on the 
field’s prospects and problems. One is rejectionist: the law of the horse 
does not merit separate study. Get the doctrine right, within each legal 
category, and the results will be good, or at least legitimate, for health care 
and all other endeavors. The second calls on lawyers to agree on a unifying 
account of what diverse legal and regulatory schemes should accomplish in 
the health care sphere. The third tells health lawyers not to fret about 
theory: get the policy right, case by case, by paying heed to law’s practical 
impact, and do not worry about coherence in the abstract, either within or 
across doctrinal realms. 
I shall argue herein that health law has enormous potential to 
ameliorate our nation’s worsening crises of medical care access, cost, and 
quality, but that none of these approaches can fulfill this promise. Health 
law rejectionists, I will contend, ignore the urgency of legal coordination. 
Pursuit of rigor within doctrinal categories and regulatory regimes can 
create incoherence in the governance of health care provision. Legal tools 
that are well designed for some purposes yield dysfunctional results when 
they work poorly in concert. Proponents of grand theory promise to solve 
this coordination problem, but basing all of health care law on a single 
paradigm is not possible. The law of health care provision, like medicine 
 
 12. See Greely, supra note 9, at 406–07 (advising health law scholars not to fret about the 
absence of an agreed-on organizing paradigm and to instead get on with the work of analyzing health 
care law’s diverse problems). It is my impression (for which I do not claim proof) that health law 
scholars with left-of-center politics have been less inclined than have those toward the right to press for 
recognition of one or another overarching theory—and more inclined to press for particular legal 
changes without giving great weight to theory. Sara Rosenbaum, for example, has focused on 
expanding health care access and bringing civil rights law to bear on racial disparities in care. See Sara 
Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Addressing Racial Inequality in Health Care, in POLICY CHALLENGES 
IN MODERN HEALTH CARE 135 (David Mechanic et al. eds., 2005). George Annas has emphasized the 
importance of safeguarding patient autonomy and, more recently, the protection of professional 
discretion from encroachment by powerful, market-driven institutions. E.g., George J. Annas & Frances 
H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the 
U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357, 369 (1994). Alex Capron has focused on insulating the 
physician-patient relationship from market pressures. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, At Law: 
Between Doctor and Patient, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 23, 24. And Rand Rosenblatt 
has focused on resisting the stratification of health care quality based on ability to pay. E.g., Rand E. 
Rosenblatt, Rationing “Normal” Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1407–
16 (1981). 
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itself, pursues diverse and conflicting aims. Organizing the legal 
governance of medicine around any one theory is bound to neglect some of 
these aims. Such neglect, I will contend, is incompatible with stable 
governance. Theory, nevertheless, is indispensable. Too often, health 
lawyers ignore the big picture, urging solutions to practical problems 
without heeding the connections between moving parts. Coherence matters, 
even if it can never be complete, owing to health law’s competing goals. 
This will lead me to a sharply different conception of health care law. 
My central contention is that the law of health care provision and the health 
care system itself are best understood and acted on as emergent systems. 
This understanding comes to terms with health law’s seeming chaos—its 
emanation from disconnected regulatory and judicial decision makers, and 
from myriad, separate doctrinal spheres. As with all emergent systems, 
these many inputs interact in unpredictable ways, clashing with, 
reinforcing, and reacting to each other. No one actor is in position to sort 
out these influences. No one actor takes a grand overview. There is no 
center of command and control. The health care policy this system 
produces is the sum total of these inputs and of mutual adjustments by 
stakeholders and decisionmakers. 
What legal scholars and practitioners who specialize in health care 
have to offer thus falls short of an ability to influence the law in top-down 
fashion. Yet their contributions can make a critical difference. By virtue of 
their disinterestedness,13 understanding of clinical practice and health 
systems, and grasp of relevant fields of law, they are best situated to see 
how the moving parts fit together. They can glimpse, albeit imperfectly,14 
beyond contiguous interactions between colliding doctrines, rival 
stakeholders, and decision makers with overlapping authority. They are 
thereby able to counsel changes of course that take account of effects 
throughout the health care system, while giving weight to legal values such 
as due process and doctrinal coherence. They can amplify, dampen, or 
redirect the flow of policy influence through networks of legal and 
 
 13. They are, of course, not literally disinterested—they have preferences and passions (and 
perhaps even clients and consulting arrangements in the health care industry)—but they are not wholly 
committed to serving stakeholders’ interests, as are legal practitioners, legislative advocates, and 
hospital and health plan officials. 
 14. Scholars of health care law cannot be expected to have fine grain knowledge of medical 
practice, the organization and financing of care, or the myriad legal doctrines and regulatory 
frameworks that govern medical care provision and financing. Competent specialists in each of these 
areas will have richer “local” knowledge. Health law scholars are akin to general contractors: they 
should be sufficiently informed to see the connections and to tap specialized expertise when it can add 
substantial value. 
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regulatory decision makers, as well as health care industry actors. Health 
lawyers, in short, can shape the dynamics of emergence, guiding the law 
toward accommodations among its many aims. 
I shall proceed as follows. Part II will weigh the three, above-
described stances toward health care law: rejectionism, the quest for a 
unifying analytic framework, and the pursuit of solutions to practical 
problems with little regard for either legal coherence or connections 
between the health system’s moving parts. I will consider each stance in 
stylized form. In practice, the lines between them are blurry, and health law 
commentators often cross over. Using examples from diverse doctrinal 
realms, I will argue that each of these stances ignores critical aspects of 
health law’s role, and that none offer an adequate account of what health 
law’s decision makers should try to achieve. In Part III, I will make the 
case for considering the legal governance of health care as an emergent 
system, unguided by any one actor and thus not susceptible to any centrally 
imposed paradigm. Health care law’s contradictions, I will contend, make 
sense in bottom-up terms, as the product of competing perspectives and 
concerns that the law must accommodate. These contradictions give rise to 
feedback among legal decision makers, feedback that sculpts health law in 
self-organizing fashion as these decision makers react to each other. 
In Part IV, I will urge a reform strategy that rests on an understanding 
of health care’s governance as an emergent system. I will argue for a 
reimagining of the role of law as an instrument of health reform—a shift 
from linear pursuit of specific policy objectives to a quest for evolutionary 
pathways toward reformers’ ultimate efficiency, equity, and other goals. 
Competing values and stakeholders, not grand designs, drive health law’s 
evolution. Reform-minded actors therefore should become opportunists. 
They should look for potential evolutionary pathways that launch from 
present-day institutional arrangements and incentives. And they should 
pursue legal and policy interventions that push our health system along 
these pathways, powered by stakeholders’ and legal decisionmakers’ 
interacting responses. The key here is to craft interventions that are 
“nonlinear” (in emergent systems argot)—interventions that achieve large, 
long-term impact through minimally disruptive short-term change. To 
illustrate this strategy, I will offer approaches to some of the most urgent 
challenges facing health care reformers. 
II.  THREE “TAKES” ON HEALTH CARE LAW 
There is wide agreement that the law of health care provision, like our 
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medical care delivery system, is in disarray. Commentators who attempt 
overviews of the field reach this conclusion unfailingly,15 each discovering 
anew that chaos reigns and that the law sends incompatible, often 
incomprehensible messages to health care payers, providers, and 
consumers. Astonishingly complicated regulations cover such matters as 
Medicare fraud and abuse16 and the tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals and 
health plans.17 Frustratingly convoluted case law governs Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preemption18 of state efforts to 
regulate health plans19 and expand medical coverage.20 Further confusion 
besets health care antitrust law,21 medical liability, and other regulatory 
realms. 
Legal scholars bemoan this, since they are lovers of coherence. They 
 
 15. E.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at xxxi; Bloche, supra note 11; Elhauge, supra note 9. 
 16. Physician Financial Relationships with, and referrals to, Health Care Entities, 60 Fed. Reg. 
41,914 (Aug. 14, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411); Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities 
with Which They Have Financial Relationship (Phase I), 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 4, 2001) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 411, 424); Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial 
Relationship (Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054 (Mar. 26, 2004) (same), Physicians’ Referrals to Health 
Care Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationship (Phase III), 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012 (Sept. 5, 
2007) (same). 
 17. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(e) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.509(a)-3 (2008). 
 18. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). Even the 
U.S. Supreme Court has commented unfavorably on the vagueness and confusion of ERISA preemption 
law. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002) (stating that “congressional 
language seems simultaneously to preempt everything and hardly anything”). 
 19. See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It: 
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 534 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, 
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption]; Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or 
“One Good Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 89–90 (2005) 
[hereinafter Korobkin, Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans]. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 
200 (2004), put the question of employer-sponsored health plans’ liability for coverage denials to rest 
by holding that ERISA preempts state tort liability. 
 20. Several states, including Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and Maryland, are 
considering (or, in Massachusetts’ case, implementing) plans that would expand coverage in part by 
requiring employers to choose between providing coverage themselves, or paying taxes or fees to 
support state-sponsored coverage. ERISA preemption jeopardizes these efforts. See, e.g., Retail Indus. 
Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA preempts Maryland’s 
so-called Wal-Mart law, requiring firms with ten thousand or more employees to spend 8 percent or 
more of their payrolls on medical coverage for their workers); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk 
County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). But see Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a San Francisco 
mandate requiring employers either to provide medical coverage or pay into a city-administered health 
fund is likely to survive preemption); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639 
(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that ERISA does not preempt a San Francisco mandate requiring employers 
either to provide medical coverage or pay into a city-administered health fund). 
 21. See Peter J. Hammer & William H. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 637 (2002). 
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ascribe the chaos variously to ignorant legislators, inept agency 
bureaucrats, clueless judges, and the power of interest groups to shape the 
law to their liking. Academics who write about health law also get some of 
the blame. It has become conventional wisdom within hiring and tenure 
committees at elite law schools that scholarship in this field is poor and that 
the supply of exciting prospects is thin by comparison with corporate law, 
antitrust, and other established subjects.22 Both health law rejectionism and 
advocacy of a cross-cutting paradigm are responses to the field’s disarray. 
Proponents of case-by-case pragmatism treat this disarray as beside the 
point—irrelevant to the work of making health care more available, 
effective, efficient, and fair. 
A.  REJECTIONISM: THE CASE AGAINST HEALTH LAW 
The law-of-the-horse put-down works by connotation, not crystalline 
logic. The problem with horses is that they are passé.23 Other areas of law 
are no less of a doctrinal and statutory jumble, yet they are widely taught, 
and some have considerable scholarly cachet. Environmental law is an 
example.24 It would not have worked as witticism for Easterbrook. It has 
become a fixture of curricula at almost all law schools, including the U.S. 
News & World Report elite. Articles on environmental matters appear often 
in the toniest student-edited law reviews—health law articles do not25— 
and the U.S. Supreme Court regularly hears high profile environmental 
cases. As Einer Elhauge points out, even some of the classics of the law 
school curriculum began as hodgepodges. Tort law dates back many 
centuries, but contract law (as an integrated field) does not: it is a mélange 
of once-separate subjects, such as suretyship, admiralty, and the law of 
 
 22. The Peter Hammer affair—due to the discovery process that followed his lawsuit against the 
University of Michigan for denial of tenure—became the occasion for rare public expression of this 
sentiment. See supra note 10. But I have heard it expressed frequently, in private, in conversations 
about faculty hiring with legal scholars at elite schools. 
 23. The “law of the horse” itself is not quite passé, as my colleague, Michael Seidman, could not 
resist pointing out. Books on the subject include: DONALD CASSELL & R.J.F. GORDON, THE HORSE AND 
THE LAW (1987); JULIE I. FERSHTMAN, EQUINE LAW & HORSE SENSE (1996); BRENDA GILLIGAN, 
PRACTICAL HORSE LAW (2002); EDWARD H. GREENE, THE LAW AND YOUR HORSE (1971); MURRAY 
LORING, YOUR HORSE AND THE LAW (1975); JULIE MACKENZIE, HORSE LAW (2001); C.L. PANNAM, 
THE HORSE AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1986); THEODORE JOHN SOPHIAN, HORSES AND THE LAW (1972); 
JOHN WEATHERILL, HORSES AND THE LAW (1979). 
 24. One could say equally of environmental law and the law of the horse that they are constituted 
by “property, torts, commercial transactions, and the like.” Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 208. Indeed, 
environmental law is much more of a hodgepodge than is the law of the horse, since myriad state and 
federal regulatory regimes contribute to it. 
 25. See supra note 10. 
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sales.26 So a field’s being a doctrinal admixture is no bar to its becoming an 
important focus for scholars and an established part of the curriculum. 
Another factor, not the hodgepodge problem, drives health law 
rejectionism. Legal categories are malleable over time, as the case of 
contract law illustrates, but the categories that govern at any given moment 
carry great weight. In all human endeavors, categories frame perceptions 
and thereby shape decisions. But law’s categories are special. Young 
lawyers are taught to venerate them and to make arguments that treat them 
as givens. The practice of law is, in large measure, the translation of real-
world occurrences into narratives that fit into particular legal categories—
say, elements of a cause of action, prerequisites for a binding agreement, or 
triggers for regulatory intervention. Students, especially in their first year, 
are assessed and ranked based on their ability to perform these acts of 
translation with aplomb, on behalf of hypothetical clients or causes. Law’s 
categories anchor this enterprise, and disregard for them will not do. 
This conservatism about categories is at the heart of law’s morality. It 
constrains legal decisionmakers’ discretion27 and thus limits what lawyers 
can plausibly argue on their clients’ behalf. It is central to what we mean by 
due process. Its powerful corollary is the importance of interpretive 
consistency and coherence both within and between legal categories.28 
These are not merely ideals of craft, or further safeguards against 
arbitrariness; they are answers to a bounded-rationality problem. Legal 
categories invite endless bids for special exceptions, based on claims of 
unique circumstance. But lawyerly cognition is not up to the task of fully 
appreciating the fractal geometry of special circumstances. Legal 
decisionmakers who craft exceptions to rules and categories, especially 
those that govern complex fields of endeavor, are at high risk for getting 
things wrong.29 They also risk producing inconsistent results and thereby 
undermining confidence in rule-of-law values. 
 
 26. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 366–67. 
 27. The extent to which law’s categories and procedures constrain discretion is, of course, much 
disputed—this large question has long been one of the central foci of legal scholarship for the past 
century. E.g., Frederick Shauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1915–17 (2004). 
 28. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 219–24 (1986). 
 29. The Supreme Court cited this concern in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), as a 
reason for rejecting a health plan subscriber’s bid to construe ERISA to bar some, but not all, financial 
rewards to physicians for withholding costly treatments. Holding that ERISA’s fiduciary duty 
provisions did not apply to a health plan’s attending physicians, the Court said it lacked the health 
policy expertise necessary to distinguish between acceptable and troublesome incentives to clinical 
caregivers to practice frugally, and thus would not apply ERISA fiduciary duty principles to the practice 
of medicine. Id. at 222, 231–33. 
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Skepticism toward health law reflects this conservatism about 
categories—and associated concerns about consistency and coherence. 
Claims that one or another aspect of medical care merits distinctive 
treatment under tort, contract, or antitrust law invite allegations of special 
pleading and anxiety about departure from the rule of law. The proposition 
that a unifying paradigm for the legal governance of health care ought to 
trump interpretive consistency within doctrinal spheres raises an even 
greater spectre of lawlessness. Health law’s low standing among academics 
is a byproduct of these misgivings. 
As environmental law illustrates, such misgivings need not be 
decisive: a subject’s public import and social cachet can inspire legal 
decisionmakers (and scholars) to shift their professional focus toward 
policy coherence across doctrinal categories.30 But health law has not yet 
won such recognition. Courts and regulators have been reluctant to sculpt 
legal doctrines to accommodate health care’s peculiarities. To be sure, 
there are exceptions. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, judges bent the law 
of ERISA preemption to permit patients to sue health plans for medical 
negligence.31 Likewise, courts have from time to time applied antitrust law 
with a wink to let doctors and hospitals collaborate, purportedly on 
patients’ behalf.32 But judges have eschewed explicit reliance on any 
overarching governance model for health care. Instead, they have typically 
pursued doctrinal coherence in disparate realms of law, with little regard 
for the health policy consequences. They have, for example, sustained 
 
 30. This is not to say that environmental law (or any other “hodgepodge” field) achieves such 
coherence—sharp differences over such matters as the role of cost-benefit analysis stand in the way. It 
is merely to say that pursuit of such coherence across diverse doctrinal spheres and regulatory schemes 
is a widely recognized environmental law goal. 
 31. Section 514 of ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to” fringe benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144 (2006). To allow patients to sue HMOs in state courts for negligent care by staff physicians, 
some courts characterized HMOs as medical care providers rather than as components of employers’ 
fringe benefit plans. See Bloche, supra note 11, at 301; Korobkin, Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 
supra note 19, at 535. And to circumvent ERISA preemption of actions against employer-provided 
health plans for negligent refusal to authorize services, some courts characterized health plans’ 
utilization management decisions as medical rather than administrative. Korobkin, Reinterpreting 
ERISA Preemption, supra note 19, at 522. The former characterization has thus far survived; the latter 
was rejected by the Supreme Court in 2004. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) 
(holding that ERISA preempts state actions against health plans for negligent denial of medical 
coverage). 
 32. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 771–73 (1999) (upholding a professional 
society’s restraints on advertising as procompetitive on the ground that they protected patients against 
misleading claims). Some market-oriented health law scholars have been sharply critical of courts’ 
willingness to soften their application of antitrust principles when confronted with claims from 
professionals that unmitigated competition might harm patients. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Health 
Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 939, 949–53 (2001). 
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medical malpractice law’s deference to extant clinical practice patterns, 
impeding efforts to make medical care more evidence based33 and cost 
sensitive.34 And they have, for the most part, enforced antitrust principles 
with vigor, in pursuit of a free-market vision for medicine that strains 
against tort law’s more egalitarian approach to specifying the range of 
allowable clinical alternatives.35 
Congress and the federal agencies with authority over medical care 
financing and provision have shown, if anything, less regard than the courts 
for the health policy impact of their decisions. The convolutions of 
Medicare fraud and abuse law, Medicare payment to hospitals and health 
plans, tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals, and rules governing health 
information privacy reflect the triumph of interest-group power and 
compromises among competing stakeholders. Additional regulatory 
convolutions play out at the state level. Constraints on potentially 
duplicative capital investment by hospitals dampen competition that 
antitrust law aims to encourage.36 Statutes requiring health insurers to 
cover particular services or provider types are products of interest group 
 
 33. A much publicized RAND Corporation study of clinical decisionmaking found that 
American patients receive only 54.9 percent of “recommended care” when measured against a set of 
more than four hundred evidence-based best-practice standards. Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The 
Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2642 
tbl.3 (2003). This is hardly a vote of confidence in extant practice patterns, or in the longstanding 
medical tort law policy of deference to these patterns, whether or not scientific evidence supports them. 
 34. Extant practice patterns have been forged largely by fee-for-service incentives, which 
discourage economizing, and by accompanying patient expectations of all possible beneficial care. 
 35. The free-market vision allows for multiple levels and standards of care tied to patients’ 
ability and willingness to pay. HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 23–25. Tort law, by contrast, presumes a 
unitary standard of care, with only slight downward flexibility when health care providers can show 
they were operating under resource constraints. Since clinical practice patterns vary widely, CTR. FOR 
THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCIS., DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 91–104 (1999); John E. Wennberg & Philip 
G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine 
Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 937–41 & figs. 1–2 (2002), the idea of a 
unitary standard of care is mythic, but it is nevertheless an obstacle to formal legal recognition of 
multiple tiers of care. 
 36. As of mid-2008, thirty-six states require that a hospital obtain a Certificate of Need (“CON”) 
in order to commence some capital projects, such as construction of a new wing or acquisition of new 
equipment with costs above some statutory threshold level. National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/cert-
need.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (2008). The premise behind CON 
regulation—that rivalries among hospitals tend to generate wasteful overcapacity—is at war with the 
antitrust law premise that competition hones efficiency. Though health law commentators have been 
making this point for a generation, see, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and 
Services by “Certificate of Need,” 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973), robust CON regulation and antitrust 
enforcement persist, side by side. 
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competition,37 rather than an overarching understanding of what medical 
coverage should include. A comprehensive survey of health care law’s 
crosscurrents and eddies (and contradictory policy messages) is beyond my 
scope here. But one is not needed to underscore the point that pursuit of 
policy coherence across disconnected doctrinal categories and regulatory 
regimes has not yet become a driving force for health law decisionmakers. 
Legal academia’s rejectionist stance toward health law both reflects 
and reinforces courts’ and regulators’ desultory approach to health care 
policy coherence. An entry-level scholar would be ill advised, from a 
careerist point of view, to plunge deeply into health care’s institutional and 
clinical peculiarities.38 It is better, or at least safer, to offer a new take on an 
oft-pondered doctrinal question or to develop an elegant economic model, 
whether or not its assumptions come close to capturing health care’s 
realities. Even if the model’s premises are profoundly mistaken, the 
professional risks to the modeler are low. This is because only a few 
scattered scholars of health law and policy are sufficiently knowledgeable 
and well positioned to assess the fit between the model’s premises and 
health care’s peculiarities, and to gain an audience for their criticisms.39 An 
early-career scholar can get things fundamentally wrong, from a health 
policy perspective, while making a stunningly positive impression on 
colleagues who are unfamiliar with health care. 
These perverse professional incentives lock in health law rejectionism 
and reduce legal academia’s ability to contribute to the rationalization of 
health care’s regulatory governance. In view of the enormity of our health 
system’s problems, this desultory approach to its governance is a costly 
indulgence. Mark Hall and Elhauge have argued that health law deserves 
recognition as a “field” because medical care and its financing are 
distinctive, even unique, in ways that matter for the application of law.40 I 
 
 37. Interest groups at play in statehouses across the country include providers’ trade associations 
and patient advocacy groups, which tend to push for expansion of coverage for particular services, and 
insurers and employers, which resist new coverage mandates in order to control costs and maintain 
market flexibility. 
 38. Such an intellectual immersion is at high risk of yielding work that strikes legal scholars as of 
limited reach and therefore uninteresting. 
 39. See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 10 (asserting that an elite law school should give little weight 
to the opinions of health law scholars when assessing tenure candidates’ work). 
 40. Both state that health care’s distinctive features are so important to the analysis of legal 
issues that an industry-wide focus is preferable to treatment of health care as just another application of 
generic legal doctrines. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 361; Elhauge, supra note 9, at 380. Elhauge 
distinguishes his argument from Hall’s by chiding Hall for failing to say why medicine’s unique 
features merit treatment of health law as a separate field. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 380–81. But Hall 
does point to particular features that he says might merit separate legal treatment: these include the 
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would press this further. Fixing America’s health care mess is a matter of 
national urgency, and an integrated approach to the development of health 
law will be essential to any solution. 
The high stakes are familiar but worth underscoring. Continuation of 
the growth in medical spending that has persisted over the past several 
decades41 will ensure federal fiscal catastrophe. To support Medicare and 
Medicaid at this rate of growth, the percentage of GDP that goes to taxes 
would need to rise by nearly one-third by 2030 and more than one-half by 
2040. By 2050, it would need to nearly double. Failure to keep pace with 
this schedule of shockingly large tax increases would lock in unsustainable 
budget deficits.42 Absent this Medicare and Medicaid growth, we would 
face no such nightmare scenario: tax revenues could remain stable, at 18.3 
percent of GDP (the average rate in recent decades), without a long-term 
federal deficit.43 The sustained gap between rates of medical spending 
increase and growth throughout the rest of the economy also threatens the 
ability of businesses to compete in world markets while employing 
Americans. Germany and Canada, our closest health spending rivals, spend 
 
vulnerability of patients, the professional ideals of health care providers, the role of trust and 
dependency in relations between the two, and medicine’s existential stakes. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 358. These features, he says, deserve separate treatment, including a departure from generic legal 
doctrine, to the extent that they matter when law is applied. Id. at 361. This is circular reasoning, one 
might say, but, for Hall, it frames the question of what health law is about: “[I]t [is not] necessary to 
agree on what are all the special features of medicine, much less how and why they should matter in 
particular areas of law. Debating, disagreeing, and figuring this out is what health law scholarship 
does.” Id. Elhauge’s approach fits within Hall’s framework. Elhauge suggests that medical care 
deserves distinctive legal treatment because it encompasses a unique set of relationships among 
patients, doctors, hospitals, insurers, employers, and the state. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 369–70. He 
notes that other fields, including property and family law, are defined in terms of their governance over 
distinct sets of relations, id., and he proposes to apply a mix of market theory, political authority, 
professional judgment, and moral thinking about autonomy and equity to the problems that these 
relations pose. Id. at 381–89. 
 41. Since 1960, American health care spending has outpaced income growth by an average of 2.7 
percentage points per year. Henry J. Aaron, Budget Prospects and Health Policy, in BEYOND LEARNED 
HELPLESSNESS: SOLVING AMERICA’S MEDICAL COST CONUNDRUM (G. Bloche & L. Meltzer eds., 
forthcoming 2010). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 1 (projecting unsustainable 
increases in both public and private sector medical spending absent dramatic policy changes). 
 42. Assuming no increase in the percentage of GDP going to taxes, the federal deficit would rise 
from just over 1 percent of GDP in 2005 to almost 8 percent of GDP in 2030, nearly 12 percent in 2040, 
and 16 percent in 2050. Aaron, supra note 41 (citing Congressional Budget Office projections). 
 43. Id. As Aaron notes, neither long-term Social Security obligations nor growth in other 
entitlement programs are projected to make substantial contributions to the long-term federal deficit. 
Assuming no cuts in Social Security benefits or increases in Social Security taxes, the projected Social 
Security shortfall over the next thirty to forty years is about 2.5 percent of GDP—hardly trivial, but 
small compared to the federal government’s health care burden. Projected decreases (measured in terms 
of percentage points of GDP) in other parts of the budget will fully compensate for this Social Security 
shortfall. Id. (relying on Congressional Budget Office projections). 
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little more than half of what we do, per capita, on medical care, and no 
other country so burdens its business sector with direct responsibility for 
health care costs.44 Finally, our national failure to provide medical 
coverage to forty-seven million Americans45 is not merely cruel and 
indecent; it is a threat to social stability. In the two other industrialized 
nations that have eschewed universal coverage, the resulting suffering and 
indignity have fed large-scale civic unrest.46 We are hardly at the point of 
riots in the streets over health care; to the contrary, most Americans report 
satisfaction with their medical coverage. So far, this satisfaction has been 
an obstacle to health care reform: voters are disinclined to give up what 
they have in order to improve the lot of others. But the growing number of 
uninsured Americans could tip the balance suddenly from complacency 
 
 44. The United States is alone in relying so heavily on employers to provide coverage to its 
nonelderly. Other industrialized countries (except for China, which does not provide universal 
coverage) spread this expense more broadly, through various public-financing schemes. Germany, with 
its system of employer-supported, quasi-public “sickness funds,” comes the closest to our workplace-
based system. See Stephanie Stock, Marcus Redaelli & Karl Wilhelm Lauterbach, The Influence of the 
Labor Market on German Health Care Reforms, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1143, 1144 (2006) (discussing 
German employers’ evolving role in financing that country’s Social Health Insurance system). But 
German employers’ contributions to sickness funds cover only 46 percent of the cost of care for 
workers and their families. Id. at 1144. Employees pay an additional 54 percent. Id. By comparison, 
American employers pay, on average, 84 percent of premiums for employee-only coverage and 73 
percent of premiums for family coverage. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. 
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2008 ANNUAL SURVEY 68 (2008), available at 
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf. Employees and their families pay the rest; public funding plays no role 
(unless one counts the tax expenditure represented by the deductibility of employer and employee 
contributions toward health insurance premiums). In the United States, employment-based insurance 
covers approximately 60 percent of individuals (workers and their dependents). Press Release, Ctr. on 
Budget & Policy Priorities, The Number of Uninsured Americans Is at an All-Time High (Aug. 29, 
2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/8-29-06health.pdf. In 2006, 27.6 million workers were 
uninsured because not all businesses offer health benefits, not all workers qualify for coverage, and not 
all employees can afford their share of health insurance premiums even when workplace-based 
coverage is available to them. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 2, at 23. 
 45. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 2, at 18. Over the past two decades, the ranks of the 
uninsured have risen by about eight hundred thousand per year. Id. at 58 tbl.C-1. 
 46. The shredding of China’s social safety net, including universal access to basic health care 
regardless of ability to pay, has contributed to widespread disturbances and outbreaks of violence in 
poor, rural areas. See Hannah Beech, Inside the Pitchfork Rebellion, TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at 28; Elaine 
Kurtenbach, Health Crisis Plagues Rural Areas of China, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at A16. China 
is now urgently pursuing strategies for making medical care available to all. William C. Hsiao, 
Editorial, The Political Economy of Chinese Health Reform, 2 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 241, 244–45 
(2007). In apartheid-era South Africa, poor black people’s lack of access to basic care fueled anger over 
the indignities and deprivation associated with all-white rule. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
SCI. & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH: THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID 
19–27 (1998), available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/report-1998-
legacyapartheid.html. One of Nelson Mandela’s highest priorities after becoming president of South 
Africa in 1994 was to make basic medical services available to all. 
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toward popular ire.47 
Should this happen, law will be critical to the crafting of an affordable 
and effective approach to Americans’ health-related hopes and fears. 
Statutory drafters will need to consider how disconnected regulatory 
schemes work together, and against each other, to frame choices for the 
health system’s many actors. And the bounded rationality inherent in these 
drafting efforts will require courts and agencies to fill in the statutory 
interstices as unanticipated situations arise. To do so without a strategic eye 
toward the governance of our health system as a whole would be to sow 
chaos. 
The same is true of efforts to gain control of medical costs. Neither 
public nor private health care spending can be contained in isolation: each 
influences the other by shaping research investment, product development, 
standards of care, and patients’ expectations. Cost control that persists will 
require trade-offs that Americans can tolerate. This will call for 
management of tensions between medicine’s therapeutic, caring, and other 
purposes, as well as mediation of conflicts among health care industry 
stakeholders.48 Striking balances between benefits, risks, and costs in the 
abstract will not do. As questions arise within the doctrinal and regulatory 
realms that bear on medical spending, legal decisionmakers will need to 
assess the impact of proposed answers on industry actors’ behavior. They 
will also need to think strategically about synergies and conflicts between 
disconnected legal frameworks. Fixation on doctrine and disregard for the 
health care context will lock in health policy disarray. 
This is not to say that health care lawyers and health law 
decisionmakers should eschew doctrinal consistency or other rule-of-law 
values. To the contrary, these values are a vital part of the health law mix; 
the health sphere should not become lawless in pursuit of even the most 
urgent policy objectives. But where plausible interpretations of the law can 
accommodate important health care policy concerns, legal decisionmakers 
should not shy away from adopting such interpretations. And coordination 
among the doctrinal and regulatory schemes that shape health care policy 
should be a high priority when legal decisionmakers are called on to make 
 
 47. See supra note 45. Rising copayments, deductibles, and employee contributions toward 
premiums for employment-based coverage are likely to feed dissatisfaction even among the insured. 
These costs have not increased substantially as a proportion of total medical spending, but they have 
risen in relation to employee compensation. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & 
EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 6 (2006), available at 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/upload/7527.pdf. 
 48. Bloche, supra note 11, at 302. 
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interpretive judgments in the health sphere. 
These are hardly radical propositions. Nine years ago, the Supreme 
Court did both of these things when it ruled that health plans’ financial 
rewards to physicians for practicing frugally do not violate ERISA’s 
fiduciary duty provision.49 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter 
acknowledged ERISA’s ambiguities, pointed to health plans’ need to limit 
services to stay within budget, and concluded accordingly that the fiduciary 
requirement should not be read to bar rewards to doctors for rationing 
care.50 Rationing, he wrote, was necessary to control medical spending.51 
Souter also underscored the need to resolve ERISA’s ambiguities in a 
manner consistent with the surrounding health law context.52 Construing 
ERISA to prohibit health plans from rewarding their doctors for saving 
money would have put ERISA at odds with the Health Maintenance 
Organization (“HMO”) Act of 1973,53 he said, since such incentives are 
essential to HMOs’ efforts to keep within their budgets. The 1973 Act 
awarded federal subsidies to HMOs and required employment-based health 
plans to offer an HMO option; this, Souter said, constituted congressional 
endorsement of HMOs’ rewards to doctors for practicing frugally.54 Souter 
also cited state law remedies for medical malpractice as reason not to create 
an ERISA cause of action for improper physician incentives.55 Such a 
cause of action, he wrote, would duplicate malpractice law, since proof of 
substandard care would be necessary to show that improper incentives 
 
 49. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236 (2000). But see infra text accompanying notes 95–99 
(pointing out contradictions between the Court’s understanding of health care law in Pegram and in 
subsequent cases). 
 50. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219, 225, 235–36. My own view is that Pegram was unwisely decided. 
The Justices took no account of the corrosive effect of payments to physicians for withholding care on 
professional trustworthiness and the doctor-patient relationship. It is indisputable that rationing is 
inevitable when a health plan undertakes to provide care within a limited budget, but it is hardly the 
case that physicians must play the lead role in doing the necessary rationing. See M. Gregg Bloche & 
Peter D. Jacobson, Commentary, The Supreme Court and Bedside Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776, 2777 
(2000). Pegram nevertheless represents an effort to accommodate vital health policy concerns—in this 
case, the importance of cost containment—and to harmonize the operation of uncoordinated legal and 
regulatory schemes within the constraints of existing doctrine. 
 51. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221. 
 52. Two articles by Russell Korobkin on ERISA’s treatment of employment-based health plans’ 
coverage determinations, Korobkin, Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, supra note 19, and states’ 
efforts to extend coverage to the uninsured, Korobkin, Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, supra note 
19, represent, in my view, the finest effort by a legal scholar to resolve ERISA’s vagaries in a manner 
sensitive to both health policy concerns and the surrounding legal and regulatory context. 
 53. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000)). 
 54. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 220–22. 
 55. Id. at 235–36. 
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resulted in harm.56 
Integration of rule-of-law values with sensitivity to law’s impact in the 
health care sphere is central to the work of health lawyers. So is acceptance 
that their working conditions are hazardous. Health law practitioners, 
scholars, and decisionmakers stand on seismically active ground, cleaved 
by regulatory and common law schemes that strain against each other. 
Policymakers who are in a position to draft new statutes and regulations 
would seem to have it better. They can, in theory, formulate rules that take 
account of both the health system’s realities and the surrounding legal 
environment. But in practice, interest group power and unintended 
consequences often foil the best of intentions. Later in this Article, I will 
set out a strategy for legal practitioners, scholars, and decisionmakers that 
takes account of these distinctive challenges.57 That the challenges are 
sufficiently distinctive and urgent to treat health law as both a separate field 
and a high professional priority cannot, in my view, be seriously contested. 
B.  “BIG THEORY”: PURSUIT OF A UNIFYING PARADIGM 
If the health law rejectionists are wrong—if the governance of our 
health care system is in dire need of integrated treatment, as I contend—
where should we begin? The way forward, say some, is more and better 
“big theory”—greater effort by the brightest minds to develop a unified 
understanding of what the law of health care provision ought to 
accomplish. Several unifying models have been urged. One—health law as 
a scaffold for market competition—ranks well ahead of others in its hold 
on scholars who aspire toward coherence in health care law. Another–
protection for professional authority–often plays the role of straw man in 
legal scholarship; yet it enjoys considerable support. A third is defense of 
patient autonomy, and a fourth is public determination (through politically 
accountable mechanisms) of medical spending priorities. These models are 
not mutually exclusive; indeed some commentators on health law call for a 
unified understanding that taps different models for varying governance 
purposes.58 For example, the law could support political (or market) 
determination of a health plan’s overall budget while deferring to doctors’ 
clinical judgments within this budget. Such a composite approach could 
also preserve some space for individual patient choice. 
Proponents of each of these several models, and advocates of 
 
 56. Id. at 236. 
 57. See infra Part IV. 
 58. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 359–60; Elhauge, supra note 9, at 379–90. 
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composite approaches, hold that an overarching conception of health care’s 
governance should guide the law’s treatment of medicine. They make their 
cases for why one or another model is best, or why one or another 
composite is best matched to health law’s variegated governance tasks. But 
they do not say how we should choose from among them. Hall and Elhauge 
each contend that argument about which is best is an endeavor that health 
law scholars should undertake with zeal.59 But neither they nor others 
answer the question of how the makers of health law—the myriad courts, 
regulators, and legislators who shape it in piecemeal fashion—ought to 
settle this argument. 
To give effect to a unified conception of health care governance, these 
disconnected decisionmakers would have to resolve such arguments in a 
tightly coordinated way, within disparate doctrinal and regulatory contexts. 
Coordination of this sort is unachievable. No single decisionmaker has the 
power to pull all (or even most) of the others into line. No networks, 
positive feedback loops, or mechanisms of viral spread are capable of the 
horizontal dissemination necessary to give effect to a single way of doing 
things. To the contrary, the clashing perspectives of multiple interest 
groups and levels and branches of government pose an insurmountable 
obstacle to broad agreement on a single understanding of health care 
governance.60 
An even larger obstacle is our irresolution, as individuals and as a 
society, over the purposes of medicine and, thus, the aims of health policy. 
It is often said that the purpose of medicine is the promotion and restoration 
of health, yet we could promote health in much more cost-effective fashion 
by doing more to create educational and economic opportunity. A large 
body of evidence supports the conclusion that income and wealth,61 
education, social connectedness,62 and the quality of the built 
 
 59. HALL ET AL., supra note 9; Elhauge, supra note 9. 
 60. See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT 345–95 (1996) (analyzing the collapse of President Clinton’s health 
reform plan as the product of paralytic conflict between interest groups). Conceivably, a crisis of 
transcendent magnitude—say, an economic cataclysm equal to or worse than the Great Depression of 
the 1930s—could mobilize Congress and the president to act in the face of interest-group power to 
implement a unified understanding of health care governance as part of a plan for universal coverage 
and comprehensive health-system reform. But the failure of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Depression-
era plan for universal coverage—a plan opposed by the American Medical Association and other 
interest groups—underscores the difficulty of doing so. See RICK MAYES, UNIVERSAL COVERAGE: THE 
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 19–20 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (2001). 
 61. Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & 
MED. S9, S14–18 (2003). 
 62. John T. Cacioppo & Louise C. Hawkley, Social Isolation and Health, with an Emphasis on 
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environment63 are more important than medical care as determinants of 
health.64 Some medical services make measurable contributions toward 
improving health at reasonable cost,65 but many others do not.66 It is easy 
to read this as proof that we are grossly overspending on medical care,67 
but this begs the question of why. Self-serving, free-spending doctors may 
be part of the problem, but why are we so willing to go along? The answer 
is that we want something else beside utilitarian maximization of health—
otherwise we would bring the wrecking ball to our intensive care units and 
reallocate this spending to pay for prenatal care or preschool.68 We want 
intangibles like hope (even when it is illusory), comfort, and reassurance. 
We are willing to pay for plausible explanations of our ailments: some tests 
that are pure waste from a treatment perspective allay anxiety by helping 
patients to better understand their circumstances. We want our doctors’ 
uncompromising loyalty at times of need: we appreciate the importance of 
cost control, but we would rather that they economize on the other guy. 
And we cling to the Saving Private Ryan69 perspective on rescue—
whatever the cost—as affirmation of every person’s moral import and 
community membership: at dire moments, we believe, doctors should do 
all they can to save their patients.70 
We want all these things, but we would prefer not to pay. We elect 
 
Underlying Mechanisms, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S39 (2003); Robert J. Sampson, The 
Neighborhood Context of Well-Being, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S53 (2003). 
 63. Cacioppo & Hawkley, supra note 62; Sampson, supra note 62.  
 64. Various papers were presented on this topic at a conference held by the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars titled “Health Disparities in the United States.” See Woodrow Wilson 
Int’l Ctr. for Scholars, Health Status Disparities in the United States, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ 
index.cfm?topic_id=116811&fuseaction=topics.documents&group_id=347153. See also generally 
RICHARD WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES (1996) (arguing that there is a strong association 
between socioeconomic factors and quality of life). 
 65. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE 22–60 (2004) (finding that advances in 
therapy for heart attacks, depression, and low birth weight have yielded substantial health benefits at 
reasonable cost). 
 66. HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ WITH MELISSA COX, CAN WE SAY NO? THE 
CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE 1–2 (2005). 
 67. If health is our sole objective, we are most certainly overpaying. Research by John Wennberg 
and his colleagues at Dartmouth Medical School’s Center for Evaluative Clinical Sciences strongly 
suggests that approximately 30 percent of American medical spending yields no net health benefits. See 
John E. Wennberg, Elliot S. Fisher & Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography and the Debate over Medicare 
Reform, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 13, 2003, at W96, W104, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
hlthaff.w2.96v1?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=wennberg&andore
xactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT (estimating that 30 percent of 
Medicare spending yields no clinical benefits). 
 68. See Bloche, supra note 11, at 270–82, 299–309. 
 69. SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (DreamWorks SKG 1998). 
 70. Bloche, supra note 11, at 304–05. 
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politicians who promise tax cuts, and our shopping and dining choices keep 
the pressure on businesses to skimp on workers’ health care. We put the 
pressure on ourselves (and our doctors) as well, by choosing health plans 
with an eye toward price, then demanding tests, treatments, and referrals 
without regard for cost when we are ill and afraid. Some argue that there 
are right and wrong resolutions to our contradictory expectations of 
medicine—and of health law and policy.71 But even if this were true in the 
abstract, it is of little help in gaining agreement on the purposes to be 
served by health law and policy. As a practical matter, our irresolution is 
sure to persist, abetted by our resistance (as individuals and as a society) to 
acknowledging the contradictions within ourselves. Ongoing conflict over 
the aims of health law is therefore inevitable. Agreement on a unitary 
conception of health care governance, even one composed of a composite 
of the previously discussed models, is unachievable. The work of health 
care law, as I will argue later,72 must include management of fundamental 
differences73 tied to interest group viewpoints, politics and ideology, and 
our many cultural and psychological contradictions. 
The impossibility of settling on a single conception of health care law 
is illustrated by the most prominent scholarly effort to purvey one. More 
than thirty-five years ago, Clark Havighurst began to challenge the then-
prevailing assumption of deference to medical authority over health care 
resource allocation.74 Havighurst urged reliance on markets and criticized 
laws that allowed physicians to act collectively to fix prices and set 
standards of care.75 As the health planning paradigm gained influence in 
the early 1970s (culminating in legislation creating a national network of 
politically accountable planning bodies76) he responded with a scathing 
 
 71. Norman Daniels, for example, holds that the moral purpose of health care is restoration and 
maintenance of health. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 36–58 (1985). If so, hope, explanation, 
and affirmation of community solidarity are not grounds for additional medical spending. Clark 
Havighurst asserts that once a consumer signs up for a health plan, he or she should be bound by that 
plan’s economizing policies—and that courts have been too willing to defer to sick patients’ after-the-
fact preferences for pricey care by forcing health plans to pay for services beyond the scope of plans’ 
contractual commitments. HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 110–53, 157–221. 
 72. See infra text accompanying notes 138–58. 
 73. The fundamental nature of these differences distinguishes health care law from numerous 
other fields, especially those—antitrust, torts, and contracts, for example—that have become organized, 
more or less, around the paradigm of economic efficiency. 
 74. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services, 
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716 (1970). 
 75. See Brief for Clark C. Havighurst as Amicus Curi, Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th 
Cir. 1974) (No. 73-1247), rev’d, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
 76. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 
Stat. 2225 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k–300s (2000)). 
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critique of this strategy’s coercive feature—its requirement that hospitals 
seeking to offer new services or to make major capital investments obtain a 
“Certificate of Need” from state regulatory authorities.77 Havighurst also 
rejected bioethics approaches that emphasized patient autonomy without 
regard for the need to set limits and to make cost-quality trade-offs. He 
thought of himself as a “radical,”78 and in the early 1970s he was, but he 
made shrewd use of prestigious and powerful institutions, including the 
Institute of Medicine and the American Enterprise Institute, to push his 
views into the mainstream.79 Over time, in conjunction with others,80 he 
formulated a comprehensive model of competition in markets for medical 
care and coverage.81 In the tradition of Milton Freedman, he emphasized 
personal freedom as much as efficiency. Today, his vision of health law as 
a catalyst for market allocation of clinical resources—driven by consumer 
preferences and specified through contracts among patients, doctors and 
hospitals, and health care payers—has come close to prevailing among 
legal scholars who focus on health care organization and financing. Within 
the upper echelons of the legal academy, it is the main alternative to health 
law rejectionism.82 
It has also had enormous real-world impact.83 In 1975, the U.S. 
Supreme Court discarded the “learned professions” exemption from 
application of the antitrust laws,84 opening the way for federal and private 
actions against anticompetitive practices in health care. Collective price 
setting and prohibitions against advertising—once praised by scholars, 
including a Nobel prize-winning economist, as essential to an 
anticommercial ethos that sustained patients’ trust in their doctors85—were 
 
 77. Havighurst, supra note 36. 
 78. Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law and Policy, 
14 HEALTH MATRIX 107, 129 (2004). 
 79. Havighurst was also a chief health policy advisor to Ronald Reagan during the 1980 
presidential campaign and the early months of Reagan’s presidency. 
 80. Others who played leading roles in development of the market paradigm—and who at times 
collaborated with Havighurst—include Paul Ellwood (widely viewed as the father of the HMO 
concept), Alain Enthoven (who coined the term “managed competition”), James Blumstein (an early 
critic of deference to professional judgment and reliance on political mechanisms to allocate clinical 
resources), and Richard Epstein (an early advocate of contractual variation in clinical standards of care). 
 81. See generally HAVIGHURST, supra note 11 (detailing his most comprehensive account of this 
model). 
 82. See supra note 10 (discussing elite legal academia’s skepticism toward health law). 
 83. What follows is a brief summary of the competition model’s transformative impact on health 
care law. I am not going so far as to assert that Havighurst’s work alone brought about this impact—the 
decisiveness of its influence would be exceedingly difficult to assess—but it is beyond question that 
Havighurst has been the preeminent voice for this model among health law scholars. 
 84. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975). 
 85. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. 
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suddenly illegal. By the end of the 1970s, the health planning paradigm had 
fallen into wide disfavor, and conservatives were gaining ground in their 
opposition to regulatory methods of cost containment.86 In 1980, Alain 
Enthoven’s call for cost control through competition between vertically 
integrated health systems87 seized policy makers’ attention. President 
Reagan’s budget director, David Stockman, lauded the proposal as a 
“counterrevolution in health care policy.”88 Insurers that once passively 
paid claims for whatever the doctor ordered began to say no to pricey, 
unproven treatments—and to create integrated systems like those that 
Enthoven (and Havighurst) envisioned. Courts empowered insurers to 
depart from doctors’ determinations of “medical necessity” (the almost-
universal contractual standard for coverage, then and now) and to decline 
claims.89 Influenced by scholars sharply critical of laws protecting 
professional prerogative,90 judges whittled away at such doctrines as the 
ban on so-called corporate practice of medicine, which limited health 
plans’ and hospitals’ ability to exercise managerial control over physicians’ 
clinical judgment. 
Most importantly, federal courts construed ERISA to preempt a wide 
range of state laws that would otherwise govern employer-sponsored health 
plans.91 This largely deregulated employment-based coverage, since 
ERISA neither mandates nor restricts employee benefits. Employer-
sponsored plans were free to fashion packages of covered services without 
regard for professional beliefs about appropriate care—or for political 
action at the state level to set health care priorities.92 Plans, moreover, were 
 
REV. 941, 965–66 (1963). 
 86. In 1979, a Democratic Congress rejected President Jimmy Carter’s proposed national scheme 
of hospital price controls. See Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Centered vs. Job-Centered Health 
Insurance, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1979, at 141. Despite considerable evidence that hospital rate 
regulation constrains private sector health spending, it never again received serious federal 
consideration. 
 87. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980). 
 88. Id. (book jacket quotation). 
 89. E.g., Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987). To be sure, in Sarchett and 
other similar cases, courts imposed stringent requirements of good faith and fair dealing. Judges also 
invoked the standard insurance law principle that ambiguity in coverage contracts must be construed 
against the insurer and in line with “the reasonable expectations of the insured.” Id. at 273. But even 
with these reservations, permitting insurers to say no represented a radical step away from blind 
deference to doctors’ determinations of medical necessity. 
 90. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to 
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 474–75 (1988). 
 91. See supra notes 18–20. 
 92. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 757–58 (1985) (construing 
ERISA’s preemption provisions to immunize self-insured employer-sponsored plans from state 
mandatory benefits laws). 
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immune from state medical malpractice suits for denial of coverage. This 
insulated them further from professional authority, since physician-set 
standards of care were (and still are) the touchstone of malpractice liability. 
A measure of the market model’s real-world success is the fact that by 
1992, cost containment through competition between health plans had 
become the centerpiece of the Democratic presidential nominee’s proposal 
for health reform.93 Since then, no serious candidate for the presidency has 
proposed health reform that did not rely mainly on markets to cover the 
uninsured and limit spending. 
Yet, the market-oriented counterrevolution in health care law and 
policy never fully supplanted competing models. Efforts to shift medical 
malpractice liability from tort to contract94—and to thereby permit health 
care payers and providers to offer levels of care that diverged from 
professional standards—were almost uniformly rejected by the courts. 
Medical tort litigation remains a contest over whether defendants’ actions 
measure up to clinical practice norms set by physicians. Even in the 
antitrust setting, courts have displayed ambivalence about no-holds-barred 
medical markets. Most notably, a 1999 Supreme Court holding allowed 
California dentists to band together to set ethical limits on price 
advertising.95 The Justices said such limits were “procompetitive,” and thus 
permissible under the antitrust laws, because they helped to clarify 
consumers’ understanding of dentists’ price discounting practices. Market-
oriented critics of the professional paradigm chided the Court for turning 
antitrust principles on their head by characterizing restraints on competition 
as “procompetitive.”96 The Justices, said Havighurst, had reverted to older 
thinking about the virtues of professional benevolence as a corrective for 
flawed markets. 
In two more recent health care opinions, both authored by Justice 
Souter (who also wrote the opinion allowing dentists to restrict 
 
 93. To be sure, the Clinton plan (both during the 1992 campaign and through the 1993–94 
legislative debate over health reform) also incorporated regulatory measures—for example, national 
budget ceilings for insured health spending—that the competition strategy’s proponents did not like. 
Enthoven participated in formulating the Clinton plan, then dropped out of the process, disillusioned. 
Havighurst contributed his views but sharply criticized the administration’s plan for being too 
regulatory. See Havighurst, supra note 78, at 123–27. 
 94. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 87. 
 95. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771–73 (1999). The advertising restrictions at issue 
required dentists to reveal their standard, prediscount prices and to otherwise be transparent about the 
size of claimed discounts. Id. at 761. 
 96. Once again, Havighurst led the charge (among scholars, at least). Havighurst, supra note 32, 
at 949–53. 
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advertising), the Court showed its ambivalence about markets in a different 
doctrinal context—ERISA. Both cases involved the balancing of clinical 
benefits and costs when a physician provides care within a health plan’s 
budgetary constraints. In Pegram v. Herdrich,97 decided unanimously in 
2000, the Justices embraced the market model wholeheartedly. The Court 
characterized clinical standards of care in economic terms as judgments 
about “acceptable . . . risk” and “optimum treatment levels” to be made by 
health plans and their physicians in response to market forces.98 But two 
years later in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,99 the Court opted for 
the paradigm of deference to medical professionalism. Holding that ERISA 
does not preempt state laws requiring independent physician review of 
refusals by health plans to pay for tests, treatments, and referrals, a 5-4 
majority characterized such review as akin to a doctor’s second opinion, 
not a legal remedy for contractual breach by a health plan.100 This 
maneuver enabled the majority to rescue state-mandated independent 
review from the black hole of ERISA preemption (since established 
jurisprudence holds that ERISA preempts state remedies for coverage 
denial), but it divorced independent review from health insurance contracts, 
and thus from the market. Under Rush Prudential, medical reviewers are 
free to make their own clinical judgments and to thereby require health 
plans to pay,101 without regard for the terms of the deal struck among 
employers, health plans, and subscribers. That Souter wrote both of these 
opinions, as well as the Court’s 1999 opinion on dentists’ advertising 
restrictions, underscores the Court’s irresolution when it comes to the 
market model. 
For Havighurst and other market purists, irresolution is probably too 
polite a term. Havighurst condemns departures from the market paradigm 
as the product of “authoritarian/collectivist . . . leanings,”102 and he saves 
 
 97. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000). 
 98. Id. at 221–22. The Court treated ERISA as a statutory framework for such a market, but it 
allowed that Congress could intervene, if it chose, to set limits on these market-driven “judgments of 
social value.” Id. 
 99. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002). 
 100. See id. at 381–83 (rejecting characterization of independent medical review as an arbitral 
remedy for contractual breach). 
 101. Patients who prevail in medical review proceedings can then obtain judicial enforcement of 
the favorable result by pursuing their federal remedy under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Id. at 385. 
 102. Havighurst, supra note 78, at 110. Havighurst makes me into his example of “persons with 
authoritarian/collectivist, rather than pluralist, leanings” who oppose allowing “people [to] make 
consequential choices for themselves.” Id. He mischaracterizes my empirical account of the limitations 
of welfare economics as a tool for analyzing choice between health care’s competing purposes. 
“Bloche,” he says, cannot imagine “allow[ing] individuals . . . to make the consequential choices” and 
“is quite comfortable with having nonaccountable judges serve as the ultimate arbiters” of health care 
 416 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:389 
 
special ire for those who would allow professional judgment to trump 
contractual limits on health spending.103 But Souter’s irresolution reflects 
our own, as a nation, about the purposes of health policy and thus the 
premises of medicine’s legal governance. No legal system can render 
clarity—certainly not clarity that lasts—out of pervasive conflict over core 
premises. Full commitment to any one paradigm requires sustained public 
disregard for passionately felt concerns that are embodied in others. We are 
nowhere near a settled view of the place of market mechanisms, public 
allocation, and professional judgment in the governance of medicine. We 
differ sharply, both between and within ourselves, over the relative import 
of equity, solidarity, rescue, relief of suffering, and the restoration and 
promotion of health. We differ, also, over the comparative weight we 
should accord to these purposes and to society’s other concerns; from 
education and the environment to criminal justice and national security. 
These differences make agreement on a unifying paradigm for health care 
law unattainable. 
C.  CASE-BY-CASE PRAGMATISM 
Proponents of case-by-case pragmatism in health care law treat the 
quest for a unifying theory of legal governance as beside the point; a 
distraction from the work of making medical care more efficient, effective, 
equitable, and otherwise expressive of our values. As Henry Greely puts 
the point, “the existence or absence of a dominant paradigm has nothing to 
do with the value of academic health law”104 or with the quality of health 
care lawyers’ contributions. Whether one prefers a single paradigm or a 
“messy, sprawling, and loosely connected field” is a matter of personal 
style; neither “is right or wrong in the abstract.”105 Rather than fretting 
about the matter, health lawyers should just get on with it: “[t]here is work 
to be done.”106 Most law review articles on health care topics take this tack, 
as do lawyers’ contributions to the medical and health policy literature. 
Without reference to overarching theory, or lack thereof, this work 
addresses particular legal and policy problems, such as medical 
 
choice. Id. at 110 n.5 (citing Bloche, supra note 11). And he misrepresents my acknowledgement that 
legal interpretation in the health care context requires normative judgment: this acknowledgement, he 
claims, constitutes a rejection of personal choice in medical matters. Id. 
 103. That the “medical necessity” standard for coverage (a staple of almost all health insurance 
contracts) constitutes contractual deference to professional judgment is a possibility Havighurst does 
not acknowledge. 
 104. Greely, supra note 9, at 408. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 409. 
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malpractice, racial disparities in care, and hospitals’ obligations to provide 
free care to the poor.107 It is influenced (overtly or otherwise) by 
underlying values, but its aim is practical guidance for courts and 
regulators, grounded in cross-disciplinary appreciation of the workings of 
health care and law.108 
This work has made important contributions to the solution of 
problems in health law. Sara Rosenbaum’s quest to bring civil rights law to 
bear on racial disparities has produced a blueprint for doing so109 and put 
pressure on providers and health plans to take equity more seriously.110 Jay 
Katz’s call for greater focus on sick people’s varying beliefs and fears111 
has sensitized legal commentators, clinical caregivers, and some judges to 
the pitfalls of allowing informed consent to become a routinized, pro forma 
process. But these and many other efforts to address particular problems in 
health law pay too little attention to interactions among the medical care 
system’s moving parts—and to the contradictions and confusion embedded 
in the messages that health law sends. 
For example, Rosenbaum’s advocacy for robust use of civil rights 
 
 107. Other topics that health law scholarship frequently addresses, in disconnected fashion, 
include tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals, Medicare fraud and abuse, regulation bearing on clinical 
quality and hospital rates, and myriad bioethics matters. 
 108. There are outstanding and diverse examples of such work. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT 
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (pleading eloquently for more emphasis on dialogue between 
doctor and patient and greater deference to sick people’s varying, idiosyncratic preferences); Michelle 
M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrance of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice 
Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (2002) (presenting recommendations for medical malpractice reform); 
Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System: 
Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215 (2003) (advocating for the use of federal civil rights law as a tool 
against racial disparities in care); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model 
of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001) 
(presenting recommendations for medical malpractice reform).  
 109. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 108. Stepped-up enforcement efforts (by the 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights) and statutory reform (to establish a 
private right of action against health care providers based on disparate racial impact, in the wake of 
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides 
no such right of action) would be needed to pursue Rosenbaum’s blueprint. But see Richard A. Epstein, 
Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage: A Critique of the Institute of Medicine Study, 
48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S26, S31 (2005) (criticizing covert, mandatory cross-subsidies inherent in 
civil rights law remedies for racial disparities in medical care). 
 110. Hospitals and health plans have been critical of the civil rights approach, preferring to treat 
racial disparity in care as a quality issue better addressed by managerial methods that promote best 
practice for all. See Nicole Lurie & Tamara Dubowitz, Health Disparities and Access to Health, 297 
JAMA 1118, 1120 (2007). But the possibility of civil rights litigation has pushed them to address the 
disparities question. 
 111. KATZ, supra note 108, at 151–64. 
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litigation to combat racial disparities in care disregards the potential impact 
of such litigation on efforts to improve the quality of medical services. 
Racial disparity is, at bottom, a quality-of-care matter. At issue are 
disparities in standards of care and in the compassion and respectfulness 
with which care is provided.112 Strategies that bring quality of care (in 
these several senses) into line with agreed-on best practice will, in course, 
ameliorate racial (and other) disparities. Litigation is of doubtful value as a 
tool for achieving this, as abundant evidence from the study of the medical 
malpractice system shows.113 Litigation prioritizes individual 
accountability over pursuit of systemic changes that have been shown to 
promote clinical excellence. These include promulgation of evidence-based 
practice protocols, candid discussion of clinical errors (with an eye toward 
“lessons learned”), collection of data on doctors’ and hospitals’ 
performance, and coordination of care in complex cases (involving 
multiple specialists).114 Malpractice cases commonly turn on the opinions 
of partisan “experts” rather than science-based standards of practice, 
putting reduction of legal risk in conflict with pursuit of health care 
quality.115 Individual blame, moreover, discourages open discussion of 
mistakes and of management strategies that might prevent them,116 since 
 
 112. Not all differences in care constitute disparities. The Institute of Medicine has proposed a 
useful distinction between appropriate differences in the care patients receive (arising from differences 
in clinical circumstances and patient preferences) and inappropriate disparities (tied to race and 
ethnicity, absent clinical justification). INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT 125–59 (Brian D. 
Smedley et al. eds., 2003). 
 113. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., supra note 4 (reviewing 
the large literature on mismatches between the messages sent by the medical tort system and the causes 
of medical errors). 
 114. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY 
CHASM 128–40 (2001) (urging team-oriented managerial strategies, borrowed from aviation and other 
industries, for health care quality improvement). 
 115. The medical tort system, for the most part, continues to labor under the fiction that there is a 
single standard of appropriate care in each case to be determined by the trier of fact based on testimony 
from plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts. Malpractice law typically accords partisan experts trump status 
over standards of care developed by academic and clinical leaders, based on scientific evidence. This 
makes malpractice litigation into something of a roulette wheel, since doctors’ practice styles vary 
greatly and often depart from evidence-based standards. Cf. CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL 
SCIS., DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE: 1998, at 53–80 (1998) 
(reviewing and analyzing local variations in medical and surgical responses to a broad range of 
illustrative clinical problems). Thus, at best, the malpractice system offers minimal reward for best, 
evidence-based practice. At worst, the system encourages doctors to depart from best practice when 
doing so might protect them from plaintiffs’ experts. 
 116. A substantial literature documents the risk-reducing value of open discussion and rigorous 
analysis of the causes of error. See, e.g., Ellison C. Pierce, The 34th Rovenstine Lecture: 40 Years 
Behind the Mask: Safety Revisited, 84 ANESTHESIOLOGY 965 (1996) (discussing anesthesiologists’ 
success at reducing risk by identifying mistake-prone parts of the anesthesia process). 
 2009] EMERGENT LOGIC OF HEALTH LAW 419 
 
admission of errors can increase liability risk.117 Fear of liability, moreover, 
discourages collection of data on doctor and hospital performance—data 
essential to ongoing quality improvement. And pursuit of culpable 
individuals diverts attention from opportunities to improve quality by better 
coordinating care and otherwise promoting team effort. 
This is hardly to say that civil rights law has no place in efforts to 
reduce health care disparities. Nor is it to deny the moral force of the 
argument that racial injustice must be named and blamed,118 even when it 
results from institutional insensitivities, rather than intentional design.119 
But it is to caution that individual culpability operates on health care 
systems in paradoxical fashion, creating incentives that put quality 
improvement, and thus amelioration of racial disparity, at risk. 
Management of this risk requires attention to medical care’s moving 
parts—and to the mix of messages that the prospect of liability sends. 
Similarly, calls by Jay Katz and others for informed-consent law to 
take richer account of individuals’ beliefs, hopes, and fears120 disregard 
competing health law and policy goals, including cost control and 
distributive fairness. Empowering patients to assert their subjective 
preferences puts pressure on doctors to accommodate them. This, of course, 
is the point of such empowerment. But to the degree that doctors 
accommodate by prescribing pricier, more intensive treatments to some, 
medical spending will rise, and health insurance will spread this burden to 
all of us.121 
 
 117. Immunizing discussion of possible errors from discovery—or from admissibility—in 
litigation does not fully address this problem, since potential plaintiffs can use information from such 
discussion to pursue other evidence of alleged clinical errors (for example, by deposing participants in 
such discussions). 
 118. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY 16–22 (2001) (arguing 
for the importance of identifying and addressing the racial bias embedded in our institutions, social 
structures, and thought processes). 
 119. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 95 (2001) (analyzing racial disparities in health care as the product of 
interaction between clinical uncertainty, institutional and economic incentives, bias and stereotypes, and 
historical discrimination). 
 120. Current informed-consent doctrine, as Katz points out, makes little space for individual 
patients’ varying preferences. Katz, supra note 108, at 82–84. In most states, physicians need only tell 
patients about risks and benefits that a reasonable physician would deem material to a patient’s 
decision. (The reasonable physician standard, moreover, is typically applied by reference to prevailing 
professional approaches to disclosure.) In other jurisdictions, doctors must disclose those risks and 
benefits that a reasonable patient would deem material. This rule is no more friendly to individual 
differences in patients’ beliefs, hopes, and fears. See id. at 81–82. 
 121. To be sure, “medical necessity” clauses in insurance contracts limit physicians’ ability to 
accommodate patients’ subjective preferences. Insurers employ these clauses to resist covering care that 
lies at or beyond the margins of accepted clinical practice. On the other hand, health insurance law 
 420 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:389 
 
The changes that Katz and others urge, moreover would turn 
informed-consent law into an instrument of inequity—and of racial, ethnic, 
and gender disparity, to the extent that patients’ preferences (and 
willingness to pursue them) vary with group membership.122 Tying clinical 
practice more closely to sick people’s subjective preferences would 
empower the self-assertive to obtain costly, “boutique” care—care not 
typically provided to the more retiring among us—at the insurance pool’s 
expense.123 Not only could this widen disparities in care, it would also 
make health insurance into a mechanism for cross-subsidies from the 
diffident to the demanding.124 
Neither Katz nor other proponents of greater legal deference to 
patients’ individualized preferences acknowledge, let alone address, these 
conflicts among autonomy, control of costs, and distributive fairness. 
Empowering patients to express their hopes and fears is a deeply appealing 
idea. But health care law serves other purposes, at odds with maximum 
responsiveness to sick people’s personalized preferences. Focus on 
informed consent, without regard for these other purposes or for the legal 
doctrines that pursue them, contributes to health law’s confusion. 
“There is work to be done,” as Greely says, and health care law is 
indeed a “messy, sprawling” field.125 But this work includes the 
accommodation of health law’s cacophony of aims and the management of 
conflict among its myriad legal doctrines and regulatory regimes. No single 
paradigm can neatly accomplish this. Yet disregarding this challenge would 
 
(which itself embodies tension between support for cost control and for patients’ and doctors’ clinical 
freedom) makes it risky for insurers to say no to such care. Constraints on nay-saying by insurers 
include the availability of independent medical review in cases of coverage denial in at least forty 
states, see Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 369 (2002), and rules of insurance 
contract interpretation (for example, the principle that ambiguous contract language must be construed 
based on “the reasonable expectations of the insured,” 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 297 (2003)) that 
favor the insured. Insurance law would provide ample opportunity for patients and their doctors to 
demand pricier services if informed-consent law took greater account of patients’ subjective 
preferences, as Katz urges. 
 122. There is some evidence that male patients are more assertive than women in their care-
seeking behavior and that whites, as a group, are similarly more assertive than African-Americans. 
INST. OF MED., supra note 112, at 131–35. 
 123. Magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”), which typically costs in excess of $800, is an 
illustration. Should savvy and assertive patients be referred for MRIs to rule out exceedingly unlikely 
illnesses simply because these patients verbalize their anxieties (and make demands of their doctors) 
with less reserve than do others? Turning informed-consent law into a cudgel against doctors who resist 
such entreaties would further empower the most privileged patients and thus widen socioeconomic and 
racial disparities in medical care. 
 124. Since, within any given insurance plan, all pay the same premium, more demanding patients 
would enjoy subsidies from those in the same clinical circumstances who ask for less. 
 125. See Greely, supra note 9, at 408; supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text. 
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guarantee chaos in the governance of our medical system. Law’s 
contribution to creating a more cost-effective, caring, and just health 
system will turn in large measure on how courts, regulators, and other legal 
decisionmakers pursue this task. 
III.  HEALTH CARE LAW AS AN EMERGENT SYSTEM 
Can health care law rise to this challenge? No single legal actor can 
answer this question. No homunculus can command health law’s 
fragmented decisionmakers to adopt one or another way of doing things. 
The law of medical care provision and financing can be usefully 
understood as an emergent system.126 It arises from myriad “deciders”—
and from the interactions between them and the health care system’s 
disconnected participants. Like other emergent systems, biological127 and 
social,128 the legal governance of health care exhibits an intelligence (often 
perverse129) that materializes from below.130 Efforts to influence this 
intelligence for the better must take account of this. In this part and the 
next, I shall propose a strategy for doing so—a strategy that breaks sharply 
with the counsel that commentators on health law have, so far, offered legal 
decisionmakers. 
 
 126. My proposition is not that health care law “is” (in some absolute sense) an emergent system; 
my claim, rather, is that the emergent systems model has value as a tool for understanding and 
navigating the obstacles to health law reform. 
 127. See, e.g., GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE 7, 39–41 (1992) (analyzing 
intelligence and consciousness as the emergent product of neural networks); BERT HÖLLDOBLER & 
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE ANTS (1990) (analyzing the complex social organization of ants (and other 
insects) as the emergent product of simple biochemical signals exchanged among individual ants); 
STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER (1993) (drawing on complexity theory to analyze 
evolution as a nonlinear process). 
 128. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY (2000) 
(urging business leaders to think of their organizations as complex adaptive systems, empowered by 
variation, in both product lines and decisionmaking strategies, to adjust to changing market conditions); 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 13–14 (1978) (considering the 
connections between individual incentives and patterns of social behavior). 
 129. The logic of emergent systems is, from the perspective of the aims we seek, often perverse: 
common examples include the development and spread of cancer, epidemics, war, and economic 
bubbles and busts. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 15–17 (2d ed. 2005) 
(tracing breakdowns in market valuation that arise from interactions between individuals’ self-
deceptions and misperceptions). 
 130. See generally JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1998) (laying out 
the idea of emergence); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE (1995) (offering accounts of 
how order in complex systems emerges from innumerable interactions among simpler elements). 
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A.  BEYOND THE MYTH OF THE “DECIDER” 
Commentary on health care law (and other legal fields) typically 
presumes the existence of key decisionmakers—and their top-down 
authority over the law within their domains. More often than not, in most 
fields of law, this presumption is a close-enough approximation to reality. 
The Supreme Court holds sway over federal constitutional law, and a 
variety of federal agencies set the rules within their regulatory realms,131 
subject to judicial review and congressional oversight. Health care law does 
not function this way. No single authority sets the rules or is in position to 
implement the proposals and paradigms urged by commentators. Health 
law is the product of many, scattered deciders who act not in concert but in 
interdependent fashion. It exhibits the properties of an emergent system—a 
system with a design that arises from ongoing feedback among these 
scattered deciders.132 Its design—its intelligence—transcends these 
deciders. Indeed, it is a common feature of emergent systems that their 
component elements do their part absent awareness of their places in the 
larger scheme. 
Ants, for example, “decide” to forage or to fight, or to follow paths 
and to ferry food from distant places, based on pheromone levels they 
detect. They neither take orders from superiors nor grasp their larger 
mission on the colony’s behalf.133 Researchers have shown this by 
exposing individual ants to different mixes of pheromones in laboratory 
settings. The ants then forage or follow as they would in the wild, behavior 
that seems perversely out of context beneath the laboratory’s bright 
lights.134 Neurons, similarly, sum up the electric signals they receive, then 
fire to activate or suppress follow-on cells that participate in networks tied 
to perceiving, understanding, and acting on the world.135 Neurons have no 
“sense” of their larger, networking mission. They simply follow the laws of 
chemistry and physics; the logic of our thoughts and behavior emerges 
from this. 
 
 131. Standard examples of agencies that function as the principal authorities within their realms of 
law and policy include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
 132. The emergent properties of health care law (by comparison to other areas of law) are a matter 
of degree. All areas of law are influenced by multiple, interacting decisionmakers; thus all areas of law 
can be seen as emergent to some degree. My limited point here is that the law of health care provision 
and financing is more dependent on myriad, minimally coordinated decisionmakers—and less 
influenced in top-down fashion by centralized legal authority—than almost any other field of law. 
 133. Eric Bonabeau & Guy Théraulaz, Swarm Smarts, SCI. AM., Mar. 2000, at 72, 73–74. 
 134. See id. at 74. 
 135. See EDELMAN, supra note 127, at 115–18. 
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Likewise, the designs of cities, societies, and economies emerge from 
the motives and actions of individuals who think they know what they are 
doing but who are mostly unaware of their roles in fashioning and 
sustaining neighborhoods, subcultures, industries, or the other social forms 
that organize our collective lives.136 We are, of course, different from ants 
and neurons—we are more flexible (since our neural networks evolve in 
response to events), hierarchical, and, up to a point, self-aware. But what 
we have in common with our remote, six-legged relatives is that the 
intelligence of our social forms transcends our sense, as individuals, of our 
motives, judgments, and actions.137 
B.  THE EMERGENT LOGIC OF HEALTH CARE LAW 
The structure of health law is similarly emergent, for better and worse. 
Take, for example, the tension between malpractice law’s reliance on 
professional standards of care and the proposition that markets should 
permit consumers to pick from among different levels of care, an idea 
embedded in antitrust doctrine and, to some degree, judicial interpretation 
of health insurance contracts. Commentators on health law treat this tension 
as a failure of coherence. Market-oriented commentators complain that 
liability for breach of professional standards prevents health plans and 
providers from offering lower-cost care and coverage options.138 Liberals 
who object to tying medical care to ability to pay defend professional 
 
 136. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY (1996). 
 137. Other legal scholars have invoked emergence, albeit toward ends that differ from mine. 
Commentators on environmental law have drawn an analogy between ecosystems (often analyzed by 
researchers as complex adaptive systems characterized by self-organization and nonlinear responses to 
changing conditions) and the legal regimes designed to protect them. They have argued that complexity 
(and the variation it generates) makes legal governance more robust—more responsive to changing 
circumstances—just as complexity and chaos (which engender variation and thus expand evolutionary 
options) make species and ecosystems better able to adapt to change. This line of reasoning has led 
them to favor such approaches as greater devolution of regulatory authority to the states and the vesting 
of federal regulatory authority in multiple, overlapping agencies. E.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity 
Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 930–31 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness 
of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical 
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996). These scholars appear to presume that law 
adapts by becoming more “fit” in response to selective pressures. I am skeptical about this proposition 
(certainly the present state of health law is profoundly maladaptive, if by “adaptive” we mean well-
suited for the pursuit of agreed-on policy ends), given the power of interest groups, cascades of 
collective fear and belief, and other nonrational factors to shape legal outcomes. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Chaos 
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996) (arguing that different approaches 
to corporate governance in the United States, Europe, and Japan are products of initial conditions and 
path dependence, not pure “evolution-toward-efficiency,” and that suboptimal governance schemes 
persist in the absence of rival approaches with large efficiency advantages). 
 138. E.g., HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 115–17. 
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standards as a floor below which levels of care should not fall.139 
Looking at health law as an emergent system yields a different 
understanding—one that treats this conflict as a mechanism of feedback 
among scattered deciders with differing perspectives. A deeply felt 
commitment to health equity, and to the ideal of life’s pricelessness,140 
animates tort law’s deference to professional standards of care, as does sick 
people’s yearning to trust their doctors.141 Were the law to utterly abandon 
its reliance on professional standards, it would detach itself from these 
concerns. This would undermine people’s confidence in law’s 
responsiveness to their hopes and fears. Yet life is not priceless, resources 
are scarce, and Americans revere the market as the most efficient, least 
authoritarian way to manage scarcity. Antitrust and other doctrines that 
promote consumer choice in health care express this. The legal regimes that 
govern medical malpractice and restraints on competition thus embody 
different suites of concerns142 to which Americans are inextricably 
committed. From an emergent systems perspective, this is not a 
contradiction; it is an opportunity for mutual feedback among component 
systems that constitute health law. Antitrust lawyers who take Havighurst’s 
combative stance toward professional standards can stay true to their 
convictions, as can egalitarians who see health care allocation based on 
ability to pay as anathema. Both sides think they know what they are 
doing—campaigning to make health law more consistent (and to get it 
“right”) by cleansing it of the pernicious influence of the opposing view. 
Both sides, meanwhile, participate in a larger process of which they may be 
unaware—a process of feedback between legal schemes that sometimes 
sustains existing arrangements and that at other times pushes health care 
governance hard in one direction or another,143 as scattered deciders take 
 
 139. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine when Health Care Is Medically 
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229 (1999) (urging reliance on professional standards to 
determine levels of care and health insurance coverage). 
 140. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 135 (1978) (reflecting on the 
tension between the ideal that life is priceless and the reality that we put lives at risk for economic 
gain). 
 141. Mark Hall has perceptively observed that people’s trust for their doctors increases with 
severity of illness—and the accompanying anxiety and fear. He cautions that trust deepens out of 
proportion to trustworthiness as patients become more needy. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 
55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 507–09 (2002). 
 142. I have oversimplified my depictions of these sets of concerns—the thinking behind both (that 
is, consumer-choice approaches and policies that put greater emphasis on equity and/or reliance on 
professional norms) is more nuanced and variegated. But my oversimplification will serve to support 
the larger point I am making here about the role of these suites of concern in health law’s emergence. 
 143. Since the late 1970s, health care law has shifted dramatically toward the market model, albeit 
not as wholeheartedly as some market enthusiasts would have preferred. See supra text accompanying 
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account of developments in neighboring suites of law. 
There are many other examples of such feedback schemes in health 
care law. Some involve classic tensions in American public life, between 
national and local governance (the struggle over ERISA preemption of 
state efforts to expand coverage is a case in point144), equity and autonomy 
(the debate over the extent to which informed-consent law should 
accommodate individuals’ varied preferences145 is illustrative), and public 
versus personal responsibility for finding shelter against life’s vicissitudes 
(the central theme of recurring battles over the scope of Medicaid, the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”), and other health 
insurance initiatives for the disadvantaged). Others are more specific to 
medicine (for example, different views on the role of science versus 
clinical intuition in shaping medical practice).146 
Some feedback mechanisms drive change in health systems through 
public impression as much as law. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the managed-care industry successfully fought off class action suits and 
Congressional proposals (so-called patients’ bills of rights) to hold it 
accountable for refusing to cover physician-prescribed care.147 But press 
coverage of lawsuits and legislative hearings made managed-care horror 
stories into the stuff of kitchen-table conversation. Consumers left highly 
restrictive health plans or pressed their employers to do so, and investors 
turned bearish toward the industry, motivated by consumer backlash and 
perceived legal risk. Health plans responded by abandoning the very 
practices (such as frequent coverage denials and monetary rewards to 
doctors for withholding care) they had fought in Congress and the courts to 
 
notes 74–96. 
 144. See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
ERISA preempts Maryland’s so-called Wal-Mart law, requiring firms with ten thousand or more 
employees to spend 8 percent or more of their payrolls on medical coverage for their workers). Efforts 
by multiple states, most notably Massachusetts and California, to expand coverage by requiring 
employers to contribute more toward medical costs, will likely lead to reprises of this struggle in the 
months and years ahead. 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24. 
 146. Although the Daubert principle, requiring that expert testimony on scientific and technical 
matters be grounded in “scientific knowledge,” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
589–90 (1993), has been applied by state as well as federal courts in many legal contexts, it has not 
generally been applied to medical testimony concerning appropriate treatment in malpractice and 
insurance coverage cases. Courts’ peculiar reluctance to extend Daubert to these contexts probably 
reflects their regard for physicians’ clinical judgment—the proverbial “art of medicine”—when 
supporting scientific evidence is lacking. 
 147. M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as an Agent of Health 
System Change, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 29. 
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defend.148 The industry prevailed in the legal arena, but the struggle carried 
a cost imposed on health plans by unhappy customers and investors. 
Such feedback schemes enable the expression of values and concerns 
that are at odds with each other but deeply felt, to the point that health law 
cannot realistically discard them. Legal and regulatory actions that offend 
these values inspire responses—from the losing parties and from legal 
decisionmakers with different perspectives. Decisionmakers charged with 
implementing different legal regimes—tort and contract, ERISA, antitrust, 
and many others—send negative or positive feedback signals through their 
responses. Refusal by state judges, for example, to endorse contractual 
departure from professional standards of care in medical malpractice cases 
sends a dampening message to antitrust and other decisionmakers eager to 
advance the market model in the medical realm. On the other hand, state 
courts’ growing willingness since the 1970s to permit insurers to deny 
coverage for physician-prescribed services on contractual grounds149 
signals that their support for professional authority has diminished. 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to give full effect to the market model 
even in the antitrust context—for example, the Justices’ acceptance of 
professional restrictions on price advertising150—may reflect its summing 
of these and other mixed signals, from many decisionmakers, about the 
comparative desirability of unfettered competition and deference to 
professional norms. Justice Souter’s seeming confusion about the sweep of 
markets—his characterization of clinical standards of care as the product of 
market-driven cost-benefit trade-offs in Pegram, followed by his portrayal 
of medical standards as a matter of professional opinion, not contract, in 
Rush Prudential151—may merit criticism as lawyerly craftsmanship. But it 
is a sign of the Court’s role as a processor of mixed messages about the role 
of markets and professionalism in health care governance. The Justices 
participate in overlapping networks of feedback involving health law’s 
myriad decisionmakers.152 In response to the varied signals the Justices 
receive, they invoke competing models of medical governance, all of which 
have some legal force. So it is hardly surprising that the Court sends 
 
 148. Id. at 37–38. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 86–89. 
 150. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 95–101. 
 152. The Court is, to be sure, an outsized participant: its “signal” to these networks is decisive on 
federal law matters plainly covered by its precedents, and it is “loud,” due to its audibility, even on 
matters outside this scope. Yet the network metaphor still holds: by analogy to strategically placed cells 
in neural networks, the Justices have much influence, but they exercise it through constrained channels 
in response to other decisionmakers. 
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messages that do not cohere: consistency would require the Justices to 
discard large parts of health law, embodying values and concerns 
Americans are unwilling to abandon. 
Within the networks of decisionmaking that constitute health care law, 
negative feedback tends to support the status quo, and positive feedback 
tends to promote change. Novel judicial, regulatory, and legislative gambits 
typically provoke suppressive responses,153 but they sometimes catch fire, 
propagating to broader networks of decisionmakers. The law’s embrace of 
the market paradigm is the highest profile example. Isolated initiatives in 
the 1970s—the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the learned-profession 
exemption from antitrust law154 and congressional passage of a law 
promoting HMOs155—triggered positive responses, probably potentiated by 
rising skepticism toward professional authority. Other decisionmakers 
picked up, then amplified the signal. The Federal Trade Commission began 
antitrust enforcement against health care providers, state regulators backed 
away from limitations on hospitals’ capital investment, and courts, as 
mentioned earlier, allowed insurers to decline coverage for physician-
prescribed care. 
Preceding and parallel developments in neighboring legal spaces 
widened the possibilities for propagation. Those who urged more robust 
informed-consent requirements during the 1960s and 1970s did not mean to 
promote medical markets,156 but by winning broader legal recognition for 
patient autonomy, they primed courts’, regulators’, and the public’s 
receptivity to the competition paradigm. And for the Congress that enacted 
ERISA in 1974, in response to pension fund scandals that shattered 
 
 153. An example is the effort by some state and federal judges, beginning in the late 1990s, to 
chart a path around ERISA preemption of managed care liability for negligent coverage denial. See 
Bloche, supra note 11, at 301. To avert preemption under ERISA’s section 514 of state laws that “relate 
to” employment-based health plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006), judges sought to characterize health 
plans’ coverage determinations as medical judgments (beyond the preemptive reach of section 514, 
based on established precedent) rather than plan administration (clearly within ERISA’s preemptive 
shield). See Bloche, supra note 11, at 301. Variants of this approach caught on in some jurisdictions, 
including several federal circuits, but the Supreme Court squelched the strategy in 2004, in Aetna 
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–21 (2004), holding broadly that ERISA’s preemption 
provisions preclude such liability. 
 154. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975). 
 155. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000)) (offering grants and loans to qualifying HMOs, exempting 
qualified HMOs from restrictive state regulation, and requiring employers with twenty-five or more 
employees to offer their workers an HMO alternative to conventional fee-for-service insurance). 
 156. See M. Gregg Bloche, Medical Ethics in the Courts, in ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH 
POLICY 133, 135–40 (Marion Danis et al. eds., 2002) (considering the emergence of patient autonomy 
as a value in bioethics commentary and legal doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s). 
 428 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:389 
 
American workers’ confidence, the potential implications for health 
insurance were an afterthought. But by preempting most state regulation of 
fringe benefits (and substituting no minimum requirements of its own), 
ERISA largely deregulated the market for medical coverage. 
Out of many interwoven networks of deciders, health care law 
emerges. This process hardly guarantees a governance system that serves 
us well; by way of analogy, emergence in biological systems generates 
tumors, seizures, and other phenomena that careen out of control when the 
feedback mechanisms that maintain homeostasis fail. America’s worsening 
crises of cost and access, clinical mistakes that kill tens of thousands of 
patients per year, and the proliferation of treatments absent proof of their 
value strongly suggest that, in health care law, much has gone awry. How 
to intervene to make health law part of the solution is a question that calls 
for attention to the logic of emergence. 
IV.  TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR HEALTH CARE LAW 
Commentators on health care law and policy urge courts, legislators, 
and sundry regulators to pursue elegantly designed approaches, rooted in 
one or another governance paradigm. Rarely is this advice taken. Instead, 
health law decisionmakers continue to churn out a hodgepodge of 
disconnected doctrines and policies. Academic disdain for this incoherence 
makes for edgy commentary,157 but it has done little to change health law. 
If the health law commentariat is to become more than marginally relevant, 
it will need to radically shift its focus, toward opportunities for influencing 
the dynamics of emergence. Seen through an emergent systems lens, health 
law’s contradictions express competing, deeply felt values and concerns 
that feed back on each other. If health law is to maintain its democratic 
legitimacy, these discordant values and concerns cannot be abandoned. 
Thus the challenge for health lawyers is not to efface the field’s 
contradictions. It is to glimpse or intuit the flows of influence through 
networks of scattered deciders, with an eye toward chances to amplify, 
dampen, or redirect the flow; and with a readiness to seize moments as they 
arise. 
The most effective democratic leaders—and the greatest legal 
advocates—have preternatural understandings of their potential avenues of 
influence.158 They intuit how networks of decisionmakers might react to 
 
 157. In my view, David Hyman is by far the most engaging—and insightful—on this theme. See, 
e.g., DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006). 
 158. President Franklin Roosevelt, a law school dropout, intuited open and closed pathways with 
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legal and policy changes—and thus how these changes might play out over 
the long haul. They grasp the potential for small changes to have large 
long-run impacts—that is, they intuit possible nonlinear relationships 
between legal interventions and social consequences. They do not invoke 
the emergent systems model or metaphor. Yet this model captures a critical 
aspect of their judgment: their ability to anticipate the possibilities and 
limits of their influence by intuiting other legal and political actors’ 
responses. 
In the field of health care reform, such understanding has been in short 
supply. With disastrous results, the Clinton administration crafted an 
unwieldy reform scheme that took little account of likely sources of 
resistance.159 After the Clinton plan’s collapse, many observers wrote off 
the possibility of substantial reform, concluding that interest group 
opposition stands immovably in the way. This pessimism is misplaced. 
Opportunities for transformation abound, but they require attention to the 
dynamics of health law’s emergence. They also require reformers to 
acknowledge a corollary of the logic of emergence—that they can 
jumpstart change but cannot order up precise results, since exact outcomes 
cannot be known in advance.160 
I shall devote the rest of this Article to these opportunities for 
transformation. Though the obstacles are formidable, possibilities are 
plentiful on the health care policy fronts that are of most urgent concern: 
access to care, cost, and value. There are, of course, large differences of 
opinion as to what constitutes sufficient access to care, how much America 
should spend on health services, and how to assay their value. I have 
opined in detail on these questions elsewhere,161 and I will not do so here. 
 
aplomb as he maneuvered through political and legal obstacles to his economic reform strategies, then 
to the waging of war. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1999). Legendary 
examples of lawyers with this gift include Clark Clifford, Thurman Arnold, and Thurgood Marshall. 
See generally DOUGLAS FRANTZ & DAVID MCKEAN, FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
CLARK CLIFFORD (1995); SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); JUAN 
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998). 
 159. THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG 48–73 (1996). 
 160. Emergent systems are self-organizing; that is, their order arises from the incalculable (quite 
literally) combination of simpler interactions at lower levels (for example, neurons that constitute a 
nervous system; businesses and individuals who comprise an economy). Because these countless, 
simpler interactions cannot be exhaustively predicted, their emergent results cannot be specified in 
advance. See supra Part III.A. Emergent software is illustrative: its repeat “plays” of a given, complex 
scenario (for example, a model for the spread of an epidemic, the propagation of a financial panic, or 
the evolution of traits by natural selection) yield different results. The predictive power of such software 
comes not from individual runs, or plays, but from large numbers of plays (made possible by enormous 
computing power) that, together, suggest the range of possible outcomes. 
 161. See M. GREGG BLOCHE, DO NO HARM (forthcoming 2009); Bloche, supra note 11. 
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But I note that my views about the goals of reform are influenced by my 
belief that making decent medical care available to all is a moral 
imperative, that current medical spending trends are unsustainable, and that 
the law should leave room for diverse understandings of health care’s 
value. 
I note also that thinking about health care governance as an emergent 
system hardly predisposes the resulting analysis toward reform. To the 
contrary, the emergent systems model is descriptive—and open to use (or 
exploitation) by anyone who aims to advance or stymie reform. Indeed, as I 
will point out below, strategies that show awareness of emergent 
possibilities have, in the past, been employed most effectively by actors 
and interest groups intent on blocking health systems change. My aim in 
Part IV is to invite reformers to harness the power of emergent strategies on 
behalf of urgently needed change in health care provision and financing. 
A.  EXPANDING ACCESS TO CARE 
Although a large majority of Americans support universal health 
insurance coverage,162 political and legal obstacles have repeatedly stymied 
efforts to achieve it.163 Contemporary barriers include ERISA preemption 
of state initiatives to expand coverage (many of these initiatives require 
employers to cover their workers or pay into public funds set up to 
subsidize insurance), ideological resistance to publicly supported coverage 
as incompatible with personal responsibility, and health care stakeholders’ 
concerns about disruptions in cash flows on which they have come to rely. 
Foremost among the likely disruptions is the shift from veiled cross-
subsidies to visible means of financing care for the less well-off. 
Americans subsidize care for the medically indigent through a variety of 
mechanisms that few understand. These include extra payments from the 
 
 162. Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support U.S. Guarantee of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
2, 2007, at A1 (citing survey data from N.Y. TIMES/CBS NEWS, POLL: FEB. 23–27, 2007, at 15, 
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/03022007_poll.pdf). 
 163. These failures date back to the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, whose nascent 
proposal for publicly sponsored coverage was undercut by wartime portrayals of public coverage as a 
German concept (German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had pioneered the idea of universal publicly 
provided health insurance in the 1870s) incompatible with Americanism. See RONALD L. NUMBERS, 
ALMOST PERSUADED 75–78 (1978). Numbers observes: “As [World War I] progressed, Americans in 
increasing numbers began referring to compulsory health insurance as ‘un-American’ and predicting 
that it would lead to the ‘Prussianization of America.’” Id. at 77. In the 1930s, President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s administration developed a plan for public coverage (as a companion to Social Security), 
but Roosevelt backed off in the face of fierce resistance from the American Medical Association and 
others. Other presidents who unsuccessfully proposed universal coverage include Harry Truman, 
Richard Nixon, and, of course, Bill Clinton. See generally MAYES, supra note 60. 
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Medicare trust fund to hospitals with large numbers of uninsured patients, 
as well as private insurance premiums set high enough to contribute to the 
costs of indigent care.164 Publicly sponsored coverage for the less well-off 
would supplant these covert cross-subsidies with a high-profile tax,165 an 
inviting political target. The prospect of these cross-subsidies’ 
disappearance, moreover, alarms hospitals and clinics, who fear that public 
funding for broader coverage will not suffice to replace this “bird in 
hand.”166 
1.  State Solutions? 
States have seized the initiative on the health reform front, and 
creative, bipartisan ideas about how they might expand coverage have 
spread virally.167 From a conventional health reform perspective, the 
prospect of fifty different insurance schemes is anathema: a single, national 
system (whether market oriented or government administered) is essential 
to avoid Byzantine bureaucratic and legal complexity.168 But from an 
emergent systems vantage point—a perspective that focuses on 
evolutionary possibilities—the state-by-state route is worth encouraging. 
Ongoing ideological and interest group gridlock at the federal level has 
stymied reform at the national level. State-by-state progress could build 
momentum toward nationwide insistence on universal coverage, so long as 
high-visibility state initiatives are seen as successes worth propagating.169 
 
 164. Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The 
Regressive Profile of a “Hidden Tax,” 2 HEALTH MATRIX 141 (1992). 
 165. A tax with a distributive profile akin to that of the federal income tax would be more 
progressive than the current system of veiled cross-subsidies (from private insurance premiums and the 
Medicare trust fund) for uncompensated hospital care. Id. at 156–58. On the other hand, public 
coverage sufficient to provide access to comprehensive, mainstream care would cost more than the 
current, incomplete web of cross-subsidies for care in hospitals and community clinics. 
 166. Resistance to California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s failed health reform plan was 
illustrative. Schwarzenegger proposed in 2007 to pay for expanded medical coverage in part by pooling 
current cross-subsidy streams and rechanneling them from hospitals and clinics to support insurance 
premiums for the less well-off. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CAL., GOVERNOR’S HEALTH CARE 
PROPOSAL 7 (2007), http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf. Health care providers—
the recipients of these cross-subsidies—have fretted about the prospect that they could lose these cross-
subsidies and still face a substantial uncompensated care burden, absent the achievement of universal 
coverage. 
 167. See Stuart Butler & Henry Aaron, A Bipartisan Push on Healthcare, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 13, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
05/11/AR2007051101784.html. 
 168. Multistate employers, especially, dread the prospect of myriad state regimes, each with its 
own minimum coverage requirements and revenue-raising scheme. 
 169. There is no small risk here. The success or failure of Massachusetts’s pioneering plan for 
universal coverage will have a large impact on the future of state reform. The financial difficulties that 
endanger Maine’s Dirigo program, Pam Belluck, Maine Learns Expensive Lesson as Universal Health 
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Similarities in design are likely to result from the propagation of successful 
state models along informal networks of influence;170 this would ease 
administrative burdens. But if large employers or health plans become 
concerned about the balkanization of legal and regulatory requirements, 
they could press Congress and the White House for federalization of the 
emerging universal coverage scheme. They might well succeed, 
demonstrating the power of feedback mechanisms to transform health 
policy and law in circuitous fashion171—and locking in a national 
commitment to medical coverage for all. 
Support for state initiatives thus constitutes a wise gamble from an 
emergent systems perspective. It carries no guarantee that the country will 
embrace any particular model for expanding coverage;172 states will decide, 
case by case, and more likely than not, one or a few prevailing models will 
emerge. Nor must it lead, in the end, to state governance of health 
insurance coverage. Congress and the White House could respond to state 
initiatives by imposing an overarching federal scheme. Were this to 
happen, state reforms would still have served a vital purpose as steps in the 
evolution of universal coverage. 
This rationale favors legislative revision of ERISA to clear the way for 
state experimentation,173 and, in the meanwhile, this rationale supports 
judicial construction of ERISA to minimize preemption of state 
initiatives.174 There is ample doctrinal space for such a judicial reading. 
 
Plan Stalls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A1, and led to the collapse of Tennessee’s TennCare scheme, 
Robert E. Hurley, TennCare–A Failure of Politics, Not Policy: A Conversation with Gordon Bonnyman, 
25 HEALTH AFF. W217, W217–25 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/ 
abstract/ 25/3/w217, underscore the uncertain fate of state initiatives. 
 170. Such networks include the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and numerous think tanks that function as forums for 
the sharing of state health reform experiences and ideas. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55. 
 172. States are now weighing a variety of models, alone and in combination; these include 
expansions of Medicaid, employer obligations to provide coverage or contribute toward its cost, 
consumer-directed health care, premium support, and insurance market reforms. CTR. FOR BEST 
PRACTICES, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, LEADING THE WAY: STATE HEALTH REFORM INITIATIVES 
(2007), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0707HEALTHREFORM.PDF. 
 173. Bipartisan support for revising ERISA will become increasingly likely as states enact 
coverage expansion initiatives and look to their congressional representatives for support. Former 
Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis argues that California and other states considering such 
initiatives should ignore the ERISA preemption issue as they draft legislation, then ask Congress to 
either exempt them or to trim back the preemption for everyone. Personal Communication with Michael 
Dukakis, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 2007). 
 174. The extent to which ERISA preempts state laws requiring employers to either provide 
coverage for their employees (up to some state-defined minimum level of benefits) or to contribute 
funds in some other fashion, toward coverage of the uninsured, will be the principal focus of such 
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The Supreme Court has said, in a case involving state regulation of hospital 
charges for the purpose of expanding coverage, that ERISA’s preemptive 
provisions are to be read narrowly when they infringe on traditional state 
power over health matters.175 To be sure, there is lower court precedent to 
the contrary,176 but the accretion of state reform initiatives would put 
pressure on judges not to stymie legislators’ wills when neither Supreme 
Court precedent nor the plain language of ERISA requires it. 
2.  Personal Responsibility 
Objections to publicly supported coverage on the ground that it is 
incompatible with personal responsibility177 pose a larger challenge for 
efforts to expand health care access. Commentators, advocacy 
organizations, public officials, and others who favor government action to 
increase access have offered many countervailing arguments.178 This battle 
has been joined in American politics since Theodore Roosevelt urged 
national health insurance during his Bull-Moose run for the presidency in 
1912.179 There have been incremental steps forward—Medicare and 
Medicaid in 1965, Medicaid expansion during the 1980s, and SCHIP in 
1997. Yet portrayals of public coverage as a handout—a step toward 
socialism180 and away from self-reliance—have retained their resonance. 
 
preemption litigation as state reform gathers steam. See supra note 20. State insurance market reforms, 
including new mechanisms for pooling risk among small employers, could also face preemption 
challenges under ERISA. 
 175. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 659–62 (1995) (holding that state law requiring hospitals to collect higher payments from 
commercial insurers than from nonprofit Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans survives ERISA section 514 
preemption). 
 176. E.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 177. The leading proponent of this view among legal scholars is Richard Epstein. See generally 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997). 
 178. There are innumerable examples of leading scholarly efforts to make the case for government 
action to achieve universal coverage. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 71, at 42–48 (making a Rawlsian 
case for universal coverage); EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE 120–24, 178–97 (1991) 
(criticizing Rawlsian arguments and making a communitarian case); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF 
JUSTICE 64–94 (1983) (offering communitarian arguments). See also INST. OF MED., INSURING 
AMERICA’S HEALTH (2004) (reviewing clinical, economic, and philosophical arguments for universal 
coverage). 
 179. MAYES, supra note 60, at 1. 
 180. The American Medical Association deployed the “socialism” canard with much effect in the 
1930s to derail President Franklin Roosevelt’s national health insurance proposal. See id. at 19–20. In 
muted form, it persists to the present day: 2008 Republican presidential candidate Rudolph Giuliani 
characterized Democratic candidates’ universal coverage proposals as “socialized medicine.” 
Republican Presidential Candidate Giuliani Discusses Health Care at Events in N.H., S.C., KAISER 
DAILY HEALTH REP., Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/health2008dr.cfm? 
DR_ID=46953. 
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Universal coverage proponents have struggled to rebut this portrayal 
with more and better arguments. But the logic of emergence suggests 
another approach—one that takes advantage of the tension between 
people’s contradictory commitments to universal coverage and to self-
reliance. Rather than ruing this contradiction, health policy progressives 
should harness its political energy by weaving individual responsibility and 
mutual obligation together into a new reciprocity of personal and public 
commitment to health. This new reciprocity might start with an “enhanced 
sense of individual obligation—to eat sensibly, exercise regularly, avoid 
smoking, and otherwise care for ourselves.”181 It could include an 
obligation to buy insurance. Our failure to do these things should carry 
consequences, such as premium surcharges and a measure of 
embarrassment over personal behavior that adds health risk without 
corresponding social benefit.182 The state, in exchange, should offer some 
protection when self-reliance falters. Americans who cannot afford 
coverage should be able to turn to their government for help in acquiring it. 
If the United States is to come close to universal coverage, personal 
responsibility will probably need to play a larger role than it did in the mid-
twentieth century welfare state.183 But in return, we should be able to count 
on each other, through our government, to shield us from the degrading, 
life-endangering consequences of going without basic care because we 
cannot pay. 
3.  Taxes, Subsidies, and Settled Expectations 
Health care stakeholders’ concerns about disruption of their revenue 
streams as a result of movement toward universal coverage need to be 
taken seriously. From a conventional policy wonk perspective, this 
disruption should not count. It is a mere transition problem. If one or 
 
 181. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care for All?, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1174 (2007). 
 182. Such behaviors include substance abuse, reckless sex, and overeating. Here, conservatives 
have a point (in my view) when they chide some liberals for characterizing these behaviors as wholly 
the products of illness, compulsion, corporate marketing, or social injustice, rather than personal choice. 
Social norms that reward self-control and punish lapses have a role. See M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and 
the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 GEO. L.J. 1335, 1351–54 (2005). This is hardly to say that social 
conditions have no causal role in behaviors that put health at risk; to the contrary, poverty (and its 
tendency to keep people focused on their immediate needs), environmental disadvantages, the media’s 
messages, and other social circumstances are important factors. But a sense of individual responsibility 
can make a positive health difference, even when social unfairness renders the playing field uneven. 
 183. The health care reform ideas being taken seriously in state capitals and in the 2008 
presidential campaign are notable for their emphasis on personal responsibility. Bloche, supra note 181, 
at 1174–75. Some (including the Massachusetts plan) include an individual mandate to buy insurance, 
and most make some reference to people’s responsibility to keep fit, stop smoking, and otherwise care 
for themselves. 
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another universal coverage scheme constitutes an improvement over 
today’s tangled web of cross-subsidies, it ought to be enacted—unless a 
competing scheme would improve things even more. But from an emergent 
systems perspective, transitions are crucial. They are not details to be 
worked out, bureaucratically and legally, after new policies are chosen; 
they are the terrain that must be negotiated to achieve policy ends. 
Obstacles thrown up by stakeholders, bureaucratic structures, and legal 
regimes must be anticipated. And public perceptions are crucial, as is 
illustrated by voters’ resistance to new taxes, even when these would 
supplant payroll deductions that cross-subsidize care for the poor. 
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson understood this 
last point when they insisted on characterizing working Americans’ 
contributions toward Social Security and Medicare as insurance premiums, 
not taxes. Aspiring architects of expanded medical coverage today would 
do well to fashion schemes that separate collection of general tax revenues 
from public financing of care for people unable to meet their own needs. 
This is more than just rhetoric; both promising political pathways and 
insurmountable obstacles to reform emerge from the structure of people’s 
perceptions about the options they confront.184 
Aspiring architects of reform should also avoid large, immediate 
disruption of current financial arrangements, even when the policy case for 
disruption is powerful. Sudden disruption of settled expectations invites 
fierce political and legal resistance from stakeholders—resistance that can 
put reform at risk.185 From an emergent systems perspective, getting reform 
right is more than a matter of preparing a blueprint for the best policy in the 
abstract; it requires charting a path through networks of political and legal 
influence. Policies that postpone the prospect of disruption—leaving open 
multiple, more gradual evolutionary possibilities—will tend to arouse less 
resistance. 
There is, for example, a strong public policy case for ending tax 
exemption of nonprofit hospitals upon the advent of comprehensive, 
universal coverage.186 The prevailing rationale for property and income tax 
exemption of hospitals has long been their provision of care to people 
 
 184. See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN 89–93 (2007) (drawing on neuroscience evidence 
to argue that people form policy positions by (unconsciously) organizing their perceptions of new 
circumstances into preconceived patterns, then reacting emotionally to these patterns). 
 185. M. Gregg Bloche, A Graveyard for Grand Theory, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1534, 1535 (2007). 
 186. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable 
Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 394–98 (1995). 
 436 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:389 
 
unable to pay.187 Adoption of universal coverage would render this 
rationale obsolete. Elimination of these tax subsidies would make 
additional state and federal dollars available to support insurance for those 
unable to afford it. Redirecting public funds from subsidies for hospitals to 
coverage for the uninsured would both empower patients188 and better 
match public spending with clinical need.189 Yet the nonprofit hospital 
sector’s resistance to loss of its tax exemptions weighs heavily against 
trying to do so as part of a health reform plan. Exemption, even for 
hospitals that provide minimal “charity” care, has become a settled 
expectation, and enactment of universal coverage—at either the state or the 
federal level—without the nonprofit sector’s support is difficult to imagine. 
Thus the demise of this otherwise unjustifiable190 subsidy is not worth 
demanding.191 
The same is the case for other cross-subsidy schemes entangled within 
the disordered web of American health care financing. Extra Medicare 
payments to teaching hospitals for the training of residents, so-called 
disproportionate share subsidies from Medicare to hospitals that admit 
large numbers of poor patients, and myriad other flows of cash have their 
dug-in defenders. For some observers, such seepages of public funds 
constitute arguments against government action to expand coverage.192 But 
 
 187. This “quid pro quo” rationale is well-established in state property tax law, and until 1969 it 
was explicitly part of the IRS rationale for federal income tax exemption. Id. at 382–83. Other proposed 
justifications for tax exemption include Henry Hansmann’s argument that it compensates for nonprofit 
firms’ disadvantage in raising capital, owing to their inability to distribute profits to owners, and the 
nonprofit hospital sector’s claim that nonprofit status yields community benefits, beyond free care, 
deserving of public subsidy. Id. at 320–22. 
 188. Instead of being beneficiaries of hospital charity, the (formerly) uninsured would become 
consumers with purchasing power and choice of providers. Id. at 334. 
 189. Tax subsidies for hospitals support hospital-based care, rather than the full range of clinical 
services (including outpatient screening, chronic disease management, and preventive care) available to 
patients with adequate insurance. Tax subsidies are thus a poor substitute for insurance. Id. at 369. 
 190. But see Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law and Ethics 
of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1346–47 (2003) (arguing that nonprofit hospitals 
supply community benefits that merit tax exemption). 
 191. Although tax exemption is, in my view, unjustifiable, see Bloche, supra note 186, from a 
policy analytic perspective, its persistence presents an opportunity. Rather than insisting on its 
elimination, one might (from an emergent systems perspective) seize on it opportunistically, as a 
fulcrum for policy leverage. This might be accomplished by taking nonprofit hospitals’ claims of 
community benefit, see Horowitz, supra note 190, very seriously, to the point of conditioning tax 
exemption upon hospitals’ achievement of benchmarks for health promotion, clinical quality, and as 
care for the needy. Transforming tax exemption into a type of pay-for-performance, in this fashion, is 
politically and legally more plausible than eliminating it altogether. M. Gregg Bloche, Tax Preferences 
for Nonprofits: From Per Se Exemption to Pay-for-Performance, 25 HEALTH AFF. W304 (2006), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/4/W304. 
 192. See, e.g., HYMAN, supra note 157, at 27–47. 
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for those who hold that failure to extend coverage to the nearly fifty million 
Americans without it is indecent, this leakiness is an acceptable cost. The 
emergent systems perspective counsels patience. Perhaps, once universal 
coverage becomes America’s baseline expectation, these embedded 
subsidies will be seen as giveaways, and courts and regulators will no 
longer countenance them. On the other hand, they could survive, like farm 
subsidies, despite popular scorn—protected by politically leveraged 
advocates.193 
4.  The Politics of Emergence: The Demise and Rebirth of Health Care 
Reform 
Thus far, opponents of publicly sponsored universal coverage have 
displayed a deeper intuitive awareness of the power of emergence than 
have advocates of health insurance for all. A stunning example played out 
in 1993, as congressional Republicans scrambled to prepare for President 
Clinton’s anticipated health care reform juggernaut. The party’s Senate and 
House leaders eyed plausible compromises that might have achieved near-
universal coverage with a reduced role for government.194 These 
compromises hewed to traditional Republican principles. They would have 
left open a wide playing field for competition between health plans, 
 
 193. This points to another role for health law and policy scholars—as participants in the process 
of emergence. Scholars of health care governance are uniquely positioned to detect embedded interest-
group influence, to expose it, and to speak to public audiences about its pernicious policy and legal 
impact. They are especially well-situated to identify cases of government responsiveness to this 
influence and to call public officials to account when they service parochial interests. This has 
traditionally been the role of investigative journalists, but deeply probing reporting on public affairs is 
in decline. National news organizations are budgeting less for investigative reporting and in-depth 
analysis, and recent changes in the ownership and business objectives of leading newspapers (most 
visibly the sale of the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal by founding families deeply 
committed to these publications’ journalistic missions) could lead to further declines in penetrating 
reporting and analysis. The expertise necessary to track and interpret government action in such 
complicated realms as health makes it unlikely that the blogosphere will fill this gap. By incorporating 
this work into their professional role, and by seeking visible platforms for their findings and analyses, 
scholars of health law and policy can diminish the ability of embedded interests to shape health law and 
policy, unrestrained by the prospect of public revelation. A potent array of public platforms is available 
to scholars and researchers: these include op-ed pages, medical and health policy journals covered by 
national media (principally the New England Journal of Medicine, JAMA, and Health Affairs), 
symposia and briefings sponsored by high-profile think tanks, and blogs sponsored by some of these 
venues. 
 194. Options included R.I. Sen. John Chafee’s proposal, the Health Equity and Access Reform 
Today Act of 1993, S. 1770, H.R. 3704, 103d Cong. (1993) (proposing mandatory private insurance 
with a scheme of public subsidies for low-income subscribers and cosponsored by twenty-one other 
Republican senators, including Minority Leader Robert Dole) and the Heritage Foundation’s Consumer 
Choice Health Plan, see Stuart M. Butler, Have it Your Way: What the Heritage Foundation Health 
Plan Means for You, POL’Y REV., Fall 1993, at 54. 
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minimally restricted by federal regulators. But conservative strategist 
William Kristol looked beyond the policy logic of the possible deals and 
toward the longer-term implications of government-guaranteed coverage. 
For Republicans, he intuited, the implications were disastrous. Enactment 
of any publicly financed scheme to cover all would rekindle Roosevelt-era 
confidence in government as guarantor of personal security, undermining 
the broader Republican case for lower taxes and less government.195 
Conversely, utter defeat for health care reform on President Clinton’s 
watch would deliver a lasting blow both to Americans’ belief in 
government’s ability to solve complex social problems and to confidence in 
the Democrats’ ability to deliver on their promises.196 
In a memo that quickly achieved iconic status among conservatives, 
Kristol urged Republicans to go all-out to kill health care reform.197 There 
should be no deals, no carefully nuanced compromises, Kristol argued. The 
Clinton plan should come to nothing, except disillusionment.198 Swayed by 
Kristol’s analysis, House and Senate Republican leaders abandoned 
compromise alternatives in favor of a scorched-earth stance toward health 
care reform.199 By the fall of 1994, the Clinton plan had succumbed.200 A 
few months later, disillusioned voters delivered both houses of Congress to 
the Republicans for the first time in forty years. Universal coverage 
disappeared from the national agenda for a decade, despite the ongoing 
increase in the numbers of the uninsured. More than that, Americans 
maintained their skepticism toward government’s ability to transform their 
 
 195. SKOCPOL, supra note 159, at 145–46 (quoting Memorandum from William Kristol, 
Chairman, Project for the Republican Future, to Republican Leaders (Dec. 2, 1993)). Calling the 
Clinton plan “a serious political threat to the Republican Party,” Kristol warned that passage of 
comprehensive reform would “revive the reputation . . . of Democrats as . . . the generous protector of 
middle-class interests” and “relegitimize middle-class dependence for ‘security’ on government 
spending and regulation.” Id. at 145. 
 196. Kristol wrote that rejection of the Clinton plan “by Congress and the public would be a 
monumental setback for the president, and an uncontestable piece of evidence that Democratic welfare-
state liberalism remains firmly in retreat.” Id. at 146. 
 197. See id. at 145–46. 
 198. “The goal over the next several months,” Kristol urged, at the height of the battle over the 
Clinton plan, “should not be simply to wound the proposal, to nitpick the numbers or criticize some of 
the most onerous provisions, but to defeat the Clinton plan root and branch. . . . We want to use the 
health care debate as a model for routing contemporary liberalism and advancing an aggressive 
conservative activist agenda.” Adam Meyerson, Kristol Ball: William Kristol Looks at the Future of the 
GOP, POL’Y REV., Winter 1994, at 14, 15. 
 199. See SKOCPAL, supra note 159, at 146–47.  
 200. Neither Kristol nor congressional Republicans can claim full credit for defeating health 
reform. Potent opposition from health insurers and other interest groups had a large impact, as did the 
Clinton administration’s tactical missteps. See JOHNSON & BRODER, supra note 60, at 123–24, 137–
207. 
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lives for the better through grand social policy schemes. Kristol had gotten 
it right. By focusing his party on the emergent consequences of the success 
or failure of health care reform,201 rather than on the policy pluses and 
minuses of particular compromises, he positioned Republicans to achieve 
their larger, longer-term objectives. 
Proponents of robust government action to achieve universal coverage 
have been slower to seize on the promise of emergence. The architects of 
the Clinton plan intended for it to take effect as a finished product. To be 
sure, they envisioned a phase-in period, and they deferred to competition 
among health insurers to fill in the plan’s fine details. But they fashioned a 
detailed, top-down regulatory scheme to define the parameters of this 
competition,202 and they envisioned little change in the plan’s basic 
structure once it went into effect. Advocates of Canadian-style single-payer 
coverage likewise urge top-down imposition of their approach, with little 
regard for the enormous disruption it would entail.203 This disruption is the 
driving force behind opposition to the single-payer model. A sudden switch 
to single-payer would push the American health economy toward chaos by 
shattering current financial arrangements and dislocating millions of 
workers.204 Political resistance by those potentially affected makes this 
approach a nonstarter.205 
 
 201. Kristol did not explicitly invoke emergent systems thinking, but he thought emergently. He 
strategized to create conditions more likely to give rise to feelings and beliefs conducive to longer-term 
Republican political and policy success. 
 202. The Clinton plan’s regulatory mechanisms addressed myriad matters in top-down fashion, 
including specification of minimum benefits to be provided by competing health plans, establishment of 
cross-subsidies among insurers to compensate for risk selection and adverse selection, and requirements 
that employers assume financial and administrative responsibility for employee coverage. 
 203. See, e.g., Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer Nat’l Health Ins., Proposal of the 
Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2003) 
(urging complete replacement of private insurance by public, single-payer coverage without discussion 
of transition issues, aside from a brief mention of job retraining programs for insurance company 
employees). 
 204. Adoption of single-payer coverage would put an end to cash flows in the hundreds of billions 
of dollars per year from private health care payers to hospitals, doctors, drug and device makers, and 
others. Cash flows from the public payer (or payers, if a system of regional payers were adopted) would 
commence in lieu of private payments, but there would surely be substantial changes in coverage 
policies and amounts paid, with profound financial implications for health care providers. Moreover, 
many of the millions of Americans who administer our decentralized system of private coverage and 
payment could find themselves out of work. There would be ripple effects as well, on labor markets (as 
millions, or at least hundreds of thousands, found themselves out of work), businesses that look to 
insurance companies for investment capital, and economic sectors that depend, in turn, on these 
businesses’ buying power and on the purchasing power of insurance company employees. 
 205. I take no position here on the policy question of whether a single-payer model would be 
better as an end state, in the abstract, than other universal coverage schemes. For a powerful argument 
that the single-payer model is superior, see THEODORE R. MARMOR, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE 
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There is, nevertheless, cause for optimism about health care reform. A 
new generation of proposals harnesses the power of emergence in ways that 
enhance the likelihood of extending coverage to all, or at least to many. 
During the 2008 presidential campaign, leading candidates from both 
parties urged legal changes that would free states to pursue promising 
initiatives—initiatives now jeopardized by ERISA preemption206 and by 
limits on states’ ability to make creative use of their Medicaid and SCHIP 
funds to expand coverage.207 Some supporters of universal coverage 
dismiss state initiatives as mere incrementalism—a diversion from the 
quest for universal coverage. This criticism ignores the emergent 
possibilities of state-by-state action—its potential to propagate “me-too” 
optimism (and feasible compromises), as well as the prospect that state-by-
state success (and ensuing worries about regulatory balkanization) could 
prompt Congress to enact nationwide reform.208 
Likewise, proposals advanced by both Republicans and Democrats 
during and after the 2008 campaign would leave private, employment-
based coverage intact while opening up evolutionary pathways toward 
large-scale change. President Bush209 and the principal Republican 
contenders to succeed him urged an end to tax preferences for employer-
provided health plans.210 Americans, they argued, should be able to spend 
pretax dollars on coverage and care, up to a limit, whether or not they 
acquire or tap workplace-based insurance.211 By leaving employment-based 
 
REFORM 215–33 (1994). My limited point is that top-down imposition of a single-payer model by 
legislative enactment would be so disruptive as to preclude its happening. 
 206. See supra notes 173–74 (discussing possible ERISA preemption of state laws requiring 
employers to contribute toward their workers’ health benefits or toward funds established to subsidize 
coverage for the uninsured). 
 207. Mitt Romney, Rudolph Giuliani, and Barack Obama were among the candidates who made 
greater deference to state initiatives part of their campaign messages on health care. However, they did 
not specify the legal changes they would pursue in order to accomplish this. See Robin Toner, 2008 
Candidates Vow to Overhaul U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at A1. 
 208. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 209. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 87 box 4-1 (2007), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/2007_erp.pdf. 
 210. Under current law, employees’ and employers’ contributions toward workplace-based 
medical coverage are not treated as taxable income. I.R.C. § 105 (2006). Likewise, employee 
contributions toward health savings accounts are nontaxable (up to an annual limit). Id. § 223. 
Employers can also make nontaxable contributions to workers’ health savings accounts (up to an annual 
limit) when employers offer and workers choose high-deductible insurance plans. Id. By contrast, 
Americans who do not subscribe to employment-based health plans must spend post-tax dollars on care 
and coverage (up to very high annual limits, above which medical expenses become deductible). Id. 
§ 213. 
 211. See Katherine Baicker, William H. Dow & Jonathan Wolfson, Lowering the Barriers to 
Consumer-Directed Health Care: Responding to Concerns, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1328 (2007) (article by 
former Bush administration Council of Economic Advisors member and staffers, making the case for 
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coverage in place, this approach averts sudden, large-scale disruption of 
settled arrangements and expectations. But by removing a powerful 
disincentive to the purchase of care and coverage outside the employment 
relationship, this strategy opens the way to the emergence of new ways of 
pooling risk—and to new health plan designs. Over time, as innovative 
pooling mechanisms appear, workers with employment-based coverage 
could migrate to them. Meanwhile, Americans without workplace-based 
insurance options could pay for care and coverage on their own, using 
pretax dollars. This level playing field could reduce the ranks of the 
uninsured, especially if combined with public subsidies for the least well-
off.212 On the other hand, this new generation of Republican proposals calls 
for greater out-of-pocket (albeit tax-subsidized) spending on care213 and a 
reduced role for insurance, relative to traditional health plans (including 
HMOs and preferred provider organizations). Over time, this approach 
would probably lead to steeper tiering of levels of care, based on wealth.214 
Democratic proposals hold out a different range of emergent 
possibilities. The leading Democratic presidential candidates prioritized 
near-universal coverage (their Republican rivals did not), but sought to 
minimize disruption of established arrangements and settled 
expectations.215 To this end, the Democrats’ proposals would leave 
 
treating employment-based and independently purchased health plans in tax-neutral fashion). 
 212. Id. 
 213. President Bush has called for tax-deductibility of contributions to health savings accounts 
(his principal proposed vehicle for out-of-pocket medical spending)—a regressive tax subsidy since 
those most in need pay the lowest marginal tax rates. Other proponents of this approach (so-called 
consumer-directed health care, accompanied by high-deductible insurance) urge that the least well-off 
be given tax credits toward their contributions to health savings accounts—a more progressive 
approach. Id. 
 214. M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Disadvantaged, 26 HEALTH AFF. 
1315, 1316–22 (2007). By “levels of care,” I refer to levels of personal attention, convenience, and 
technological intensity—aspects of health care that are attractive to many patients but that do not 
necessarily correlate with clinical outcomes. 
 215. The plans proposed by the three principal Democratic candidates—Hillary Clinton, John 
Edwards, and Barack Obama—were remarkably similar. Aside from the question of an “individual 
mandate” (Clinton and Edwards proposed that all Americans be required to sign up for insurance; 
Obama urged such a mandate only for children) the differences were little more than cosmetic. See 
generally BARACK OBAMA’S PLAN FOR A HEALTHY AMERICA, http://www.barackobama.com/ 
pdf/HealthPlanFull.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary 
Clinton’s “American Health Choices Plan” (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.pnhp.org/ 
news/2007/september/hillary_clintons_a.php; John Edwards for President, Universal Health Care 
Through Shared Responsibility, http://johnedwards.com/issues/health-care/health-care-fact-sheet (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2009). See also Henry J. Aaron, Take a Chill Pill, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 2007, 
http://www.tnr.com/politics/ story.html?id=7f7e2f07-86f5-4eb6-86f5-047139f05ef6 (characterizing the 
campaign vitriol between Senators Clinton and Obama over individual mandates as overdone and 
contending that the three candidates’ health reform proposals did not differ substantially). 
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employment-based coverage in place. They pursue universal coverage by 
expanding Medicaid and SCHIP to reach lower-income Americans not now 
eligible for these programs and by subsidizing middle-income Americans’ 
purchase of private insurance. They avoid extending Medicaid and SCHIP 
to people at income levels that are within the marketing sights of private 
insurers (doing so would arouse strong insurance industry opposition216), 
and the subsidies they promise for the purchase of private coverage are a 
multibillion dollar benefit for insurers.217 The only likely near-term losers 
are employers who do not now provide coverage: they would have to 
choose between offering insurance or paying a tax (or “fee”) to support the 
public subsidies.218 Thus, these plans would pursue universal coverage by 
leveraging some existing arrangements and minimizing disruption to 
others. 
On the other hand, they open pathways toward more fundamental, 
long-term change. By establishing insurance exchanges to pool risk (and 
thereby reduce premiums) for individual insurance purchasers and small 
employer groups,219 they create an economically viable alternative to 
workplace-based coverage. Over time, this alternative purchasing 
mechanism could eclipse the workplace as America’s main source for 
private insurance. The ability of insurance exchanges to attract large 
numbers of purchasers220 and to offer many coverage choices will give 
 
 216. The battle over state and federal efforts to expand SCHIP to cover children from families 
with higher incomes illustrates the likelihood of such opposition. New York, for example, attempted in 
2007 to make SCHIP available to children in families with annual incomes as high as $80,000. After the 
Bush administration announced that it would construe the SCHIP statutory scheme to disallow this, the 
state indicated it would challenge the administration in court. Sarah Kershaw, Eight States to Press 
Bush on Insurance Coverage of Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at B1. 
Meanwhile, in the last months of 2007, President Bush vetoed two Congressional efforts to 
expand SCHIP funding and eligibility to income levels unacceptable to the administration. Robert Pear 
& Carl Hulse, Congress Set for Veto Fight on Child Health Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at 
A28. The 2008 election resolved this conflict: within a month of President Obama’s inauguration, 
Congress passed yet another SCHIP expansion bill, which the president promptly signed. John K. 
Iglehart, Expanding Coverage for Children—The Democrats’ Power and SCHIP Reauthorization, 360 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 855 (2009). 
 217. Employers that provide insurance to low-wage workers will also benefit from these subsidies 
(and, possibly, from expansion of Medicaid and SCHIP). 
 218. They would be losers to a lesser degree than they would have been under the 1993 Clinton 
plan, since Democrats contemplate raising most of the revenues needed to support the public subsidies 
by allowing President Bush’s term-limited income tax cuts to expire at the end of 2010 for the 
wealthiest Americans. See Laura Meckler, $318 Billion Tax Hit Proposed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009, 
at A1. 
 219. The large risk premiums that insurers charge for individuals and small groups mean that the 
prices they pay for a given level of coverage are much higher than the prices for larger groups (which 
incur more predictable aggregate medical costs). 
 220. Larger numbers of purchasers translate into lower premiums for health plans listed on an 
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them formidable advantages over employment-based plans. Vast 
purchasing pools could turn these exchanges into the “Amazon.com’s” of 
medical coverage, able to outperform all but the largest employers on price. 
Things could play out this way, but, then again, they may not. The plans 
leave the future of employment-based coverage open. Its persistence, or 
demise, would be determined by millions of Americans, acting as best they 
can to protect their families and themselves, with minimal attention to the 
policy impact of their choices. 
A more provocative possibility is the emergence of single-payer 
coverage from these plans. The proposals call for creation of a public 
plan,221 to be listed on health insurance exchanges as an alternative to the 
private options. If the public plan fared better than its rivals in the 
competition for subscribers—whether because of lower administrative 
costs,222 better deals with doctors and hospitals, or other reasons—it could 
eventually come to overshadow them. This growth could feed back on 
itself in positive fashion by empowering the plan to obtain lower prices 
from providers,223 thereby crowding out private competitors. Absent 
congressional intervention to limit the public plan’s monopsony power over 
providers or to otherwise restrain its growth, it could evolve into single-
payer coverage.224 This long-run outcome—ideal in the eyes of some and 
nightmarish to others—is hardly foreordained. American antipathy toward 
government bureaucrats and one-size-fits-all solutions could limit the 
public plan’s appeal. But the leading Democratic plans leave this 
possibility open, to be decided in emergent fashion by future health plan 
subscribers. 
 
exchange, thanks to larger risk pools and higher numbers of “covered lives.” 
 221. Hillary Clinton’s proposal called for “a public plan option . . . modeled on the traditional 
Medicare program.” Press Release, Hillary For President, supra note 215. The Barack Obama and John 
Edwards proposals contained similar language. 
 222. Single-payer advocates point to dramatically lower administrative costs for public, single-
payer plans, by comparison with private plans. E.g., Steffie Woolhandler, Terry Campbell & David U. 
Himmelstein, Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 768, 768 (2003). But see Henry J. Aaron, The Costs of Health Care Administration in the United 
States and Canada—Questionable Answers to a Questionable Question, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED 801, 
801–02 (2003) (arguing that projections of administrative savings achievable by implementing the 
single-payer model in the United States have been exaggerated). 
 223. See Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different 
From Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May–June 2003, at 89, 101–03 (reporting that prices for health 
services are lower in nations with monopsonistic public plans (or multiple plans that bargain 
collectively) than they are in the United States, where health care purchasing power is fragmented, and 
explaining these price differences as a function of international differences in payers’ ability to exercise 
monopsony power). 
 224. Private plans might remain in the market, offering high-end, boutique coverage options for 
wealthy subscribers. 
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B.  CONTROLLING COSTS AND PURSUING VALUE 
We know, in general terms, what needs to be done to control health 
care spending. In theory, we need simply say no to care that exceeds budget 
limits we set, whether for individuals, institutions, or society. But this of 
course begs many questions. Who should set these limits, and at what level 
of governance—from the individual patient to hospitals, health plans, or the 
nation as a whole? And how should resources be dispensed within these 
limits? We could, in theory, just say no once annual budgets are exceeded 
(or on a random basis) without regard for the comparative value of 
different kinds of care. Virtually all agree that this would be a preposterous 
approach: limit setting should be tied, somehow, to the expected value of 
diagnostic and therapeutic measures. But how do we figure these expected 
values, trade them off against each other (and against the expected value of 
nonmedical spending options),225 and decide what health plans should pay 
for226 within their economic constraints? 
1.  Obstacles to Progress 
Despite countless, carefully thought-out efforts by scholars to resolve 
these questions, we have not progressed as a society toward answers. 
America has been loath to embrace total health care spending limits at the 
national or regional level,227 and consumers have proven hostile to tight 
constraints on health plan budgets.228 They have also been reluctant to 
 
 225. Were it possible to achieve consensus on how to figure the expected values of diagnostic and 
therapeutic measures—say, in quality-adjusted life years or some other metric that achieves 
commensurability—trading them off against each other (and against the expected values of alternative, 
nonmedical use of the resources at issue) would be a matter of simple arithmetic. But we are far from 
agreement on a commensurable measure—or on how to cope with the incommensurability of expected 
results from different clinical interventions for different illnesses. Bloche, supra note 11, at 275–77; 
Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1493–1524 (1994). 
 226. People able and willing to pay will have access to extant treatments regardless of the limit-
setting treatments that health plans make, but “thumbs-down” judgments by health plans could reduce 
wealthy people’s demand for some treatments by stamping them as low-value. 
 227. Early versions of President Clinton’s health plan included global budgets—national and 
regional—to be implemented as a backup cost-control strategy if managed competition failed. In the 
face of strong resistance from health care interest groups (and charges from Republicans that the 
Clinton plan would ration care), the Clinton plan’s drafters transfigured their global budgets into a 
comprehensive scheme of caps on health plan rates—and, therefore, health plan spending. Continued 
characterizations of this aspect of the plan as health care rationing played a substantial role in the 
Clinton plan’s declining popularity and eventual defeat. See JOHNSON & BRODER, supra note 60, at 85–
86, 161–63; SKOCPOL, supra note 159, at 39–47. 
 228. Americans’ resistance to health plan budget limits played out in different forms during the 
several years after the Clinton plan’s collapse, as employers shifted vast numbers of workers into 
HMOs and other restrictive health plans. Beginning in the late 1990s, restrictions on choice of provider 
and access to costly treatments triggered intense popular backlash (expressed through political, legal, 
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appoint themselves as limit setters by signing up for lower-cost coverage 
that kicks in only after they and their families spend thousands of dollars on 
care out-of-pocket.229 Moreover, we are nowhere near to agreement on an 
approach to working out the expected value of clinical interventions, then 
making the requisite trade-offs, within whatever budget limits are 
established. 
a.  Assessing the Benefits and Hazards of Medical Interventions 
There are myriad obstacles to the making of these trade-offs—
obstacles that pose large challenges for health law. We lack data 
concerning the effectiveness of most medical interventions,230 and political 
resistance from doctors, hospitals, and drug and device makers has blocked 
large-scale, publicly funded research to fill this void.231 Private insurers 
lack the requisite incentives to step into the breach. Research into the 
comparative efficacy of tests and treatments is a classic public good, 
supplied at socially suboptimal levels by private health plans because they 
cannot capture all of its social benefits. Savings from published research 
that results in the demise of low-value therapies redound to the benefit of 
 
and market mechanisms, see supra text accompanying notes 145–48), forcing health plans to abandon 
these restrictions and allow costs to float upward. More worrisome is our country’s resistance to limits 
on Medicare spending, though Medicare’s long-term threat to American fiscal stability dwarfs that 
posed by Social Security, military spending, or any other federal program. Aaron, supra note 41. On the 
other hand, Americans have proven quite tolerant of budget limits on health plans for the poor and near-
poor. Under the pressure of competing priorities and frugal taxpayers, states have capped their 
Medicaid benefits at levels unthinkable for Medicare and private health plans, to the consternation of 
advocates for the disadvantaged. See, e.g., Hurley, supra note 169 (interviewing an advocate of 
Tennessee’s Medicaid program). 
 229. So-called consumer-directed health plans, which combine very high deductible insurance 
with cash contributions to health spending accounts (vehicles for pretax, out-of-pocket medical 
spending), enrolled only 5 percent of the 158 million Americans who received medical coverage 
through the workplace in 2007 (up one percentage point from 2006). Only 10 percent of employers 
offered such plans in 2007. Gary Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2007: Premium Increases Fall to an 
Eight-Year Low, While Offer Rates and Enrollment Remain Stable, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1407, 1411–13 
(2007). The economist Rashi Fein has argued that people choose more comprehensive medical 
coverage (when they can afford it) in part because they dislike the experience of having to trade off 
money against health when they or their loved ones are ill; low deductibles that do not otherwise make 
economic sense (since they raise premiums substantially) are attractive to health plan subscribers as a 
safeguard against this unpleasant, sometimes anguishing experience. RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, 
MEDICAL COSTS 147 (1986). 
 230. Bloche, supra note 11, at 266–70. 
 231. See Shannon Brownlee, Newtered, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, at 27; Bradford H. Gray, 
Michael K. Gusmano & Sara R. Collins, AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services 
Research, HEALTH AFF., June 25, 2003, at W3-283, W3-297 to -298, http://content.healthaffairs.org/ 
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.283v1.pdf (identifying interest group hostility as a major factor in the demise of 
the federal agency devoted to research on the effectiveness of clinical interventions). 
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all health plans, not just those that pay for the research.232 Likewise, 
benefits from treatments found to be of high value accrue across the 
medical marketplace, not just to the plans (and subscribers) that fund the 
studies. To be sure, pharmaceutical firms and medical device makers 
finance a great deal of research,233 but these studies are fashioned with 
regulatory hurdles in mind. They are aimed at identifying chemical 
candidates for intellectual property protection and Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approval, neither of which require showings of 
comparative therapeutic value. Safety and efficacy, not cost effectiveness 
(by any measure) are all that the FDA regulatory scheme requires for 
approval.234 
Even if the federal government (or the private sector) were to commit 
to a large-scale program of comparative research into the outcomes of 
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, serious obstacles to evidence-
based, cost-sensitive practice (and payment policies) would remain. 
Selection of outcome measures for such studies is fraught with normative 
questions that lack agreed-on answers.235 A classic example is the 
comparison of coronary revascularization (angioplasty and coronary artery 
bypass surgery) and drug therapy for atherosclerotic heart disease. What 
roles should prolongation of life, reduction of pain, and improvement of 
physical endurance have in assessment of these therapies? Such measures 
sometimes correlate, but often, they diverge. Preferences will vary from 
patient to patient, and for some patients, they will fluctuate over time. 
Variation of this sort opens the way for competing interest groups—say, 
 
 232. In theory, a health plan could conduct clinical effectiveness research on a proprietary basis, 
then use the research results to formulate coverage policies that yield competitive benefits through cost 
savings that accrue uniquely to the plan. In practice, this scenario is implausible, since coverage policies 
that deviate from industry practice would spark hostile reactions (including appeals to state-mandated 
independent reviewers and to the courts) from doctors and patients. To defend these policies, the plan 
would have to explain them, by going public with its research design and results—and thereby 
transforming its proprietary information into a public good. 
 233. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) reports that its 
members spent $44.5 billion on drug research and development in 2007, and that such spending for the 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole was $58.8 billion. PhRMA, About PhRMA: Who We Are, 
http://www.phrma.org/about_phrma/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Skeptics contend that a great deal of 
this purported investment in research is in fact disguised advertising and other promotional spending. 
E.g., JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES 198–216 (2004). 
 234. The FDA has taken the position that its enabling statute does not permit it to consider a 
candidate drug’s cost-effectiveness or comparative value. The relevant statutory language requires only 
that drugs be safe and effective; it thereby supports this position. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL 
PATENT LAW (2005). The pharmaceutical industry opposes Congressional revision of the FDA’s 
enabling statute to empower the agency to consider comparative efficacy, value, or cost. 
 235. Elhauge, supra note 225, at 1496. 
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heart surgeons, invasive cardiologists,236 medication-prescribing internists, 
and cost-conscious insurers—to reject research results (by criticizing the 
outcome measures chosen) when studies do not go their way. 
The design of comparative clinical trials is bedeviled by another 
problem that constrains their real-world applicability. Participants in 
clinical trials typically represent a homogeneous subset of the population 
with the disease or symptoms being studied. This reduces the risk that 
confounding influences—such as age, genetic and lifestyle factors, and the 
coexistence of other illnesses—will interfere with comparison of the tests 
or treatments being studied. But this prerequisite for good science means 
that a study’s findings often apply to a small fraction of the patient 
population for which the tests or treatments are potentially relevant.237 That 
is, most real-world patients would not have qualified for inclusion in the 
study, rendering application of its findings a dubious proposition for 
them.238 The enormous cost of large-scale clinical trials, which can run to 
the tens of millions of dollars, makes this a large obstacle to construction of 
an evidence base for most of medical practice, even if outcome measures 
can be agreed on. 
There is, moreover, a fractal geometry of medical decisionmaking that 
complicates the fashioning of clinical practice protocols even when their 
drafters have abundant data at their disposal. Any protocol applied to a 
group of patients is open to the criticism that it constitutes a one-size-fits-
all approach to sick people who vary in relevant ways—genetically, 
behaviorally, or otherwise. The astonishing complexity of human biology 
virtually guarantees the plausibility of this criticism. The more we discover 
about our biology, the richer the diversity that we can envision. We have, 
for example, just begun to explore human genomic variation, its 
implications for the individualized expression of disease, and the resulting 
possibilities for personalized treatment.239 It will be increasingly possible to 
 
 236. Heart surgeons perform bypass surgery; angioplasty is typically performed by cardiologists 
(internists who have done fellowships in cardiology). 
 237. See Bloche, supra note 11, at 276 (discussing this problem as an instance of bounded 
rationality in health care policy). 
 238. For example, anticipated differences in the effectiveness of coronary angioplasty—depending 
on the anatomy of a patient’s coronary vasculature, the extent and distribution of atherosclerotic disease 
across this vasculature, differences in lipid chemistry (for example, levels of high and low density 
lipoproteins, known to be mediators of cardiovascular risk), behavioral and lifestyle factors, genetic 
markers, and age—might lead clinical investigators to narrow the inclusion criteria for an angioplasty 
trial on such grounds. But by so doing, the investigators narrow the real-world clinical relevance of 
their findings to the subset of cardiovascular disease patients who meet these inclusion criteria. 
 239. See, e.g., Thomas J. Lynch et al., Activating Mutations in the Epidermal Growth Factor 
Receptor Underlying Responsiveness of Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer to Gefitinib, 350 NEW ENG. J. 
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object to practice or payment protocols by claiming that some patients to 
whom a protocol applies will benefit greatly from a disallowed treatment, 
or visa versa. In practice, the former claim will be more frequent. Doctors, 
drug makers, and others who stand to gain from a disallowed treatment will 
have strong incentives to stake this claim—and to seek evidence to support 
it by reanalyzing data and performing new studies.240 Clinical protocols 
that group patients for the purpose of guiding practice are a probabilistic 
exercise. They reflect average, expected outcomes, when, in fact, outcomes 
vary depending on characteristics that group members do not share. 
Research that elucidates such characteristics, thereby opening the way to 
more precise predictions for subgroups, will lead clinical protocols to 
unravel. 
b.  Balancing Benefits and Costs: Preferences, Principles, and Political 
Taboo 
A further obstacle to use of clinical protocols, once cost concerns are 
allowed to count,241 is our inability as a society to come close to agreement 
on how to value the benefits of care, even when we have good enough data 
to quantitate these benefits.242 Scholars and researchers have proposed 
myriad formulations, aimed at making assessments of benefits 
commensurable for the purpose of weighing them against each other and 
 
MED. 2129 (2004) (reporting on genetic variations that dramatically increase one particular type of 
tumor’s responsiveness to a chemotherapy agent previously found to be only minimally effective for 
patients with this tumor type). 
 240. Patients who vest hope in the disallowed therapy represent additional leverage for health care 
providers and drug and device makers intent on challenging clinical protocols. The lobbying efforts of 
the so-called Center for Patient Advocacy are a high profile example. The Center was founded by a 
back surgeon opposed to a federal agency’s 1993 practice protocol that came out against spinal fusion 
and discectomy surgery for low back pain. Brownlee, supra note 231, at 28. Not only did it advocate 
successfully against broad adoption of this protocol by health care payers, but it also lobbied 
successfully—in conjunction with other provider groups, as well as drug and medical device 
manufacturers—for federal legislation that downsized the offending agency and forbade it from issuing 
additional practice protocols. Id. On this and other issues, the Center has leveraged people’s trust in 
their doctors, as well as their worries about insurers’ skimping on care. Links—accompanied by 
favorable references to the Center as a resource for patients—from such websites as those of the Kaiser 
Family Foundation and the Public Broadcasting System program Frontline today bring people to the 
Center’s website without informing them about the Center’s origins and ongoing advocacy role for 
health care providers. See, e.g., KaiserNetwork.org Reference Links, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/ 
ref_links/ reflinks_advocacy.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline: 
Dr. Solomon’s Dilemma—Links, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/doctor/etc/links.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 241. Explicit cost consciousness has not, thus far, been incorporated into protocols developed by 
federal agencies, professional societies, or medical academics. Cost sensitivity has played a role in 
proprietary payment protocols employed by health plans, but there have been no reports of plans 
weighing costs against benefits in systematic fashion; rather, consideration of costs has been ad hoc. 
 242. Bloche, supra note 11, at 270–71. 
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against costs. These approaches range from lives or life-years saved to all 
manner of methods for calculating quality-adjusted life years.243 But none 
of these approaches have caught on, and none seem about to; it is thus 
implausible that any of these formulations could become a stable solution, 
in the foreseeable future, to the problem of valuing medical care’s benefits. 
For this reason, some argue, individuals should decide for themselves 
by choosing from among explicitly stated clinical rationing policies when 
they subscribe to health plans.244 This solution is morally appealing245 but 
unlikely to work well in practice. As I have argued elsewhere, coexistence 
of multiple clinical allocation policies would impose too great an 
information-processing demand on doctors called on to implement them at 
the bedside.246 An engineer can adjust a levee’s design to withstand a ten-
year flood, or a hundred- or thousand-year tempest, but a doctor cannot 
adhere simultaneously to multiple cost-benefit trade-off schemes for 
differently insured patients. Physicians, like soldiers, learn to react, as 
much as to reason, as clinical circumstances unfold. Medical training 
entails perception and recognition of patterns—patterns that prompt doctors 
to make clinical decisions in rapid sequence, typically without engaging in 
 
 243. For an excellent review of these formulations and their shortcomings, see Elhauge, supra 
note 225, at 1493–1526. 
 244. Havighurst envisions a medical marketplace made up of differently priced private health 
plans, offering multiple tiers of quality and different cost-benefit trade-off policies. Consumers would 
choose from among these plans based on both their ex ante preferences concerning cost-benefit trade-
off policies and their willingness and ability to pay. HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 22–24. Elhauge, by 
contrast, envisions a marketplace of equally priced private health plans, offering benefits of equivalent 
actuarial value. Elhauge, supra note 225, at 1524–26, 1529–30, 1538–44. Public financing (constrained 
by a politically determined global health care budget) would cover the cost of enrollment. The plans 
would offer a variety of clinical resource allocation policies readily comprehensible to consumers, who 
could then choose from among competing plans based on their ex ante resource allocation preferences. 
Id. at 1524–26. Patients could purchase additional care out-of-pocket (if able to afford it), but there 
would be no Havighurst-style tiering of health plans by ability and willingness to pay. Id. at 1524–26. 
As Elhauge points out, the ex ante perspective is essential here. Id. at 1507. Allowing patients to 
choose cost-benefit trade-off policies (at the insurance pool’s expense) ex post the onset of illness 
reintroduces the moral hazard problem that choice between allocation policies from behind the “veil of 
ignorance” (about future medical problems) is meant to avoid. Also, as Elhauge notes, the validity of ex 
ante consent to an allocation policy is contingent upon the judgment that the conditions under which 
consent was given are morally acceptable. Id. at 1536. The public subsidies that Elhauge envisions, 
which would ensure universal coverage sufficient to purchase health care at levels now affordable to the 
middle class, suffice (in my view) to render the conditions of ex ante consent morally acceptable under 
Elhauge’s scheme. 
 245. The principal moral concern that many share—that this approach legitimizes multiple tiers of 
coverage and care, tied to ability to pay (an objectionable development if one views health care as a 
“merit good”)—dissolves if the less well off are given public subsidies sufficient to enable them to 
afford the levels of coverage and care that middle-class Americans now receive. See Elhauge, supra 
note 225, at 1491 & n.124. 
 246. Bloche, supra note 11, at 276–77. 
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conscious, probabilistic reasoning.247 Human cognitive capacity is limited 
to a degree that precludes application of such reasoning to more than a 
small fraction of the decisions doctors make each day.248 It is beyond this 
cognitive capacity for a single physician to adopt multiple clinical practice 
styles, each tied to different resource allocation principles.249 
One might finesse this problem by placing each physician within only 
one health plan; then each physician could follow his or her plan’s 
allocative principles and policies without fretting about multiple resource 
allocation schemes and practice styles.250 This might work, in theory, in 
heavily populated areas with health care markets big enough to support 
multiple plans, each with their own in-house specialty services.251 Market 
forces, though, have not played out this way. Most medical specialists and 
 
 247. This is an instance of the more general truth, increasingly recognized by cognitive scientists, 
that people engage in conscious reasoning for only a small fraction of the many quick-fire judgments 
they make each day. See GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 141–67 (1999) (employing medical and other examples to argue 
that people make most decisions by employing “fast and frugal” heuristics, not conscious, systematic 
reasoning). 
 248. See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2002) (reviewing a 
variety of psychological adaptations to human cognitive limitations, including cultural norms, imitation, 
and emotional responses, as well as unconscious heuristics). 
 249. Physicians’ past responses to heterogeneous incentives from different payers reflect this 
limitation. When, in 1983, Medicare radically changed the way it paid for acute inpatient care—shifting 
from fee-for-service to lump-sum payment based on diagnosis—hospitals reduced their average lengths 
of stay for all populations of insured patients—private, fee-for-service as well as Medicare. Judith 
Feder, Jack Hadley & Stephen Zuckerman, How Did Medicare’s Prospective Payment System Affect 
Hospitals?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 867, 870 & tbl.2 (1987). 
This reduction was an expected response to the new Medicare reimbursement scheme, which 
rewarded frugality through the lump-sum method. But its spillover into the fee-for-service market was 
surprising, since this spillover reduced hospitals’ revenues from private, fee-for-service patients. It is 
difficult to explain this spillover except as an expression of physicians’ bounded rationality—their 
inability to change their approach to Medicare patients without also changing their approach to fee-for-
service inpatients. More recently, studies of physicians who see patients covered under multiple private 
plans with differing incentives—for example, fee-for-service, capitation, and other schemes that reward 
doctors for doing less—have found that doctors do not vary their practice styles for patients in differing 
plans. See, e.g., Laurence C. Baker, Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health 
Expenditures for Fee-for-Service Medicare Patients, 281 JAMA 432, 434–36 (1999); Uwe E. 
Reinhardt, The Economist’s Model of Physician Behavior, 281 JAMA 462, 462–64 (1999). 
 250. The Kaiser-Permanente system (comprised of an HMO and a set of medical practice groups 
that treat only subscribers to the Kaiser HMO) is the most prominent example of a plan organized in 
this fashion. See Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, http://xnet.kp.org/newscenter/aboutkp/ 
fastfacts.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 251. Outside of such areas, there probably is not sufficient demand to support multiple lineups of 
specialty care providers, each dedicated to a single health plan. See, e.g., Rebecca T. Slifkin, Thomas C. 
Ricketts III & Hilda A. Howard, Potential Effects of Managed Competition in Rural Areas, HEALTH 
CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1996, at 143 (discussing difficulties that confront efforts to engender 
competition between multiple health plans, with their own doctors and hospitals, in rural environments). 
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virtually all elite tertiary care centers have maintained their independence 
from health plans.252 They treat patients from many plans, and they possess 
the bargaining power to resist plans’ efforts to influence their practice 
styles. Restructuring specialty care as an in-house component of private 
health plans would require aggressive government intervention, at odds 
with the prevailing preference for market-driven organization of medical 
care. 
In addition to these obstacles to assessing the benefits of care, efforts 
to limit medical spending must confront a larger challenge. Americans 
remain, for the most part, unwilling to acknowledge that long-term cost-
containment will require the withholding of beneficial care.253 The “R-
Word”—rationing—remains taboo in public discussion of policy responses 
to rising costs,254 except as an epithet employed by politicians to cast 
aspersions on health reform proposals they oppose.255 We are not 
absolutists in practice: unarticulated trade-offs between benefits and costs 
are embedded in clinical judgment.256 But our public morality permits no 
discussion of this,257 at least by elected officials, health plan marketers, and 
 
 252. One can interpret this in Coasean, theory-of-the-firm terms. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of 
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The higher transaction costs associated with the independence of 
specialty physicians (and tertiary care hospitals) are counterbalanced by the benefits (for both health 
plans and providers of specialized services) of the flexibility that comes from annual contracting in a 
quickly changing marketplace, as compared with the rigidities and sunk costs of vertical integration. 
See James C. Robinson, The Future of Managed Care Organization, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1999, at 
7, 8–9, 12–14, 17–23. 
 253. For a blunt discussion of the need to ration beneficial care in order to hold medical spending 
to manageable levels, see AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 6–8. 
 254. Robert Pear, The “R” Word: Justice Souter Takes on a Health Care Taboo, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 18, 2000, § 4, at 3. 
 255. The charge that President Clinton’s health reform plan (which envisioned competition among 
HMOs and other prepaid managed health plans) countenanced the rationing of care was one of the 
missives hurled by the plan’s Republican critics in 1993 and 1994. A few years later, when House 
Republicans proposed that Medicare beneficiaries be enrolled in HMOs, Democrats returned the favor, 
claiming that Republicans were planning to ration senior citizens’ care. See Robert Pear, Familiar Ring 
to the G.O.P Medicare Plan? It’s What Clinton Talked About, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995, at A20. Both 
accusations were accurate. A unanimous Supreme Court said as much in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 
211, 221 (2000), when it noted that “inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO 
scheme.” 
 256. See JOHN M. EISENBERG, DOCTORS’ DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE 30–37, 
58–61 (1986). 
 257. The Hippocratic ethic of undivided loyalty to patients, operating in conjunction with 
insurance coverage for most medical expenditures, obliges treating physicians to take little or no 
account of costs, reinforcing the taboo against rationing. Some contend that the necessity of rationing 
justifies permitting doctors to depart from this ethic by withholding care with comparatively low 
expected benefits even though insurance contracts do not explicitly countenance this and patients expect 
their doctors to do all they can (so long as expected benefits outweigh expected harm). See, e.g., Hall, 
supra note 141, at 497. I have cautioned that this puts patient trust at too great a risk, with worrisome 
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others concerned about popular opinion.258 Health plans do not promote 
competing rationing formulae on their websites, television ads, or 
billboards on the sides of buses. And insurance contracts persist in 
promising all medically necessary care, without any reference to the 
weighing of benefits against costs259 for the purpose of determining what is 
necessary.260 Likewise, medical malpractice law continues to defer to 
extant professional standards of care, which are, for the most part, only 
minimally sensitive to cost.261 For now, at least, efforts to control medical 
spending will have to proceed within the confines of our country’s refusal 
to openly countenance the calculus of cost and benefit. 
c.  Putting Policy into Practice: Our Fragmented Health Care System 
A final difficulty needs to be faced. Were it possible to surmount all of 
the obstacles just discussed, the fragmentation of our health care system 
would still present a formidable barrier to implementation of more 
evidence-based, cost-sensitive practice protocols. In the 1980s, many 
commentators on health policy predicted that consumers’ concerns about 
value would drive the consolidation of hospitals, doctors, and insurers into 
vertically integrated health plans with internal systems of cost and quality 
control. This vision has not panned out. Medical care remains a radically 
decentralized endeavor.262 Private physicians, for the most part, continue to 
practice alone or in small groups,263 organizationally separate from 
 
implications for medicine’s effectiveness and ability to contribute to people’s sense of security and 
solidarity. M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 
941 (2002). 
 258. As Elhauge points out, many academics, as well, take the absolutist view, refusing to 
countenance either health-health trade-offs or the weighing of clinical benefits against costs on the 
ground that we should shift public resources from other programs (for example, the military) to 
medicine and health. Elhauge, supra note 225, at 1460–61. 
 259. This reference to the balancing of benefits against costs is meant to include health-health 
trade-offs (that is, choices from among alternative uses of health care resources) within a limited 
budget, as well as decisions as to whether the expected benefits of a test or treatment justify spending 
additional dollars to cover it. 
 260. The Supreme Court’s conceptualization of independent review of coverage denials as akin to 
a second medical opinion, not a matter of contract interpretation, see Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 381–83 (2002), is an additional bulwark against efforts to construe the medically 
necessary standard to permit cost-conscious coverage decisionmaking. 
 261. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 262. See JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 35–62 (1999) (discussing 
the reasons why a system of competing, vertically integrated health plans did not arise, and describing 
the decentralized, rapidly shifting contractual relationships among hospitals, doctors, and plans that 
developed in its stead). 
 263. There are exceptions—large multispecialty group practices have gained substantial market 
shares in California, New Jersey, North Carolina, and elsewhere, id. at 8, but medical practice remains a 
cottage industry in most locales. 
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hospitals and health plans. Hospitals have consolidated horizontally, to 
some degree,264 but they exercise minimal managerial control over medical 
practice, and they remain institutionally independent from health plans.265 
Health plans bargain with doctors and hospitals for discounted rates, but 
they do not actually manage care.266 Physicians make clinical decisions on 
their own, influenced by personal values,267 peers and mentors,268 financial 
incentives,269 drug company marketing,270 and myriad other factors that 
contribute to wide variation in practice styles. Coordination of care often 
gets short shrift, since this fragmented system does not support team 
approaches to patients with multiple medical problems.271 
Alternative models of medical care exist. Leading hospitals and 
multispecialty group practices have adopted quality-improvement programs 
that promote evidence-based practice and collaborative decisionmaking.272 
Medicine’s academic leaders have coalesced around an agenda for 
transformation that stresses the building of systems—systems that share 
information, reward cooperation, apply state-of-the-art clinical science, 
discover and learn from mistakes, and adjust to individual patients’ varying 
 
 264. See Kristin Madison, Hospital Mergers in an Era of Quality Improvement, 7 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 (2007); Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A 
Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (2007). 
 265. There are exceptions to this institutional independence: the Kaiser-Permanente HMO in 
California is the outstanding example—the Kaiser HMO owns its hospitals, which treat only Kaiser-
Permanente subscribers. See Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, supra note 250. 
 266. “Managed care” has always been a misnomer. Even during the height of the managed care 
era, through the mid-1990s, health plans did not “manage” doctors, if by “manage,” one means rigorous 
oversight and direction of their performance with an eye toward standardizing their approaches to 
diagnosis and treatment. At most, health plans declined to cover some tests and treatments, refused to 
authorize some referrals, and profiled doctors’ clinical spending patterns with an eye toward selecting 
more frugal providers for their networks. Plans made minimal proactive efforts: they neither 
promulgated their own comprehensive, evidence-based clinical practice guidelines nor pressed their 
participating physicians to follow guidelines developed by academic or professional leaders. 
 267. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 195, 195–96 (2003). 
 268. E.g., Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge 
in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 392–93 (2002). 
 269. Michael F. Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good Candidate? 7 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 3, 18, 27 (2007). 
 270. See AVORN, supra note 233, at 292–312. 
 271. Failures of coordination can have both life-threatening and wasteful consequences: examples 
include prescribing medicines without regard for dangerous drug interactions, duplication of risky and 
costly tests, and incomplete diagnostic assessment of clinical signs and symptoms that “fall between the 
cracks” of multiple specialties. 
 272. See, e.g., James J. Mongan, Robert E. Mechanic & Thomas H. Lee, Transforming U.S. 
Health Care: Policy Challenges Affecting the Integration and Improvement of Care, HEALTH POLICY: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS (Brookings Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/1215healthcare_mongan/20061215_mongan.pdf. 
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needs.273 But neither market forces nor health law have nudged a critical 
mass of doctors and hospitals toward realization of this agenda.274 
Our system’s poor performance, measured by current understandings 
of best practice, reflects these failings. A much-publicized study of how 
American medicine fares nationwide on more than four hundred broadly 
accepted, evidence-based measures of appropriate care found that doctors 
make the “right” decisions only 50 to 60 percent of the time.275 There are 
stunning geographical variations in the care Americans receive and in the 
costs they incur276—variations that lack scientific justification.277 Indeed, 
studies of state-by-state variation in Medicare costs have found correlations 
between higher-than-average per capita spending and lower-than-average 
performance on quality-of-care measures.278 These quality measures reflect 
standards of care supported by current financial incentives. They thus do 
not incorporate cost sensitivity to the degree necessary for long-term 
control of medical spending. But our health system’s weak performance on 
these measures bodes poorly for our future ability to put agreed-on 
standards of quality and value into effect. 
2.  Emergent Possibilities 
These daunting obstacles to control of costs and pursuit of value in 
health care cannot be overcome by some grand stroke of legal design. No 
policy-wonk D-Day assault on the problem of medical spending can prevail 
over health care’s entrenched complexities, interest groups, and conflicts of 
value. Thinking about health care’s governance in emergent-systems terms 
supports a more modest approach. The emergent-systems model channels 
our attention toward opportunities to set change in motion—to navigate 
around some of the obstacles and to allow others to become less formidable 
 
 273. See generally COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., supra note 114 (setting out an 
agenda for health care reform and establishing six aims for improvement). 
 274. See Barry R. Greene & Gary L. Filerman, Reinventing CME: The Role of the Care Pilot in 
the Medical Group Practice, 30 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 283 (2007); Thomas H. Lee, Can We 
Cross the Quality Chasm? The Case for Realistic Optimism, 4 AM. HEART HOSP. J. 16 (2006); Keith D. 
Moore & Dean C. Coddington, Models of Care that Meet the Standards of Crossing the Quality Chasm: 
A New Health System for the 21st Century, J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., Jan. 2002, at 12. 
 275. McGlynn et al., supra note 33, at 2642 tbl.3 (finding that patients receive 54.9 percent of 
recommended care). 
 276. See Wennberg et al., supra note 67. 
 277. See CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE SCIS., supra note 115, at 2–8. 
 278. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the Physician Workforce, and 
Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. W4-184, W4-187 to -189, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org.libproxy.usc.edu/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.184v1 (finding that states with 
higher Medicare spending have lower-quality care). 
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as time passes. It emphasizes opportunism over elegant, system-wide 
solutions that have minimal chance of being fully implemented. 
a.  Toward Evidence-Based Practice and Value-Based Protocols 
What might a reform strategy sensitive to potential evolutionary 
pathways look like in the cost control realm? I shall point to some 
possibilities. For starters, such a strategy should aim to finesse (1) interest 
group resistance to comparative evaluation of therapies and (2) Americans’ 
aversion to the balancing of health benefits against economic costs. An 
encouraging sign is the recent surge in bipartisan support for a ramped-up 
program of comparative clinical outcomes research.279 Large federal 
deficits and ominous warnings about the consequences of failure to contain 
Medicare and other entitlement spending280 are pushing Congress toward 
action despite antipathy from those who profit from tests and treatments 
that might not pan out. Congress took a first step in February 2009 by 
appropriating $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research.281 Still 
needed is a mechanism to insulate this research from the bare-fisted politics 
of the annual appropriations process—and from the distorting influence of 
health care providers, pharmaceutical firms, and medical-device makers.282 
Possible approaches include allocation of a fixed fraction of annual 
Medicare spending (to shield outcomes research funding from the politics 
 
 279. See Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information, 25 
HEALTH AFF. w572 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w572. A promising program 
already up and running is Medicare’s Coverage with Evidence Development (“CED”) initiative, 
announced in 2006 by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). See generally CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE 
PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF: NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA 
COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVERAGE: COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT (2006), 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=8#P39_3944. Under the CED 
program, CMS conditions Medicare coverage of some tests and treatments on the collection of research 
data—information beyond what is necessary for Medicare billing—that enables CMS to assemble 
evidence bearing on their risks and benefits. The CED program, initiated under the authority of section 
1862(a)(1)(E) of the Social Security Act, empowers CMS to modify its coverage rules on an ongoing 
basis as the agency gathers and assesses data on the tests and treatments at issue. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395(a)(1)(E) (2000). By issuing favorable national coverage determinations (“NCDs”) under the 
CED program, CMS can speed the adoption of new technologies (mollifying patients, providers, and 
pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms) while making a substantial contribution to clinical 
outcomes research. 
 280. Aaron, supra note 41. 
 281. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115, 177–78 (appropriating $300 million for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, $400 
million for the National Institutes of Health, and $400 million for the Secretary of Health & Human 
Services to be spent at her discretion). 
 282. Such attacks crippled earlier federal efforts to conduct medical outcomes research and 
develop evidence-based clinical practice protocols. See Brownlee, supra note 231; Gray et al., supra 
note 231, at W3-295 to -298. 
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of the annual appropriations process283) and creation of an autonomous, 
Federal Reserve-style agency284 to perform this research (or to award 
research grants on a competitive basis, as does the National Institutes of 
Health). Research partnerships between the federal government and private 
insurers have also been urged285 to broaden both political and financial 
support for outcomes research.286 
Ideally, this agency or program should do more than just research: it 
should employ available data to assess and compare the value of clinical 
interventions,287 so as to guide doctors, hospitals, and health care payers.288 
But doctors, drug makers, and others dependent on revenues from tests and 
treatments that could fare poorly in such evaluations have the legislative 
clout to defeat proposals that would empower government to perform 
them.289 From a traditional policy-design perspective,290 creation of an 
 
 283. Committing a fixed proportion of Medicare spending—say 1 or 2 percentage points—to 
outcomes research would give it status as an entitlement program, immunizing it from efforts by 
affected interest groups to cut it during the course of the annual budgetary appropriations process. 
 284. Possible mechanisms for maintaining such an agency’s independence include keeping it 
entirely separate from the Department of Health and Human Services (and thus from the direct 
influence of the president and his or her appointees), governance by a bipartisan commission appointed 
to staggered terms, and delegation of the task of appointing commission members to a nonpolitical 
entity (perhaps the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Sciences). The Federal Reserve 
model has been endorsed most prominently by former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle—President 
Obama’s first nominee for Secretary of Health & Human Services—who has urged that decisionmaking 
about health care policy more generally (including the comparative value of tests and treatments) be 
vested in an appointed “Federal Health Board.” TOM DASCHLE WITH SCOTT S. GREENBERGER & 
JEANNE M. LAMBREW, CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 139–80 
(2008). 
 285. Wilensky, supra note 279, at w580–82. 
 286. Such partnerships could help to protect an outcomes research program from political attack 
by positioning insurers as a counterweight to interests that profit from treatments of uncertain value. 
 287. A possible model for such a program is Great Britain’s National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence, which performs and publishes assessments of tests and treatments, then issues 
recommended guidelines for clinical care. See generally Welcome to the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence, http://www.nice.org.uk (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). 
 288. It would also be helpful for this agency or program to develop alternative analytic 
frameworks, or models, for: (1) the balancing of benefits against costs and (2) the weighing of health 
benefits against each other (more relevant for health plans and providers that must make do within fixed 
budgets). Private and public insurers (and providers) could then try out these models as tools for making 
allocative decisions in candid, accountable fashion. See BEYOND LEARNED HELPLESSNESS, supra note 
41. Insurers and providers might or might not experiment along these lines, and such experiments might 
or might not catch on. Whether or not medical resource allocation evolves to embrace such models 
would be decided in emergent fashion. But development and dissemination of these models would 
widen this potential evolutionary pathway. 
 289. Physicians, pharmaceutical firms, and medical device manufacturers have done so in the 
past. See Brownlee, supra note 231; Gray et al., supra note 231, at W3-295 to -297. Those involved in 
Congressional efforts to ramp up federal support for clinical outcomes research tend toward the view 
that including statutory language empowering government to perform comparative evaluations of 
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agency that sponsors clinical outcomes research but does not assess the 
results—or offer guidance to providers and payers—is problematic. Why 
do this research without using it to improve health care quality and value? 
However, from an emergent systems perspective, even this limited mandate 
holds great promise. Such a program would generate a flood of outcomes 
data, enabling others to compare therapies and develop evidence-based 
practice protocols.291 To be sure, these protocols would be quicker in 
coming were a federal agency to sponsor them on a large scale. But a series 
of high-profile studies that found oft-used therapies to be harmful or 
ineffective292 could inspire doctors and patients to demand more vigorous 
efforts to compare treatments and to develop evidence-based guidelines. 
Rising medical spending, moreover, will put growing pressure on guideline 
authors to take costs into account. From an expanding base of data on 
therapeutic outcomes, evidence-based, cost-conscious protocols for 
payment and practice could emerge despite strong resistance from affected 
stakeholders. 
 
medical interventions and to develop clinical practice protocols would doom legislation to increase 
funding for outcomes research. Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staff Involved in Developing 
Outcomes Research Legislation (Dec. 2006). And indeed the $1.1 billion appropriated for comparative 
effectiveness research in February 2009, see supra note 281, was conditioned on the requirement that 
the interagency council responsible for coordinating this research not “mandate coverage, 
reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer” or issue “mandates or clinical 
guidelines for payment, coverage, or treatment.” American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
§804(g), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 188. The potential for backlash from stakeholders concerned 
about adverse assessments of the value of tests and treatments was underscored by angry denunciations 
of the interagency council—and the $1.1 billion appropriation—as a ploy to ration health care. See, e.g., 
Kevin Freking, Obama Team Sees Stimulus Advancing Health Reform, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2008744217_apstimulushealthobama.html?syndication=
rss. 
 290. By “traditional policy design perspective,” I refer here to approaches that envision a desired 
end state and call for reforms meant to bring about this state, rather than to create conditions for the 
future evolution of policy solutions. See supra text accompanying notes 202–03. 
 291. Among the actors that might make use of a surge in outcomes data to compare treatments and 
craft protocols are medical academics, health plans, and insurers. The risk of bias in the development of 
protocols is omnipresent (as it would be were these same actors to participate in the formulation of 
government-sponsored protocols). The important subject of the management of conflicts of interest (for 
example, medical academics’ relationships with drug companies, as well as their income from 
providing questionable treatments) is beyond my scope here. 
 292. Within the last few years, clinical outcomes studies have made headlines by finding that 
commonly prescribed treatments increase risks to life. Examples include estrogen replacement therapy 
for menopausal women, see Garnet L. Anderson et al., Effects of Estrogen Plus Progestin on 
Gynecologic Cancers and Associated Diagnostic Procedures: The Women’s Health Initiative 
Randomized Trial, 290 JAMA 1739, 1745–47 (2003), and Vioxx and other new-generation nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory medications, see Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal 
Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1520, 1520 (2000). 
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Winning widespread compliance with such protocols will require an 
approach to our health care system’s fragmentation.293 Here also, there are 
emergent possibilities. Medicare is in a position to lead by adopting 
evidence-based performance standards and rewarding doctors and hospitals 
that comply. Congress recently authorized Medicare to make extra 
payments to hospitals that meet Medicare’s performance standards294 and 
to initiate small-scale trials of pay-for-performance incentives for 
physicians.295 Medicare’s nearly 40 percent share of acute care hospital 
spending296 and substantial contribution to physicians’ incomes297 give it 
enormous influence: past changes in Medicare’s financial incentives to 
providers have produced large changes in the providers’ treatment of both 
privately insured and Medicare patients.298 Thus far, Medicare has declined 
to explicitly count costs when issuing coverage rules299 or adopting 
performance standards. Its enabling statute arguably allows it to do so,300 
 
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 262–71. 
 294. Section 501(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2289–90, and section 5001(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 28–29, establish hospital payment differentials to reward 
facilities that report how they fare on Medicare’s performance measures. Beginning in fiscal year 2009, 
Medicare will pay hospitals differentially based on their performance on a variety of measures of 
quality, as well as their investment in medical information systems. Deficit Reduction Act § 5001(b). 
 295. In 2005, Medicare initiated a pay-for-performance experiment (based on measures of quality 
in preventive care and management of chronic disease) involving ten large group practices. Press 
Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Begins Performance-Based Payments for 
Physician Groups (Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp? 
Counter=1341. 
 296. In 2003, Medicare paid 38.5 percent of America’s acute-care hospital expenses. AM. HOSP. 
ASS’N, OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 9 (2005), available at www.aha.org/aha/content/ 
2005/PowerPoint/0502-us-system-overview.ppt. 
 297. One study, drawing on data from the 2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, found that 
22.9 percent of U.S. physician income came from Medicare. Karen E. Lasser, Steffie Woolhandler & 
David U. Himmelstein, Sources of Physician Income: The Contribution of Government Payments to the 
Specialist-Generalist Income Gap, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1477, 1479 (2008). Some specialists—
cardiologists, geriatricians, hematologist-oncologists, nephrologists, rheumatologists, and urologists—
derive more than one-third of their income from Medicaid. Id. at 1478. 
 298. See supra note 249. 
 299. The most recent guidance document on coverage policy from CMS, the agency that 
administers Medicare, states: “Cost effectiveness is not a factor CMS considers in making NCDs. In 
other words, the cost of a particular technology is not relevant in the determination of whether the 
technology improves health outcomes or should be covered for the Medicare population through an 
NCD.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
FOR THE PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF: FACTORS CMS CONSIDERS IN OPENING A NATIONAL 
COVERAGE DETERMINATION (2006), available at www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_ 
document.asp?id=6. For an excellent review of the controversy over the potential role of cost in 
Medicare coverage decisionmaking, see generally Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, but Cannot, 
Consider Cost: Legal Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577 (2005). 
 300. Section 1862(a)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act states: “Notwithstanding any other 
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but the usual alliance of doctors, hospitals, and drug and device companies 
has been firmly opposed. Still, there is reason for optimism. For the first 
time, Medicare is linking payment to compliance with clinical standards, 
thereby creating an incentive scheme that might someday be used to 
encourage cost awareness across our fragmented system. Private payers are 
following suit, joining with each other—and with hospitals and medical 
groups—to seek common ground on quality measures and practice 
protocols.301 So far, they have been no more willing than Medicare to 
openly count costs,302 but they are forging collaborative arrangements303 
that could someday be employed to give effect to cost-conscious 
 
provision of [law], no payment may be made . . . for items or services . . . not reasonable and necessary 
for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000). The term 
“reasonable” has been construed by some commentators to permit consideration of cost; others have 
read this provision more restrictively. E.g., Fox, supra note 299, at 584–95. Because Medicare has 
never explicitly balanced costs against benefits when promulgating national coverage rules, its authority 
to do so has not been litigated. 
 301. America’s Health Insurance Plans, the principal trade association representing private health 
plans, is combining clinical data from multiple plans—and from Medicare—to make it possible to 
assess the performance of hospitals and physicians nationwide on agreed-on measures of health care 
quality. This aggregation of data will surmount a major obstacle to measurement of provider 
performance: the fact that providers report clinical data (for billing purposes) to multiple health plans, 
none of which, therefore, can assemble a complete picture of how well providers fare on quality 
measures. A consortium of health care industry stakeholders (including insurers, hospitals, group 
medical practices, and professional and trade associations) known as the National Quality Forum will 
formulate quality measures, including standards of care for common medical problems, that will then be 
applied to the aggregated data to assess health care providers’ performance. The results of these 
assessments will be widely disseminated with three related purposes in mind: encouraging doctors and 
hospitals to do better, enabling health plans to reward providers based on performance, and allowing 
consumers to select providers based on quality. Press Release, Robert Wood Johnson Found., National 
Effort to Measure and Report on Quality and Cost-Effectiveness of Health Care Unveiled (Oct. 3, 
2007), available at http://www.rwjf.org/newsroom/product.jsp?id=22371. 
 302. Private health plans are beginning to collaborate with doctors and hospitals to develop 
standardized methods for tracking and comparing different providers’ costs for tests and treatments. Id. 
The avowed aim of this collaboration among stakeholders is to support patients’ (and payers’) efforts to 
shop for the least expensive (that is, most cost-effective) way to achieve a given therapeutic result. Id. 
But the collaborators in this endeavor, so far, have refrained from explicitly balancing benefits against 
costs when formulating quality-of-care benchmarks. 
 303. Interlocking consortia of private health plans, hospitals, medical specialty societies, and other 
health care industry stakeholders have formed over the past several years for the avowed purpose of 
reaching industry-wide agreement on the adoption and uses of quality-of-care benchmarks. These 
include the AQA alliance (focusing on physician care), the Hospital Quality Alliance (“HQA”) 
(focusing on hospital care), and the Quality Alliance Steering Committee (meant to coordinate the 
efforts of the AQA alliance and HQA). See Press Release, AQA, Health Care Quality Leaders Join 
Forces (July 21, 2006), available at http://www.aqaalliance.org/HCQLeadersJoinForces072106.htm. 
See also generally AQA-HQA Collaboration–Quality Alliance Steering Committee, http:// 
www.aqaalliance.org/aqahqacollaboration.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). The Department of Health 
and Human Services has participated in these consortia and indicated its intention to coordinate 
Medicare and private sector quality improvement efforts. 
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protocols.304 
b.  The Emergent Potential of Current Law 
Awareness of these potential evolutionary pathways can and should 
play a role in development of several areas of law that bear on cost and 
quality: these include antitrust and privacy doctrine, medical malpractice, 
and the law governing disputes over insurance coverage. Comprehensive 
discussion of the cost and quality implications of each of these areas of law 
is beyond my scope here, but I will offer a brief roadmap of potential 
problems and opportunities from an emergent systems perspective. 
i.  Antitrust- and Privacy-Law Barriers to Information Sharing? 
Antitrust-law barriers to clinical data sharing among doctors, 
hospitals, and health plans for outcomes-research purposes should be 
minimized, if indeed there are any.305 Privacy-law protections should be 
construed with an eye toward the social importance of this research.306 The 
 
 304. Health care reform proposals urged by President Bush and by Republican and Democratic 
candidates for the presidency in 2008 presented additional emergent possibilities. The consumer-
directed model, see supra notes 213–14, 229, advanced by the Bush administration and by Republican 
presidential candidates Rudolph Giuliani and Mitt Romney, would make insured patients more sensitive 
both to cost in general and to insurance contract provisions designed to encourage patients to seek care 
from providers who score high on performance measures. For example, a consumer-directed health plan 
might require a patient to pay much more out-of-pocket for diabetes or heart disease care from a doctor 
who scores below some threshold on relevant quality-of-care measures. If and when quality measures 
come to incorporate cost-benefit trade-offs, this tiering of insurance coverage, tied to provider 
performance, would strengthen doctors’ and patients’ incentives to accept these trade-offs. 
Analogously, the insurance exchanges proposed by President Obama and by candidates Hillary 
Clinton and John Edwards, see text accompanying notes 215–18, would require health plans to report 
their performance on quality-of-care benchmarks in order to sell coverage on these exchanges. If and 
when cost-benefit trade-offs are built into these quality measures, this prerequisite for market access 
would become a powerful lever for adoption of cost-conscious treatment protocols. 
 305. Whether such barriers are real or merely perceived is unclear. Leaders in academic 
medicine’s efforts to improve health care quality believe that antitrust law stands in the way. Mongan et 
al., supra note 272, at 3–5. Collaborative setting of standards for purposes of collecting and sharing data 
has raised antitrust issues in other industries, but antitrust law has been open to arguments about the 
pro-competitive impact of network economics. Medical antitrust law scholars who have considered this 
question tend toward the view that current antitrust doctrine poses no obstacles to industry collaboration 
on outcomes research. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Five Reasons Why Health Care Quality Research 
Hasn’t Affected Competition Law and Policy, 4 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 159 (2004) (part 
of a special issue devoted to competition and health care quality); William M. Sage, David A. Hyman & 
Warren Greenberg, Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care Quality, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 
2003, at 31, 36–40. 
 306. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A 
Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1439, 1440 (2002) (arguing that “[s]haring data may be necessary to achieve important health purposes” 
such as health research and public health, and urging that “health information privacy laws . . . carefully 
balance the need for individual privacy with the benefits of using health data for the common good”). 
State-of-the-art electronic security technologies, along with entry of clinical data in deidentified form 
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question of antitrust obstacles to collaboration for the purpose of agreeing 
on quality measures and clinical practice protocols is more complex. There 
is an obvious tension between antitrust principles, which promote 
competition on quality as well as price, and collaborative setting of quality 
benchmarks. Yet current antitrust doctrine leaves room for the argument 
that collaborative standard setting can facilitate competition on quality by 
making it easier for consumers to comparison shop.307 A comprehensive set 
of quality benchmarks, accompanied by comparative performance data, 
would empower patients to choose wisely from among competing doctors, 
hospitals, and health plans. This in turn would put market pressure on plans 
and providers to deliver greater value to consumers—the end result sought 
by antitrust law. There is a snarl of doctrinal and economic issues here, in 
need of disentangling by antitrust scholars familiar with health care.308 But 
antitrust law can play a constructive role in the development of national 
standards of quality and value.309 Antitrust law should aim to distinguish 
 
(that is, without information that could be used to trace the data back to individual patients) prior to its 
aggregation, should provide high levels of privacy protection. But elimination of all risks to privacy is 
not a realistic goal, particularly in view of the proliferation of high-powered data-mining methods and 
the possibilities for illicit use of these and other techniques. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In 
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 331, 366 (2007). 
 307. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 53–55 (2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf; VMEbus International Trade 
Associtation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Business Review Letter, 2006 WL 3326742 (Oct. 30, 2006). 
 308. Among the entangled issues are how to keep collaborative standard setting from slowing the 
pace of therapeutic innovation, how to prevent anticompetitive abuse of standard-setting mechanisms 
(to exclude competing treatments and providers without scientific grounds for so doing), and the extent 
to which antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts should delve into the details of medical science 
and economics in order to make such judgments. Alternative legal approaches include looking to 
procedural fairness as a surrogate for inquiry into whether standard setting is anticompetitive as a 
substantive matter and, in the extreme, outright rejection of industry-wide clinical practice protocols 
and other quality standards as anticompetitive. 
 309. Some market-oriented commentators hold a sharply different view. They question such 
standard setting, arguing that industry-wide adoption of medical practice protocols and other quality 
norms is contrary to the letter and spirit of antitrust law because it prevents competing providers and 
health plans from marketing multiple tiers of quality. See Clark C. Havighurst, Applying Antitrust Law 
to Collaboration in the Production of Information: The Case of Medical Technology Assessment, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 341, 352–55 (arguing that agreements among professional bodies 
to develop consistent positions on the value of tests and treatments deny consumers the welfare-
enhancing benefits of competition). Consumer choice is enhanced, in this view, by allowing multiple 
levels of care, HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 7, and in the digital age, there is no lack of market-
generated information available to consumers to help them to comparison shop for care. See James C. 
Robinson, The End of Asymmetric Information, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1045, 1051 (2001). A 
rejoinder to this view, grounded in an analysis of antitrust doctrine, is beyond my brief here. But it 
would likely incorporate the near impossibility of comparison shopping (in the face of a cacophony of 
claims about quality) without broadly accepted benchmarks, as well as the near impossibility of 
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between collaborative standard setting that spurs competition to deliver 
clinical value and collusive efforts that exclude rivals and suppress 
evidence-based therapeutic innovation.310 By so doing, antitrust law can 
promote the evolution of cost-sensitive clinical practice norms and their 
dissemination through our fragmented health care system. 
ii.  Tort Liability 
Medical tort law’s approach to health care quality and value is a relic 
of past, disproven premises about the practice of medicine. It is thus an 
obstacle to the emergence of more evidence-based, cost-sensitive clinical 
care. The malpractice system’s greatest failing, from a quality and value 
perspective, is its reliance on clinical practitioners to specify standards of 
care.311 This deference to doctors is a departure from negligence law’s 
general requirement of reasonable conduct, a requirement typically 
understood in utilitarian terms as a duty to take precautions so long as 
 
maintaining multiple tiers of medical care when the same providers participate in many different health 
plans. See supra text accompanying notes 246–52. More controversially, it might suggest that enabling 
providers and plans to offer multiple economic tiers of care should count for less, from an antitrust 
perspective, than does preservation of most other forms of consumer choice, since medical care is 
widely seen as a merit good—that is, something society distributes (or ought to distribute) based on 
criteria other than ability or willingness to pay. See Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 452 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (setting out a definition 
of “merit good” and including health care as an example). Possible grounds for treating health care as a 
merit good, to be distributed (like education and fire protection) more equitably than most products and 
services, include: (1) the moral belief that all people should have access to high-quality care as a matter 
of right or human dignity and (2) the paternalistic concern that people will undervalue some forms of 
medical coverage and care—for example, preventive services and long-term management of silent but 
eventually devastating illnesses like diabetes and hypertension. 
 310. See supra note 308. 
 311. The medical tort system’s many failings have been widely discussed elsewhere. These 
failings include its lack of sensitivity and specificity as a tool for detecting negligence (studies that 
compared results from medical chart reviews of hospitalizations with the subsequent incidence of 
malpractice suits, settlements, and judgments arising from these hospitalizations have found little 
overlap between episodes of negligence discerned by chart reviewers and lawsuits brought, settled, or 
won), its limited deterrent impact on substandard practitioners, and its failure to compensate the vast 
majority of victims of negligence. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical Malpractice 
System: Structure and Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
11 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). Moreover, malpractice liability costs, combined with 
insurance market dysfunctions, have at times pushed liability insurance premiums high enough to 
measurably reduce patients’ access to physicians in high-risk specialties like obstetrics and 
neurosurgery. OFFICE OF THE ASS’T SECRETARY FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL 
LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 3–6 (2003), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.pdf. But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 5–7 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf (finding insufficient evidence to support claims 
that high malpractice insurance premiums are causing physicians in some specialties to withdraw from 
practice and thus reducing patients’ access to care). 
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benefits outweigh risks and costs.312 Negligence law, to be sure, often looks 
to common practice within an industry as the measure of reasonableness. 
But the justification for doing so is that the market works well as a cost-
benefit313 balancing device—well enough to treat industry custom as the 
standard of care.314 
For medical care, this justification has broken down, if indeed it were 
ever valid.315 It is now widely recognized that physicians know little about 
the efficacy of most tests and treatments,316 that they often do not follow 
evidence-based clinical protocols even when such guidance exists,317 and 
that insurance encourages provision of care with few benefits relative to 
cost.318 Medical custom is thus a poor guide to socially optimal standards 
of care. 
Malpractice law’s reliance on custom locks in extant clinical practice 
norms that are products of these market failures. This does not benefit 
practitioners, since absent evidence-based answers to most clinical 
questions, different doctors treat the same medical problems in different 
ways.319 The result is Russian roulette in the courtroom when things go 
 
 312. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (defining negligence law’s 
standard of conduct as “that of a reasonable man under like circumstances”); id. §§ 291–93 (defining 
reasonableness in terms of the balance between the risk and the utility of an actor’s conduct). But see 
Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1431 (2000) (arguing that negligence law in fact recognizes nonutilitarian concerns such as 
prudence and care); Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249 (1996) 
(arguing that negligence law can be consistent with non-risk-based deontological theories). 
 313. I use “cost” here as shorthand for both risk and cost. 
 314. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued 
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1388–89 (1994) 
(arguing that courts should look to industry custom to determine negligence when networks of 
contractual bargaining suffice to take all affected interests into account). 
 315. It probably never was. Through the mid-twentieth century, most commentators on health care 
law and policy believed that doctors’ scientific knowledge and patient-centered ethics ensured that 
(barring negligence) they would exercise medical judgment to which society, including the legal 
system, should defer. Kenneth Arrow captured this set of assumptions in his oft-cited 1963 article 
contending that physicians promise patient-centeredness to the public in order to win trust—and 
business—in the face of patients’ inability to evaluate the effectiveness of medical care. Arrow 
assumed—with undue optimism, it turned out—that physicians did know how well their tests and 
treatments worked, and that they largely delivered on their promise to abjure economic incentives to act 
contrary to the interests of their patients. Arrow, supra note 85, at 965–66. 
 316. See supra text accompanying notes 230–40. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
 318. Commentators have borrowed the term “moral hazard” from the casualty insurance context 
to convey the impact of insurance on medical spending. I have elsewhere questioned the analogy 
between increased risk taking by people with fire or auto insurance and increased health spending by 
people with medical insurance, Bloche, supra note 11, at 260–66, but it is plain that medical insurance 
promotes overspending on health services, relative to people’s other wants and needs. 
 319. CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCIS., supra note 115, at 2–5. 
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wrong and patients sue. If there are multiple therapeutic options and the 
one chosen turns out badly,320 the plaintiff can find a physician-expert 
witness321 who would have opted for one of the other options. Malpractice 
law lets such testimony in, so long as the witness qualifies based on his or 
her credentials. The law puts testimony about the appropriate standard of 
care to the test of professional acceptance,322 but it does not subject such 
testimony to Daubert-style scrutiny of its scientific foundations.323 And in 
many jurisdictions, malpractice law bars the admission of evidence-based 
practice protocols (by treating them as hearsay324) unless an expert witness 
testifies as to their content. When evidence-based protocols find their way 
into court, they are usually given no more weight than other medical 
testimony,325 however flimsy the science base on which this testimony 
 
 320. If a treatment yields a bad result because it was administered ineptly—say, the proverbial 
sponge left in the surgical patient or an overdose of a dangerous drug—negligence is open-and-shut, not 
a matter of Russian roulette (unless the alleged ineptitude requires a borderline call). Such cases matter 
because it is important to deter ineptitude and to adequately compensate its victims, but they are not my 
focus in the above discussion because their health care policy import is comparatively small. These 
cases involve errors of execution, not larger conflicts over how health care resources should be spent. 
 321. Expert testimony is required in all jurisdictions unless “only common knowledge and 
experience” are required to judge the conduct. See H.H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert 
Evidence to Support an Action for Malpractice Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R. 2d 597, 608 
(1962). 
 322. Legal tests for professional acceptance vary by jurisdiction: formulations in wide use include 
the requirement that a standard of care be upheld by a “consensus of opinion” among physicians, that it 
be adhered to by the “ordinary practitioner,” that it be followed by at least a “respectable minority” of 
physicians, and that it be what a “reasonable and prudent” doctor would undertake under similar 
circumstances. See Jackson v. Burnham, 39 P. 577, 580 (Colo. 1895) (“[W]hen a particular mode of 
treatment is upheld by a consensus of opinion among the members of the profession, it should be 
followed by the ordinary practitioner; and if a physician sees fit to experiment with some other mode, 
he should do so at his peril.”); Boyanton v. Reif, 798 P.2d 603, 604–05 (Okla. 1990) (“The question in 
professional malpractice suits is not whether a physician has made a mistake, but whether he has used 
‘ordinary care’—that which is ordinarily exercised by his peers.”); Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 
969 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the correct standard for avoiding malpractice liability is that the physician 
“followed a course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected 
professionals in his given area of expertise”); Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., P.S., 663 P.2d 113, 
116 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he plaintiff in an action for professional negligence must show that the 
defendant health care provider ‘failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a 
reasonably prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which he belongs.’”); 61 AM. JUR. 
2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 189 (2002); Theresa K. Porter, Cause of Action Against Physician or 
Surgeon for Breach of the Duty of Attention and Care, in 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 1, 9–11 (1990). 
 323. See supra note 146. 
 324. See 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 321 (4th ed. 1992). In a minority of 
jurisdictions, practice protocols are admissible under the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule. 
Albert Tzeel, Clinical Practice Guidelines and Medical Malpractice: Guidelines Gaining Credibility in 
Courtrooms, May Eliminate Expert Testimony, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 36, 37–38. 
 325. See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical 
Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 339–41 (2001) (discussing judicial reluctance 
to give clinical practice protocols greater weight than expert testimony concerning professional 
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rests. 
Thus, doctors who follow these protocols are as vulnerable to the 
liability roulette wheel as are those who adhere to practice norms that lack 
a scientific basis. The opposing side need only produce an expert prepared 
to claim that an alternative therapy is widely employed and would have 
yielded a better outcome. Then jurors get to choose one side (unless the 
judge does so for them326) based on professional acceptance, not scientific 
rigor. The unfortunate consequence for health policy is that early adopters 
of an evidence-based protocol face enhanced liability risk if the protocol 
departs from common practice. Prevailing malpractice doctrine is thus at 
odds with its supposed justification—the utility of medical custom as a 
measure of reasonable care. 
From an emergent systems perspective, there is thus a strong case for 
privileging evidence-based practice protocols over professional custom. 
Opportunism knocks: health care providers have taken an interest in 
practice protocols as a way to ward off lawsuits,327 making providers 
potential supporters of greater legal deference to such protocols. This 
strategy may or may not shield doctors and hospitals from suits,328 but 
provider support for it could leverage reformers’ efforts to incorporate 
science-backed protocols into legal standards of care. 
In the near term, doing so is unlikely to restrain rising costs, except 
insofar as compliance with such protocols averts adverse clinical outcomes 
that are expensive to treat. Today’s practice protocols rarely take cost into 
account, at least explicitly. But if and when practice protocols evolve 
toward greater cost sensitivity, their integration into legal standards of care 
would ease the way toward wide acceptance of clinical cost-benefit trade-
offs—in medical malpractice law and in society more generally. There is 
no guarantee of such acceptance; there could just as well be popular 
backlash against the courts for countenancing rationing. But incorporating 
cost-sensitive, science-based protocols into malpractice doctrine will be 
necessary to keep this body of law from emerging as a formidable obstacle 
 
custom). 
 326. A trial judge can do so, of course, by determining that one or the other side’s expert has 
stated the correct standard of care as a matter of law (that is, no reasonable juror could conclude 
otherwise). 
 327. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 666 (2001). 
 328. Although considerable research has addressed the impact of damage caps, shortened statutes 
of limitations, and other much-debated reforms on the incidence of malpractice suits and the size and 
frequency of settlements and awards, no study has decisively addressed the influence of clinical practice 
protocols on these variables. 
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to the balancing of health care’s therapeutic benefits and economic 
burdens. 
Detailed consideration of how evidence-based, cost-sensitive 
protocols might be incorporated into malpractice law is beyond my scope 
here.329 Three principles, though, should guide efforts to nudge malpractice 
doctrine in this direction—if malpractice law is to abet progress toward 
cost-benefit trade-offs that Americans can tolerate. First, protocols should 
be science based. By this, I do not mean that they should be put to the steep 
tests required by the research community to treat hypotheses as 
established.330 The fractal complexity of clinical outcomes research331 
precludes gathering enough data to rest most medical decisions firmly on 
publishable science. A more realistic requirement is that protocols rest on 
clinical premises accepted by researchers as more probable than not, based 
on the best available data.332 
Second, the cost-benefit (and health-health) trade-offs embedded in a 
protocol should be both explicit and broadly accepted by society. Covert 
rationing is not sustainable. It is inexorably exposed by America’s 
entrepreneurs of revelation—plaintiffs’ lawyers, journalists, congressional 
investigators, and others who reap rewards by minding the gaps between 
what those in authority say and do.333 To win widespread, sustained 
acceptance for cost-benefit trade-offs, authors and adopters of practice 
protocols will need to state their premises about the value of life and 
various states of disability.334 
 
 329. For a review of the possibilities, see Mello, supra note 327. 
 330. Strictly speaking, scientists can never say that their hypotheses are proven by experiments; 
they can only judge that a hypothesis has not been disproven. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY 10 (Routledge 2d ed. 2002) (1935). In practice, though, researchers treat a hypothesis as 
established when a sufficient number and variety of experiments (sufficiency here is a normative 
judgment) yield data consistent with that hypothesis. 
 331. See supra text accompanying notes 237–40. 
 332. Use of a more-probable-than-not standard here reflects the reality that a clinician must 
decide, one way or the other. Since a decision must be made, any guidance with more than a 50 percent 
prospect of being “right” is useful. Judicial assessment of whether the factual premises undergirding a 
protocol are more probable than not will call for inquiry into both the reasoning behind them and the 
extent to which they are accepted by the research community. This is a demanding endeavor, but no 
more so than is the assessment required when courts engage in evidentiary gatekeeping under Daubert. 
Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1094 (2006). 
 333. Bloche, supra note 257, at 946–47. Popular backlash in the late 1990s against covert 
rationing by aggressively managed health plans is illustrative. Id. at 925. 
 334. Government agencies have, on occasion, been forthright about these premises without 
unleashing popular backlash. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) basing of its aviation 
safety rulemaking on dollar values for lives lost and degrees of injury inflicted is illustrative. See GRA 
INC., ECONOMIC VALUES FOR FAA INVESTMENT AND REGULATORY DECISIONS: A GUIDE § 2-2 (2004), 
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Doing so will not guarantee public acceptance. Americans will first 
have to come to terms with the need to say no to some of medicine’s 
benefits—a need most of us are not willing to acknowledge.335 But if and 
when growing cost pressures bring about broad acknowledgment of the 
need to set limits, protocol development processes that engage a wide range 
of participants will stand the best chance of yielding trade-offs that endure. 
Industry-wide collaboration along these lines—involving doctors, 
hospitals, and health plans—is already underway. So far, this collaboration 
has focused on the setting of quality-of-care standards336 without regard for 
cost.337 But, like brain circuits that take on new behavioral tasks as 
evolution progresses, the organizations that oversee this collaboration could 
become venues for the weighing of benefits and costs.338 
Still to develop are mechanisms for incorporating the values and 
preferences of heath care consumers.339 For reasons I set forth earlier, the 
favored mechanism of most market-oriented health law commentators—
consumer choice from among health plans with multiple cost-benefit trade-
off tiers—faces formidable cognitive obstacles and moral objections.340 
These cognitive and moral factors favor maintenance of a single cost-
benefit trade-off tier for liability purposes. This trade-off policy is likely to 
be a fuzzy compromise between two starkly different consumer 
perspectives: that of health plan purchasers who economize from behind a 
“veil of ignorance” concerning their future medical needs,341 and that of 
sick people who want all the beneficial care they can get.342 Arguably, 
 
available at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost/media/050404% 
20Critical%20Values%20Dec%2031%20Report%2007Jan05.pdf. Popular backlash admittedly will be 
more likely if such dollar values are built into clinical practice protocols, since medical care (unlike 
FAA and other health and safety regulation) involves identified lives. 
 335. See supra text accompanying notes 253–61. 
 336. See supra notes 301–03. 
 337. See supra note 302. 
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 303–04. 
 339. Many such mechanisms have been proposed, including public opinion surveys, focus groups, 
presentation of hypothetical decisionmaking scenarios to research subjects, and elegant formulae that 
take account of data derived from these sources. So far, none of these approaches has gained 
institutional purchase, a reality that reflects our national unwillingness to acknowledge cost-benefit and 
health-health trade-offs in medical care. 
 340. See supra note 308. 
 341. This veil, in truth, is translucent, not opaque. Chronic disease, genetic and behavioral risk 
factors, and other health information known to consumers when they purchase medical coverage reduce 
their inclinations to economize on some kinds of care—the care they anticipate needing. 
 342. From an Olympian social welfare perspective, such a fuzzy compromise is unsatisfactory: the 
perspective of the consumer who economizes from behind the medical veil of ignorance is preferable. 
But as a practical matter, the perspective of the sick person in need will always have countervailing 
power: our hard-wired empathy (and the politics of social solidarity) will have a great deal of influence 
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industry-wide collaboration that balances the perspectives of providers and 
health plans can serve as a crude stand-in for formalized consumer input. 
Since health plans profit by paying for less, while doctors and hospitals 
have incentives to do more, their competing interests approximate the 
divergent perspectives of consumers before and after the onset of illness. 
Third, malpractice law should not incorporate practice protocols 
inflexibly as irrebuttable presumptions. Medicine’s irreducible 
variability—the fractal complexity of clinical situations—ensures that even 
protocols with solid research behind them will merit exceptions. Clinical 
outcomes research is necessarily population based, making it inevitable that 
some patients will be outliers. Malpractice law can accommodate this by 
treating protocols as rebuttable presumptions to be overridden upon an 
evidence-based showing that a different approach made sense in a 
particular case.343 
Tort law can make another contribution to health care quality and 
value by incorporating state-of-the-art, systems approaches to the 
management of medical services. This will require moving beyond blame 
for individuals and toward shared duties to disseminate and adopt 
evidence-based protocols, coordinate diagnosis and treatment in complex 
cases, employ information systems that avert mistakes, and report and learn 
from errors.344 For example, a doctor’s failure to prescribe beta blockers or 
aspirin to a heart attack patient upon discharge from the hospital should be 
treated not just as negligence on her part, but as breach of duty by the 
hospital—if the hospital has not made these medications part of its post-
heart-attack protocol and adopted monitoring practices to minimize the risk 
of their omission. And a nurse’s misunderstanding of a doctor’s hard-to-
read handwritten order, resulting in a fatal overdose, should be understood 
not merely as the nurse’s (or the doctor’s) negligence, but as the hospital’s 
breach of its duty to employ reasonably safe information systems. 
Rechanneling medical liability along these lines would help to 
 
on the clinical practice norms adopted by physicians and the law. Cf. Bloche, supra note 11, at 272 
(discussing compromise between patients’ perspectives on health care resource allocation before and 
after the onset of illness). 
 343. By “evidence-based” here, I do not mean scientific proof that measures up to Daubert 
standards of admissibility (an unrealistically high prerequisite, since comparative-effectiveness research 
cannot anticipate and keep pace with every potential exception to established protocols). A more 
pragmatic approach would be to require evidence sufficient to show that a prudent physician would, 
more probably than not, have departed from the protocol under the circumstances. Sharpening this test 
is a task beyond the scope of this Article. Doing so will be complicated by the tension between 
aspirations to make medical care more science based and more responsive to individual differences. 
 344. See supra text accompanying notes 114, 273–74. 
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promote the emergence of a better-coordinated, more efficient health care 
system.345 Some have urged enterprise liability as a means of improving 
health care quality.346 Were our medical system more vertically integrated, 
the case for this approach would be powerful.347 But our fragmented 
system presents high barriers to the transmission of enterprise liability’s 
deterrence signals from defendants (health plans or hospitals) to individual 
caregivers.348 And since malpractice settlements and judgments constitute 
less than 1 percent of U.S. health care spending,349 enterprise liability’s 
incentives would not suffice to bring about the vertical integration of 
American health care.350 More realistic—and more doctrinally modest, and 
thus more suitable for judges to do—would be to extend traditional joint 
 
 345. There are numerous open questions within the interstices of this proposition. These include 
whether health plans (which typically contract with many hospitals and physicians but do not exercise 
managerial control over them) should share in such liability, whether hospitals should ever share 
responsibility for their staff physicians’ negligent treatment of outpatients (courts have thus far said no), 
and how liability should be distributed among clinical caregivers and institutions (especially hospitals) 
with system-wide responsibility. Developing rich responses to these questions is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 346. E.g., PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 114 (1991). 
 347. Organizations that integrate health care financing, physician services, and hospital care 
would be best situated (and most motivated) to adopt systems approaches to patient safety and medical 
care quality in response to enterprise liability. For an early, comprehensive argument on behalf of 
enterprise liability for medical malpractice, see Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise 
Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 415–
20 (1994) (preferring hospitals to health insurers as objects of enterprise liability). 
 348. In theory (from a Coasean perspective), the degree of fragmentation should make no 
difference: industry actors should bargain toward allocations of liability to the lowest-cost risk avoiders, 
regardless of starting point (or default) liability rules. In practice, this classic story breaks down in the 
health care industry for many reasons. These include the transaction costs involved in such bargaining 
(among vast numbers of actors), the difficulty of pinpointing lowest-cost risk avoiders when risk is the 
product of collective efforts by independent industry actors (for example, multiple specialists in 
separate practices who treat the same patient), and cultural factors (for example, doctors’ reluctance to 
forgo professional autonomy by acceding to hospitals’ or health plans’ supervisory authority in 
exchange for avoidance of the threat of liability). 
Thus the choice of default liability rules matters greatly in health care. And in our fragmented 
system, hospitals and health plans generally lack the supervisory authority or bargaining leverage 
necessary to respond to enterprise liability’s incentives by obliging physicians to adopt state-of-the-art 
systems approaches to medical care. See supra text accompanying notes 264–73. 
 349. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the 
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 910 (2005) (“The cost of defending U.S. malpractice 
claims, including awards, legal costs, and underwriting costs, was an estimated $6.5 billion in 2001—
0.46 percent of total health spending.”). 
 350. Moreover, as a practical matter, doctors, hospitals, and health plans strongly oppose 
enterprise liability. Doctors equate giving up the “right to be sued,” as one put it, with surrendering their 
authority and autonomy to insurance or hospital bureaucrats, while hospitals and health plans fear that 
jurors will see them as “deep pocket[s].” Randall R. Bovbjerg & Robert Berenson, Enterprise Liability 
in the Twenty-First Century, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra 
note 311, at 219, 230–31. 
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and several liability to encompass a duty to adopt proven systems 
approaches to improvement of quality and avoidance of error.351 The 
provider’s personal fault would remain part of the picture, but the failure of 
health care organizations to adopt information systems, management 
strategies, and other quality improvement methods that might have averted 
error352 would subject them to liability. This would complicate litigation 
and settlement to some degree, but mounting evidence of the risk 
avoidance achievable through state-of-the-art systems approaches353 
weighs in favor of accepting this cost.354 
iii.  Health Insurance Contracts and “Medical Necessity” 
The law governing disputes over medical coverage is more 
consequence than cause of American society’s reluctance to accept limits 
on beneficial care.355 Nearly all health insurance contracts employ the term 
medical necessity as their standard for coverage, and Americans continue 
to see this term as a promise to pay for care whenever its expected benefits 
outweigh the clinical risks.356 Courts no longer defer blindly to treating-
 
 351. The legal foundations for such a duty are already in place. Since the mid-1960s, courts have 
held that hospitals have duties to take reasonable care in reviewing the credentials of staff physicians 
(including those who are independent contractors rather than employees) and monitoring doctors’ and 
nurses’ ongoing performance. Lee J. Dunn, Jr., Hospital Corporate Liability: The Trend Continues, 
MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, Oct. 1980, at 16, 16. Updating this duty to encompass adoption of systems 
approaches to quality improvement would be a small doctrinal step. 
 352. Organizations subject to this duty would include health plans, hospitals, group medical 
practices, and all others in position to reduce the risk of error by adopting systems approaches. 
 353. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., supra note 4, at 61–62. 
 354. Any such extension of institutional liability should be accompanied by empirical study of 
both its costs and its impact on the incidence of error. 
 355. Some advocates of minimally regulated medical markets assert otherwise, contending that 
courts’ lack of deference to insurers’ coverage denials is a large obstacle to health care cost 
containment. See, e.g., HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 115. They are right about judges’ lack of 
deference, but in my view, judges’ attitudes toward nay-saying by health plans reflect our society’s 
unwillingness to tolerate the withholding of beneficial care. See supra note 308. 
 356. To be sure, health insurance contracts also contain a wide array of specific exclusions and 
limitations; for example, no coverage for cosmetic surgical procedures and limited numbers of 
psychotherapy sessions per year. Legal disputes over these exclusions and limitations are much less 
common than are disputes over “medical necessity.” One type of exclusion, though, does occasion 
considerable conflict—noncoverage for “investigational” or “experimental” treatments. See, e.g., 
Elsroth v. Consol. Edison Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 427, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying the insured’s motion 
for a preliminary injuction requiring the defendant-insurer to precertify high-dose chemotherapy 
treatment because it was deemed experimental); Watts v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 892 F. Supp. 737, 
746 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (denying the insured’s motion for a temporary restraining order and/or 
preliminary injunction preventing the insurer from declining to cover autologous bone-marrow 
transplant with high-dose chemotherapy (“ABMT-HDC”) because the treatment was experimental); 
Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc. 815 F. Supp. 571, 578 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(granting the insured a preliminary injunction and ordering the insurer to provide coverage of ABMT-
HDC); Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Civ. A. No. 90-597, 1990 WL 312647 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) 
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doctors’ determinations of medical need,357 but the law still looks to 
professional norms to give content to this formless term. In forty states, 
independent medical review schemes rely on physician panels to rule on 
medical necessity, based on professional practice.358 Extant clinical 
practice is likewise the touchstone when courts confront medical necessity 
disputes, whether as breach-of-contract or tort claims.359 As the 1990s 
backlash against managed care underscores, Americans are not ready to 
recognize medical necessity as warrant for withholding care, so long as 
expected benefits outweigh clinical risks. But the law governing coverage 
disputes could support the emergence of cost-sensitive, evidence-based 
clinical protocols by permitting insurers to adopt them in lieu of traditional 
medical-necessity clauses. A cautious approach is in order: courts should 
not accede to contractual departures from long-standing consumer 
expectations360 absent clear explanation of the terms of coverage.361 
Contract language allowing health plans to weigh therapeutic benefits 
against costs should explain trade-off principles in plain language.362 
 
(enjoining a defendant medical insurer from denying coverage for ABMT-HDC). 
 357. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra 99–101, 121 and accompanying text. 
 359. These disputes present as breach-of-contract cases when patients (or providers) sue insurers 
to obtain payment after care has been provided or to secure preauthorization of payment in order to 
proceed with treatment. They present as tort cases when refusal to preauthorize care has led to denial of 
care, resulting (allegedly) in injury. ERISA preempts these state law claims when employers provide 
coverage. But patients with employment-based coverage can obtain payment for care under ERISA 
after prevailing in state-level independent medical review proceedings. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002). 
 360. This deference to long-standing expectations reflects: (1) appreciation of the fact that people 
buy medical coverage (and other kinds of insurance) in large part for the sense of security that it offers 
and (2) acknowledgment that most insurance subscribers have no role in the drafting or negotiation of 
the specific provisions of insurance policies. This accords with insurance law’s special regard for “the 
reasonable expectations of the insured.” See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and 
Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 
(1981) (discussing the justifications for the “expectations principle”). 
 361. Clarity about health plan terms that depart from consumer expectations requires more than 
the use of language readily accessible to the average person: plan marketing procedures should ensure 
that such terms are communicated to potential subscribers in vivid, high-visibility fashion. Coverage 
exclusions, in particular, should be conveyed in concrete language, perhaps accompanied by examples 
of tests and treatments covered or excluded under common circumstances. Bloche, supra note 11, at 
316. 
 362. Id. The FAA’s explicit valuation of life—and of several levels of injury and disability—in 
dollar terms, GRA INC., supra note 334, offers one model for such clarity. As with other limits on 
medical coverage that depart from consumer expectations, see supra note 361, such valuations—and 
how they are to be incorporated into clinical protocols—should be presented clearly, in vivid, high-
visibility fashion, in health plan marketing materials, not merely in the “small print” of insurance 
contracts. 
Health plans should also be clear in their contracts about how the protocols they adopt treat 
scientific uncertainty concerning the efficacy of tests and treatments. Do they, for example, rely on best 
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Clinical protocols need not be written into the contract; it should suffice to 
incorporate them by reference.363 But the cost-benefit trade-offs that 
underlie each protocol should somewhere be made explicit,364 and they 
should be consistent with the trade-off principles set out in the contract. 
One might imagine hybrid contracts, containing traditional medical-
necessity clauses modified by language incorporating some evidence-based 
protocols—for example, all protocols adopted by one or another of the 
industry-wide collaborations I discussed earlier.365 Given the 
incompleteness of the science base for medical practice, total replacement 
of medical necessity (and thus, deference to customary practice) by clinical 
protocols is impracticable, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 
Insurers might or might not offer these cost-sensitive contractual 
formulations, and consumers might or might not accept them in exchange 
for lower premiums. But if such plans emerge, the law should enable them, 
rather than stifling them by subjecting coverage denials to review based on 
customary practice when denials rest on evidence-based, cost-sensitive 
protocols. 
c.  Expectations, Incentives, and the Evolution of Medical Technology 
The above-discussed adjustments to current law have large potential to 
speed the development of cost-sensitive clinical practice if and when 
Americans accept the need to limit beneficial care for the common good. 
But so long as society rejects such limits, law cannot impose them. Health 
plans will not set them, and providers will not abide by them.366 Still, there 
are measures that government can take to slow the escalation of 
 
estimates of efficacy by protocol drafters (including leading researchers in a specialty), or do they reject 
tests and treatments outright when these have not yet been shown scientifically to work? If plans take 
the latter, more aggressive course, they should advise consumers in plain language that many therapies 
in wide use lack scientific proof of efficacy and thus will not be covered. Bloche, supra note 11, at 316. 
An in-between course that plans could take is to cover widely used clinical measures based on best 
estimates of efficacy by protocol drafters, but to insist on scientific evidence of efficacy for new clinical 
interventions. 
 363. To require that they be set out in full in health insurance contracts could turn these contracts 
into multivolume medical treatises—hardly a way to make them understandable to subscribers. 
 364. It should suffice for protocol developers to state the cost-benefit trade-off rules on which 
protocols rely. The industry-wide protocol development collaborations now getting underway, see 
supra notes 301, 303, offer an opportunity in this regard: each collaboration could adopt a common 
cost-benefit trade-off standard for the protocols it adopts. This would enable health plans to adopt 
packages of protocols that rest on compatible trade-offs—trade-offs that are also consistent with the 
resource allocation principles articulated in plans’ contracts with subscribers. 
 365. See supra notes 301, 303. 
 366. Market forces will drive health plans and providers to eschew such limits, as the late 1990s 
backlash against managed-care organizations’ rationing methods illustrates. See supra text 
accompanying notes 227–29. 
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technology-intensive medical spending. Attentiveness to emergent 
possibilities suggests an evolutionary strategy anchored in people’s 
different expectations about treatments that are technically feasible now 
and those that might arise as medicine advances. Put simply, most of us 
bristle at the prospect of being denied the benefits of today’s health care on 
account of cost, but we are not made livid by our lack of access to the 
technologies of the future.367 We hope for cures to diseases that terrify us, 
and some of us feel rage or despair over the blind cruelty of illnesses that 
wreck the lives of loved ones or end them prematurely. Yet we do not rail 
against health plans, providers, and public officials because they do not 
deliver, say, the magically effective care Dr. McCoy gives his Star Trek 
shipmates. 
This expectations gap constitutes a cost-control opportunity that does 
not depend on widespread willingness to ration contemporary medicine’s 
benefits. By reining in the development of ever more expensive 
technologies, we can restrain future spending growth without saying no 
now to beneficial care for identified patients. An obvious worry about this 
strategy is the risk of retarding clinical breakthroughs—advances that yield 
high value, relative to cost, and that are thus worth paying for.368 But there 
is a fortuitous answer to this problem. Major breakthroughs tend to result 
from leaps in biological understanding of disease—advances in 
biochemistry and physiology that open the way for elegant, decisive 
interventions. Penicillin, which destroys bacterial cell walls, is perhaps the 
best-known example. A more recent illustration is the revolution in our 
understanding of lipid metabolism,369 which opened the way for 
development of the statin drugs that tens of millions of Americans take to 
slow the growth of artery-clogging atherosclerotic plaque.370 Therapies that 
target mechanisms of disease in such elegant fashion tend to be relatively 
inexpensive to provide, once the basic science that supports them has been 
 
 367. Put differently, our anchoring heuristic for the health care we expect is the medical 
technology currently available. People alive at the dawn of the twentieth century did not take umbrage 
at the unavailability of antibiotics (which did not appear until the 1930s). Similarly, we do not bristle 
today because the gene therapies of the future are not yet on pharmacists’ shelves. 
 368. See generally CUTLER, supra note 65 (reviewing health services research that has identified 
tests and treatments worth paying for). 
 369. See Nicole Kresge, Robert D. Simoni & Robert L. Hill, 30 Years of Cholesterol Metabolism: 
The Work of Michael Brown and Joseph Goldstein, 281 J. BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY e25 (2006). 
 370. The statin medications work by inhibiting an enzyme that catalyzes one of the steps in 
cholesterol synthesis. This reduces the level of low-density lipoproteins (so-called bad cholesterol) in 
the blood, which, in turn, slows, stops, and under some conditions reverses the formation of 
atherosclerotic plaque. Dominic S. Ng, The Role of Statins in Oxidative Stress and Cardiovascular 
Disease, 5 CARDIOVASCULAR & HAEMATOLOGICAL DISORDERS—DRUG TARGETS 165 (2005). 
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paid for. 
By contrast, our most costly treatments—those that Lewis Thomas 
famously termed “half way technologies”371—tend to rest on comparatively 
crude understandings of the biology of disease. They are, paradoxically, 
marvels of engineering, electronics, and materials science, and of modest, 
often minimal medical benefit.372 Examples include drug-coated stents 
designed to keep atherosclerotic arteries open,373 high-technology life 
support,374 and last-ditch radiation and chemotherapy regimens meant 
mainly to sustain hope. Such treatments account for much of the 
outpouring of medical spending that occurs in the last months of life, in 
surgical suites, intensive care units, and elsewhere. They are expensive 
because they are both technology intensive and clinically indecisive. They 
employ costly, complex equipment and highly trained, well-paid personnel. 
And their inability, in most cases, to make more than a modest therapeutic 
difference leads, perversely, to their intensive and sustained (rather than 
one-shot) use. In medicine, as in warfare, decisive victory is cheaper than 
drawn-out struggle. 
A rational incentive scheme for therapeutic advance would reserve the 
greatest rewards for those technologies most likely to add clinical value. 
But the American health care system rewards the adoption of new 
technologies with little regard for value. Physician time spent performing 
invasive, technology-intensive procedures is much better compensated than 
is time spent counseling patients, consulting medical journals, or ordering 
and overseeing minimally invasive measures.375 Doctors thus have 
 
 371. LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 34 (1974). 
 372. When I characterize their benefits as modest, I mean modest in the aggregate, relative to cost. 
Such technologies do, in some cases, add years to people’s lives and diminish suffering and disability. 
Examples include angioplasty during the first twelve hours after a heart attack, Albert Schömig et al., 
Mechanical Reperfusion in Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction Presenting More than 12 Hours 
from Symptom Onset, 293 JAMA 2865, 2869–71 (2005) (finding that angioplasty within twelve to 
forty-eight hours from symptom onset can positively affect long-term outcomes), and replacement of 
severely arthritic hips and knees with artificial joints, NIH Consensus Dev. Panel on Total Hip 
Replacement, Total Hip Replacement, 273 JAMA 1950, 1950 (1995) (“Total hip replacement is an 
option for nearly all patients with diseases of the hip that cause chronic discomfort and significant 
functional impairment. Most patients have an excellent prognosis for long-term improvement in 
symptoms and physical function.”). 
 373. See William H. Maisel, Unanswered Questions—Drug-Eluting Stents and the Risk of Late 
Thrombosis, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981 (2007). 
 374. This can include computer-controlled ventilators and cardiac-assist devices, electronic 
monitoring of intracardiac pressures as well as peripheral blood pressure and heart rate, total parenteral 
nutrition (intravenous feeding), and pressor support for patients unable to sustain viable blood pressure. 
 375. William C. Hsaio et al., Results and Policy Implications of the Resource-Based Relative-
Value Study, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 881 (1988) (finding that despite the fact that both consume the 
same resource inputs, invasive procedures tend to be compensated at more than double the rate of 
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powerful incentives to adopt new halfway technologies,376 and, in turn, 
biotechnology firms (and investors) have strong incentives to develop 
them. By contrast, clinical advances that build on biological breakthroughs 
to treat disease in decisive fashion typically yield fewer financial rewards 
for doctors, since these therapies tend to be less invasive and technology 
intensive.377 This reward scheme is a recipe for rapid growth of spending 
on those technologies that are least likely to yield high clinical benefits 
relative to cost. 
To the extent possible, given market and political constraints, the 
compensation gap between physician time spent performing technology-
intensive procedures and talking with patients (or providing noninvasive 
care) should be closed. Market pressures rule out an immediate push by 
private insurers in this direction, since large cuts in a health plan’s 
payments for such procedures are likely to prompt specialists to drop out of 
that plan.378 But Medicare’s large market share—it accounts for almost 
one-fourth of physician payment379—positions it to lead by initiating such 
reductions. Medicare should go as far as is politically feasible toward 
closing the chasm between payment for high-tech procedures and other 
uses of physician time. As evidence accrues concerning the comparative 
effectiveness of clinical approaches,380 Medicare should adjust its 
valuations of physician time accordingly. 
Stakeholder opposition, mainly from medical specialists,381 will limit 
Medicare’s ability to do these things.382 Yet any progress that Medicare can 
 
evaluation-and-management services). 
 376. Hospitals can also profit handsomely from these technologies, which due to economies of 
scale and close proximity of complementary inpatient services, are often hospital based. But doctors’ 
incentives have a much greater influence on their rate of adoption, since doctors are the key 
decisionmakers. 
 377. An example is the prescription of statins—based on advances in our understanding of 
cholesterol metabolism, see supra note 370—to treat or prevent buildup of atherosclerotic plaque in 
blood vessels. Pharmaceutical firms, of course, can benefit greatly from the sale of drugs, so long as 
they remain patent protected, but they cannot ethically or legally share these revenue streams with 
prescribing doctors. The cardiologist who evaluates a patient, then prescribes a statin along with, 
perhaps, a few other medications might be able to bill a few or several hundred dollars. The cardiologist 
who spends the same time performing an angioplasty with placement of a stent might be able to collect 
a few or several thousand dollars. 
 378. In most regions, individual health plans lack sufficient market share to impose such cutbacks 
without losing large numbers of specialists and thereby diminishing their ability to compete. Antitrust 
law, of course, keeps plans from colluding to dictate such cuts. 
 379. See supra note 297. 
 380. See supra text accompanying notes 279–86. 
 381. Firms that develop and manufacture halfway technologies are likely to join in this opposition. 
 382. New legislation—sure to be resisted by specialty societies—would be necessary to empower 
CMS, the federal agency that runs Medicare, to do so. CMS is currently required by statute to set fees 
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make on these fronts would nudge the future trajectory of health spending 
downward, especially if (as has happened with past Medicare payment 
reforms) private health plans follow Medicare’s lead. Such progress would 
diminish doctors’ incentives to adopt new halfway technologies and thus 
reduce investment in efforts to develop them. This, in turn, would slow 
their introduction into clinical practice, moderating their contribution to 
rising costs. Unidentified future patients would forgo some therapeutic 
benefits—probably low, in the aggregate, relative to the costs saved. But 
popular objections to denial of beneficial care would not come into play, 
since the tests and treatments “withheld” would not be available to anyone 
in the here-and-now. 
This approach can be applied more generally, in ways that 
differentiate between technologies that are more and less likely to add high 
value relative to their costs. Pharmaceutical and medical device firms could 
be rewarded for new products with intellectual property protection for 
varying periods, based on how much a product improves therapeutic 
outcomes. This might nudge research and development decisions, over 
time, toward larger therapeutic advances by reducing these firms’ 
opportunities to reap windfalls from exclusive marketing of modest 
improvements. Alternatively, government could reward firms directly for 
medical innovation (through prizes or other payments) while requiring all 
such innovations to pass into the public domain.383 Such rewards could be 
tied to favorable comparative-efficacy research results, or to sales levels,384 
if evidence-based clinical practice protocols come to play a large role in the 
adoption of medical innovations. 
Potentially intractable complications cast doubt on the viability of 
these ideas. Settling on metrics of therapeutic improvement would prove 
 
based on the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (“RBRVS”) methodology, a species of cost-of-
service rate making. RBRVS incorporates physician effort and training costs but disregards therapeutic 
value. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a) (2000). RBRVS, enacted in 1989, was itself an improvement over the 
physician payment methodology enacted upon Medicare’s creation in 1965—the “reasonable-charge” 
formula (which set payments to doctors based on the physician-charge schedules prevailing in a region, 
thereby inviting doctors to raise their fees as quickly as the market would bear). See Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat. 2106, 2169. RBRVS achieved 
modest reductions in some specialists’ fees (10 to 20 percent in some cases) and correspondingly 
modest increases in primary care physicians’ fees. John K. Iglehart, Medicare’s Declining Payments to 
Physicians, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1924, 1925–26 (2002). 
 383. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 525, 525–26 (2001) (arguing that giving innovators a choice between intellectual property 
rights and a reward system under which innovations would immediately enter the public domain is 
superior to merely conferring intellectual property rights). 
 384. Id. at 526. 
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difficult at both the statutory and administrative law levels. Political and 
legal conflict between stakeholders over the selection of benchmarks385 
could paralyze implementation of any sliding scale reward scheme. And 
firms that benefit from full-fledged intellectual property protection for 
halfway technologies are likely to oppose enactment of any sliding scale 
scheme. I raise these ideas not because I am sure they would work,386 but 
because they suggest the broader potential of an evolutionary strategy—one 
that slows spending growth without awakening Americans’ passionate 
objections to the withholding of beneficial care. 
This strategy seizes the opportunity presented by people’s different 
expectations concerning access to the beneficial care that is technically 
possible today and that might become feasible in the future. The strategy is 
emergence oriented in two ways: it exploits an opening for comparatively 
modest change in current law, and it anticipates industry actors’ adaptations 
to changed incentives (and to others’ adaptations). It finesses a premise 
embedded in our culture and politics—the notion that doctors should 
provide care, whatever the cost, whenever expected benefits outweigh 
risks—by slowing the development of high-cost technologies. By itself, 
however, this finesse could not suffice to keep health care from absorbing 
an ever-rising share of our national wealth. So long as we continue to reject 
clinical limit setting on account of cost, therapies of great technical 
virtuosity and modest benefit will proliferate at the ragged edges387 of 
biological understanding, pushing medical spending upward. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The American way of paying for and providing health care cannot 
 
 385. The possibilities for conflict are much enhanced by the subjectivity inherent in selection of 
medical outcome measures. As is the case for selection of outcome measures by comparative-effective 
researchers, see supra text accompanying notes 235–36, and adoption of quality-of-care benchmarks for 
the purpose of comparing provider performance, see supra text accompanying notes 300–02, different 
personal preferences and values are best captured by different measures. There will thus always be 
room to object to designated metrics of therapeutic advance on the ground that they privilege some 
patients’ concerns while giving short shrift to those of others. 
 386. They merit further exploration by scholars of intellectual property who are familiar with the 
dynamics of technological change in health care. That exploration is beyond the scope of this Article, as 
is consideration of whether likely opposition from drug and device makers renders these ideas 
politically implausible. 
 387. The term “ragged edges” is Daniel Callahan’s, meant to capture the truth that however far 
our biological understandings of disease advance, and however quickly we devise effective therapies 
based on these understandings, there will always be a frontier zone of biological ignorance and 
minimally effective tests and treatments. DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF 
MEDICAL PROGRESS 63–65 (1990). 
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long survive. Since the early 1990s, a million people per year have lost or 
foregone medical coverage, a figure that masks countless stories of 
anguish—of loved ones dying too soon, life savings lost, and needless 
suffering and disability. Health spending, meanwhile, has become the fiscal 
equivalent of global warming. Current rates of increase are unsustainable 
without federal deficits or tax increases of astonishing size.388 American 
enterprise faces a parallel threat from the soaring cost of employee 
coverage. 
Can law help to divert our country from this path? I have argued here 
that the law has enormous potential to do so, but that this potential remains 
unfulfilled. To take advantage of the possibilities, we must begin to treat 
health law as more than a jumble of diverse doctrinal parts. Legal schemes 
that are well designed for some purposes often work poorly in concert, 
yielding chaos instead of coherent governance in the health sphere. On the 
other hand, no single, unifying paradigm can capture all that we expect 
from the legal governance of health care provision. Like medicine itself, 
health law pursues diverse and conflicting aims. Organizing the governance 
of medicine around any one theory is bound to neglect some of these aims. 
Theory, nevertheless, is indispensable. Too often, health lawyers disregard 
the big picture, urging answers to discrete questions without heeding the 
connections between moving parts. Coherence matters, even if it can never 
be complete, owing to health law’s competing goals. 
With an eye toward coherence, where possible, and toward 
opportunities to turn health care policy away from its current path toward 
ruin, this Article offers a new conception of health law. My core 
proposition is that health law’s disconnected doctrinal spheres and myriad 
decisionmakers are usefully understood as an emergent system. The same 
is the case for the American way of medical care financing and provision. 
This understanding comes to terms with health law’s contradictions, 
confusion, and resistance to wholesale change. It also explains our health 
care system’s multiple dysfunctions as regards access, cost, and value. 
These contradictions and dysfunctions are not the fault of some failed 
master designer. No one actor has a grand overview or the power to impose 
a unifying vision. Countless market actors, public planners, and legal and 
regulatory decisionmakers interact in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with, 
reinforcing, and adjusting to each other. Out of these interactions, a larger 
regulatory system emerges—one that incorporates the health sphere’s 
competing interests and values. Change in this system, for worse and for 
 
 388. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. 
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better, arises from the interplay between its myriad actors. 
By quitting the quest for a single, master design, we can better focus 
our efforts on real-world possibilities for legal and policy change. We can 
and should continuously survey the landscape of stakeholders and 
expectations with an eye toward potential launching points for evolutionary 
processes—processes that leverage current institutions and incentives. 
What we cannot do is to plan or predict these evolutionary pathways in 
precise detail—the complexity of interactions among market and 
government actors precludes fine-grained foresight of this sort. But we can 
determine the general direction of needed change, identify seemingly 
intractable obstacles, and envision ways to diminish or finesse them over 
time. Dysfunctional legal doctrines, interest group expectations, 
consumers’ anxieties, and embedded institutional and cultural barriers can 
all be dealt with in this way, in iterative fashion. 
In this Article, I have set out a strategy for doing so. To illustrate this 
strategy, I have proposed a package of approaches to the most urgent 
questions we face in health care policy and law. I have urged approaches to 
universal coverage that build on possibilities immanent in existing legal 
and institutional arrangements, draw energy from cultural currents (for 
example, rising emphasis on personal responsibility), and minimize 
disruption of settled expectations. And I have counseled cost-control 
stratagems that work around obstacles to scientific assessment of tests and 
treatments, resistance from purveyors of profitable care, and the popular 
belief that we are entitled to all beneficial care, regardless of cost. The 
indirectness and incompleteness of these approaches is bound to dismay 
scholars and activists who prefer one or another elegant, sweeping solution 
to our crises of health care access, cost, and value. But we are not about to 
adopt any single, all-encompassing answer. The clashing values and 
perspectives of the health sphere’s disconnected legal and regulatory 
decisionmakers make doing so impossible. 
There are early signs that reform strategies sensitive to emergent 
possibilities are catching on. Pending state-level reform plans, as well as 
proposals developed during the last presidential campaign, are open ended 
in their approaches to the health system’s future design. In contrast to 
President Clinton’s failed plan, which scripted the workings of the system 
it envisioned in great detail, this new generation of reform ideas leaves 
central questions unresolved. The principal Democratic presidential 
candidates’ plans built on employment-based coverage but opened the way 
to multiple evolutionary possibilities; these ranged from purchase of private 
insurance by individuals to single-payer coverage. Republican proposals 
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foreclosed the single-payer option but, like Democrats’, deferred to markets 
to decide between employment-based and individually acquired insurance. 
Both Democrats and Republicans also left space for states to seize the 
initiative by enacting their own reform schemes. 
The emergent systems perspective makes sense of the seeming chaos 
that besets American health law and policy. It invites health reformers to 
develop pragmatic agendas for change by looking for evolutionary 
possibilities immanent in current law, institutions, politics, and culture. I 
have pointed to some of these possibilities and proposed legal and policy 
changes to exploit them. It is my hope that this Article will inspire other 
efforts to do so. Health law’s fragmentation and incoherence are large 
obstacles to urgently needed change. But they reflect the ongoing collision 
of values and interests that shape the health sphere’s legal governance. 
Whether we can avert health care’s threat to our nation’s solvency while 
extending twenty-first century medicine’s benefits equitably, to all, will 
turn on our ability to seize the opportunities this collision engenders. 
The potential of emergent systems thinking as a way to understand 
fragmented schemes of legal governance is relevant beyond the health 
realm. Increasingly, governance problems—within and beyond America’s 
borders—cut across many areas of legal and regulatory authority. 
Disconnected decisionmakers in both the public and private domains shape 
policy concerning cyberspace, capital flows, and the built and natural 
environment. Prescriptions for new, hierarchical institutions to meet policy 
challenges in these areas are, more often than not, political nonstarters. 
They threaten powerful interests, and they infringe on fiercely guarded 
realms of authority. Proliferation of hierarchical mechanisms, moreover, 
would create new coordination problems, since inevitably, large issues will 
arise that cut across their domains. Efforts to understand fragmented 
governance in terms of self-organizing networks of decisionmakers have 
potential to guide law and policy in diverse fields. Adept use of emergent 
strategies to cope with our worsening crises of health care access and cost 
could become a model for the governance of other endeavors that sprawl 
across doctrinal and jurisdictional realms. 
 
